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This dissertation defines and defends the concept of ‘criminal oppression.’ Criminal 
oppression occurs when people are excluded from full participation in important social and 
political institutions because they are perceived to have violated certain community norms. 
Oppression is primarily a structural phenomenon, in which practices of formal and informal 
institutions unjustly harm people based on group membership. In structural oppression, there is 
rarely an individual who can be said to be responsible for the oppression, but I argue that at 
times, individuals may also be agents of oppression when they create, perpetuate, or exacerbate 
structural oppression. Applying this theory of oppression, the criminal justice system in the 
United States is an oppressive structure that unjustly harms those considered to be ‘criminals’ 
through a variety of practices. There are three categories of unjust practices: policing, 
adjudication and punishment, and collateral effects of arrest and conviction.  
 These three categories of practices create the social group ‘criminals’ by subjecting 
certain people to these kinds of treatments. I use the word ‘criminal’ to describe those who are 
treated as criminals by police, the courts, and even private individuals like employers. To be a 
‘criminal,’ it is not necessary that one has committed a crime or been convicted of a crime. 
Racial and criminal oppression deeply related historically and conceptually. Nevertheless, they 




‘criminals’ face many of the same unjust obstacles as those who are racially oppressed in 
addition to being ‘criminals.’  
Some may argue that ‘criminals’ duly convicted of crimes deserve to be socially and 
politically excluded. But, I argue that the criminal justice system is not properly conceived of as 
an apolitical institution that can assess moral blameworthiness. Nor should it be able to offer 
punishments that amount to social and political exclusion. Instead, the criminal justice system is 
one political institution amongst many, and it ought to be governed by the same principles of 
liberty and equality that govern other political institutions. Criminal law’s proper function is to 
facilitate government as a system social cooperation. Therefore, it ought to respond to criminal 
acts with actions designed to promote inclusion rather than exclusion. Moreover, even if 
someone has committed a crime, that does not mean that they ought to be subject to violence or 
permanent second-class status.  
Finally, I address specific, feminism-driven arguments for using the criminal justice 
system to fight violence against women. Some feminists argue that the expressivist function of 
punishment—the ability of punishment to express disapproval and disavowal—makes it a perfect 
tool for fighting the normalization of violence against women. The problem, they contend, is that 
this violence is under-punished in the United States, and the solution to ending violence against 
women is to increase prosecutions and advocate for harsher punishments because punishment 
will change the social norms and make violence against women rarer. To this, I argue that those 
who create laws or mete out punishments do not have control over the social meaning of 
punishment with precision. The historical and present-day oppressive features of criminal law 
and punishment interfere with the ability of prosecution and punishment to condemn certain 




system to fight gender-based violence will find it to be ineffective and potentially harmful to the 
already oppressed group of ‘criminals.” 
Chapter 1argues that ‘criminals’ are oppressed using a structural model of oppression that 
focuses on how collections of institutional policies and practices can create and maintain unjust 
power relations between groups of people.  I will also use an externalist theory of group identity 
to argue that being arrested or convicted of a crime is not necessary or sufficient for membership 
in the social group ‘criminal.’ Chapter 2 explains the relationship between racial oppression and 
the oppression of ‘criminals,’ noting the historical development of the modern prison system. 
Chapter 3 argues that the proper role of criminal law is to support systems of social cooperation, 
not to punish pre-political wrongs. I will suggest that criminal law is in essence part of the social 
contract, not a separate sphere of justice to which distinctive, retributive principles apply. 
Instead, the criminal law cannot determine moral blameworthiness and is only justified in 
sanctioning rule violations for the sake of supporting social cooperation in a society whose 
institutions are worth supporting. In Chapter 4, I propose a feminist, expressivist defense of the 
use of prosecution and harsh punishment as a response to rape and domestic violence that takes 
the structural nature of violence against women into account. Chapter 5, however, demonstrates 
why even this theory cannot justify incarceration in the non-ideal sphere because of the 
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In this dissertation, I defend the claim that ‘criminals’ are an oppressed class of people. 
When I say ‘criminals,’ I am referring to those who occupy a particular social location, and they 
may or may not have actually committed crimes or have been convicted of crimes. The reason 
for this unnatural use of language is to draw attention to a collection of social and institutional 
practices that are held together by a common theme: some people do not belong in our social and 
political community because they are morally unfit to be members. But membership in the 
political community is the basis of securing equal treatment and protection from violence as well 
as a whole host of other social goods. To be kept out of the community is deeply harmful and 
leaves one vulnerable to all kinds of violence and disregard.  
It should be absolutely clear today that this category is intimately tied up with race in the 
United States. Black people in the United States are most especially subject to being treated as 
‘criminals.’ I could cite endless examples of this fact, and unfortunately less than one week ago, 
George Floyd was killed by a police officer for allegedly passing a counterfeit twenty-dollar bill. 
On March 13, Breonna Taylor was killed when police indiscriminately opened fire while serving 
a no knock warrant on her boyfriend’s apartment. The person the police had the warrant for did 
not actually live there.  And Tony McDade, a black trans man, was killed by police in 
Tallahassee Florida on May 27. 
I argue that criminal oppression is not simply a type of anti-black racism, however. I 
analyze it as its own distinct form of oppression for several reasons. First, criminal oppression is 
also used against other oppressed groups, including, but not limited to: the poor, LGTBQ people, 




Second, criminal oppression has a distinct justification: the social and political exclusion is 
justified by making a claim (explicitly or implicitly) that the ‘criminal’ is morally deserving of 
exclusion because they1 have committed a crime. For the most part, this use of criminal 
oppression is a way of picking out people who are already members oppressed groups for further 
oppression with the appearance of a moral justification.  Third, the reason that I still refer to 
criminal oppression as a distinct kind of oppression rather than a way that other groups are 
oppressed is that no one ought to be excluded from social and political life because of what they 
have done, and even criminals who are otherwise not oppressed and have in fact committed 
serious crimes must be treated with a minimum of inclusion in society. There is a difference 
between appropriate state sanctions and blame on an interpersonal level on the one hand, and, on 
the other, structural exclusion from the basic institutions that make it possible to live a safe and 
meaningful life. Finally, in society, it is too easy for the institutions that perpetuate criminal 
oppression to be justified publicly by reference to otherwise non-oppressed people who have in 
fact committed serious crimes. These institutions then go on to primarily target people like 
George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Tony McDade.  
Another primary goal that I have in writing this dissertation is to challenge the idea that 
criminal law and punishment can be used as progressive tools for fighting other kinds of 
oppression. I focus in this dissertation on gender-oppression because I have found that a common 
response to my articulation of the idea that ‘criminals’ are oppressed is to ask if that includes 
Brock Turner. Brock Turner infamously was sentenced to six months in county jail after being 
found guilty of sexually assaulting Chanel Miller while she was unconscious in an alley outside a 
                                               
1 Throughout this dissertation, I use “they,” “their,” and “theirs” in the singular as well as plural forms. I have tried 
to rephrase where such usage could be confusing. I have done so in an attempt to avoid using masculine pronouns to 
stand in as universals for all genders of people. Where using “they” would be too confusing, I opted to use a mixture 




Stanford fraternity party. He plays a recurring role in this dissertation because he seems to 
perfectly represent the ‘criminal’ who is not otherwise oppressed (he is at least middle class, 
white, and seems to be cis, heterosexual, non-disabled, and a man). There is fairly uncontested 
evidence that he committed rape, and he was convicted by a jury of this crime. And, not just any 
crime. Rape is a particularly serious crime, and it is a tool of another kind of oppression: gender-
based oppression. Turner is the exemplar of the type of person that people appeal to in order to 
justify the maintenance of the criminal justice system despite the fact that he is a clear outlier. He 
plays an outsized role in this dissertation because he and people like him (Harvey Weinstein, 
Larry Nasser, Kevin Spacey) play an outsized role in the justification of the criminal justice 
system. Because he appears so often, I felt the need to clarify that this dissertation is not 
primarily meant to argue that Turner is oppressed, but to suggest that justifying the criminal 
justice system in order to punish people like Turner has its problems. 
Part of the reason that Turner is often invoked is that it is very common for criminal law 
to be the main tool for feminist anti-violence activists, a term I use to refer to people who 
advocate for policies or other social and political responses aimed at ending violence against 
women, particularly rape and domestic violence. Most feminists agree that rape and domestic 
violence are part of a system of gender oppression, so in addition to being individual acts of 
violence between two or more people, they are part of a structure that subordinates women to 
men. Although the typical logic of the criminal justice system is to treat crime as an individual 
moral failing rather than a result of social failures, many feminist anti-violence advocates still 
see criminal law as a tool for changing sexist structures. Thus, they advocate for more 




prosecutors with more power and discretion at the expense of criminal defendants.2 They also 
push for longer sentences for these crimes.  
I argue that it is misguided for feminist anti-violence advocates to argue for such policies 
and practices. But it is understandable why this would be such a popular and appealing tool. The 
criminal justice system has monopolized our idea of what kinds of solutions are available for 
social and political problems. It has also monopolized our access to justice. For most of us, the 
idea of justice for a serious wrong means prison time, and prison time is the mark of how 
seriously we as a society take the crime, the victim, and the person who committed the crime. 
The fact that we have such strong punitive intuitions as a country, and we have a criminal justice 
system uniquely bound up with racism and class oppression, suggests that our intuitions about 
proper punitive responses are not reliable. Also, because criminal justice responses tend to work 
to exclude violators from the social and political community in the long term (although these 
same people still live in our societies), I argue that criminal responses will not work to change 
the social norms that allow for gender-based violence to be so common. At most they will keep 
some perpetrators literally excluded from society in prisons for a time. They cannot bring 
structural change. 
This project is an attempt to conceptualize the American criminal justice system from 
several perspectives. Overall, I think that classical approaches to evaluate crime and punishment 
in philosophy have ignored features of the criminal justice system that are essential to a full 
understanding of it. This is why, in addition to philosophy of punishment, I engage with feminist 
and critical race theory tools for theorizing oppression. I also reframe philosophy of crime and 
                                               
2 Just one example of this is the rape shield laws which revised rules of evidence limit the kinds of questions can be 
asked of witness/victims of sexual assault only. There are certainly strong rationales for such laws, but it is also 
important to acknowledge that they take rights away from criminal defendants and give tools to prosecutors in the 




punishment as a part of social and political philosophy. Because this project is broad, taking on 
the tools of several sub-disciplines of philosophy, each engagement is necessarily limited. For 
example, while I take on feminist tools of structural oppression, I do not have the space to fully 
engage criticisms of a structural approach to oppression. But the goal of this project is to look at 
the criminal justice system from new vantages to expand our tools for critical analysis of an 
institution that has immeasurable influence on American life.  
In Chapter 1, I define and begin to defend the concept of criminal oppression. I draw on 
Sally Haslanger’s work to define structural oppression and to argue that structural oppression can 
actually create new social groups. I argue that the social group ‘criminal’ is created by a cluster 
of institutional practices around policing, adjudicating and punishing crime, and social 
repercussions of criminal status such as felon disenfranchisement. I draw on Ásta’s theory of 
social construction to explain how these institutions construct the social category ‘criminal.’ I 
also explain how some groups of people who are already oppressed are treated as ‘criminals.’  
In Chapter 2, I focus on the relationship between criminal oppression and anti-black 
oppression in the United States. I ground this analysis in a short historical overview of how 
slavery was continued after the 13th Amendment through policies and practices like Black Codes 
and convict leasing, and how the connection between the criminal justice system and systemic 
racism persists today. I then map out the concept of secondary oppression from Haslanger as a 
model for how to think about the relationship between criminal oppression and racial oppression, 
especially anti-black racism. I use Kimberlé Crenshaw’s early work on intersectionality to 
explain that when a person is a member of multiple oppressed groups, the oppressions mutually 
inflect one another. It is not just that one is doubly oppressed, but they are also oppressed in 




brutality, but the criminal oppression of poor white people might be less violent though it also 
includes overpolicing of poor white neighborhoods. Finally, I argue that though thinking about 
criminality and anti-black racism as distinct systems that intersect cannot capture the experience 
of being treated as a black person and a criminal, it is useful for some kinds of analysis. 
Complementary intersectional analysis from the perspective of members of oppressed groups 
will show that in the experience of oppression, there is no way to actually distinguish types of 
oppression. Just as black women do not experience oppression as women and then oppression as 
black people, but oppression as black women, black people will not experience oppression as 
criminal as distinct from being oppressed as black. Kristie Dotson’s discussion of different types 
of intersectional analysis helps illuminate the value of both an intersecting systems approach like 
mine and a ‘holistic’ experience-based approach that takes the view of the marginalized person 
as its starting place.  
Chapter 3 argues for the claim that it is always unjust for criminal law or punishment to 
result in the social and political exclusion of a person. In this chapter I draw on the work of 
Vincent Chiao and Erin Kelly to argue that the criminal justice system ought to be seen as a part 
of the social contract. That means that it is a political institution, and it only has the capacity to 
adjudicate violations of criminal statutes. It cannot determine moral blameworthiness, and it 
cannot deliver retributive justice. A properly restrained criminal justice system will fairly 
distribute the benefits and burdens of crime prevention and punishment, and it might be proper 
for those who are duly convicted of violating criminal laws to bear more of those burdens. Still, 
the criminal justice system must be politically justified by the same principles that justify the rest 
of the political community, and those principles will be violated if treatment of suspects or 




In Chapter 4, I make the case for what I consider to be the best argument for using the 
criminal justice system to fight gender-based oppression. Drawing on Jean Hampton’s 
expressivist theory of punishment, I present a view that criminal punishment expresses a 
society’s condemnation of certain acts. The most compelling part of this argument is that when a 
state does not punish those who deeply harm a certain subset of the population, like women or 
people of color, it is because that society does not really care what happens to these kinds of 
victims. On this argument, if the state would punish rape and domestic violence more 
consistently and harshly, this punishment would demonstrate that the state is on the side of the 
victim, and the state would communicate that it takes violence against women to be a serious 
violation. In so doing, punishment could also morally educate the wrongdoer and the community 
about the equality of women. So, rather than only treating violence against women as an 
individual crime against a person, it is possible through a communicative theory of punishment 
to argue that punishment also treats violence against women as a systemic problem with a 
structural-level solution. 
One of the strongest features of this argument is that it offers a particularly powerful 
diagnosis of both the historical lack of punishment of rape and domestic violence as well as the 
failure of many states to punish police officers and vigilantes who kill black people in the United 
States. I think that this diagnosis is basically correct. But, in Chapter 5, I make the case that the 
failure to take these crimes seriously is a symptom of existing sexism and racism, and ultimately 
advocating for more prosecutions and more severe punishment for these crimes would be 
treating symptoms rather than causes of the violence. Moreover, such a use of the criminal 
justice system threatens not only to extend the oppressive exclusion to more people, but also to 




problem arose out of her idealization of the criminal justice system as a primarily just system 
(albeit one that might have some peripheral problems with racial discrimination). On her view, 
the criminal justice system could send a message of moral condemnation without oppressing 
wrongdoers. A non-ideal theory approach to criminal law, one that this dissertation has laid out, 
shows that criminal punishments too often express society’s exclusion and lack of concern for 
the wrongdoer. The overall impact of the system is to create a group of people who are basically 
second-class citizens. Thus, the ability of such a system to condemn bad acts without 
condemning the actor to oppression is not possible. This has the effect of undermining the moral 
education of the wrongdoer and the community. The message is that some people are not worthy 
of being part of the community at all.  
 I focus in Chapters 4 and 5 on gender-based oppression, but I note that there is a similar 
kind of claim about using prosecution and punishment to fight anti-black racism by prosecuting 
and punishing police and vigilantes who murder black people. This is the goal of many but not 
all of the people and groups who are part of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement.3 Because 
there are many differences in the contexts of fighting anti-black policing and fighting gender 
oppression, I do not think that all the claims I make about fighting gender-based oppression are 
exactly straightforwardly applicable to calling for the prosecution and punishment of police and 
vigilantes who murder black people. One of the biggest differences is that in the case of BLM, 
the some of the people who are being criminally oppressed are also calling for the use of the 
criminal justice system. Basically, this means that they have more standing to be able to call for 
this kind of response because they are more likely to be the ones who are oppressed by the 
criminal justice system. Most of the feminist anti-violence movements are made up of white 
                                               





women, and many black women have been critical of and left such movements as they became 
more connected with the law and order movement in the 1980s.4 In many ways then, the feminist 
anti-violence advocates who advocate for the use of criminal justice tools will not be the ones 
adversely affected by the criminal justice system. Other contextual differences include the 
history of police brutality toward black social movements and concurrent political advocacy for 
limiting and shrinking police power and the criminal justice system.  
Importantly, I note that my dissertation should not be taken to suggest that it is wrong for 
individual women to seek protection through criminal justice tools. Neither are they 
blameworthy for seeking justice through these means because, given their options, it is 
reasonable for them to seek justice in this way. There is a difference between seeking safety and 
justice as an individual and seeking structural change as an activist. One incurs more duties when 
they advocate for structural and policy change, and those duties include some due diligence in 
making sure that the policy changes do not harm other oppressed people. While some of these 
feminist anti-violence advocates may be morally blameworthy, as a structural analysis, the main 
goal of this dissertation is not to allocate blame. Instead, I want to invite anti-violence advocates 
to be more circumspect about the possibilities of criminal law and punishment and to invest in 
building other institutions to address violence against women that do not have the same 




                                               




Chapter 1: Criminal Oppression  
How Civic and Political Exclusion Constructs Criminality 
0. Introduction 
This paper aims to introduce the concept of ‘criminal’ to identify a social group within 
the contemporary United States. I argue that this group is socially constructed by a collection of 
interrelated policies and practices that center on the criminal justice system in the United States5, 
including police, courts, and prisons. But the policies and practices also take place outside this 
official system in civil society and the private sphere (that is, policies carried out by people 
acting as employers, landlords, teachers, but also as private individuals). In some ways it seems 
trivial to note that there is a social group ‘criminal’ — there are many social identities that exist 
because of social relationships. We might identify ‘baristas,’ ‘students,’ ‘city council members,’ 
‘soccer moms,’ etc. My point in arguing that ‘criminal’ is a social group, that is, socially 
constructed, is to point to the fact that being a member of this social group has a wide variety of 
highly salient consequences that are linked together through institutions that cover all aspects of 
one’s life. Specifically, I argue, being a member of this class subjects the member to oppression. 
So, in short, in this paper I will defend the claim that there exists a social group ‘criminal,’ and 
the members of that group are oppressed as criminals. When I say that they are oppressed as 
                                               
5 I use the term “criminal justice system in the United States” to include several related, interconnected, systems. 
First, as author John Pfaff has emphasized, in the United States, there is no single criminal justice system because of 
federalism. Pfaff, Locked In, 13–16. It would be more accurate to speak of the several thousand county systems, 
which hold many more people than the federal system, as well as the different practices across states. Pfaff,  Locked 
In, 13–16. I acknowledge this empirical reality, but continue to talk of one system because at the level of this 
philosophical theory, enough is shared across these systems to abstract from them. Mainly, I want to contrast this 
system with less punitive European models of punishment. Second, I want to include practices of policing (such as 
stop-and-frisk and other less sensational policing practices which include getting “consent” for otherwise 
unconstitutional searches), the criminal court system (including practices such as plea bargaining, lack of resources 
for criminal defense, and abuse of prosecutor discretion), actual punishments (including lack of privacy, proper 
health care, bodily integrity, and sanitation in prisons but also conditions of release, including physical monitoring 
and the expenses that are often pushed onto the convicted person), and collateral consequences of convictions 
(ranging from deportation, disenfranchisement, and ineligibility for public assistance to discrimination from private 





criminals, I mean that the policies and practices that confer the status of criminal on them at the 
same time oppress them. What’s more, these policies and practices add up to a particular kind of 
oppression that I call social and political exclusion. This kind of exclusion marks criminals as not 
belonging to ‘mainstream’ society, and thus leaves them vulnerable to all kinds of unjust 
treatment.  
This dissertation utilizes non-ideal theory, so the claims that I make are about the present-
day United States and its history, but there may be ways that these claims are relevant for other 
times and places in so far as they share similar histories, institutions, and policies and practices.  
 This chapter proceeds in four sections. The first discusses some key definitions of 
oppression and draws from those to explain my theory of oppression. The second section 
discusses how oppression can create new social groups. The third explains how people are 
assigned to the group ‘criminal,’ how the group is socially constructed, and how this group is 
related to other oppressed groups.  Finally, I will explain why the same policies and practices 
that construct this group also oppress this group.  
1. What is Oppression? 
Like many philosophers, I think of oppression as a structural phenomenon in which a 
group of people face similar, unjust obstacles in a variety of aspects of their lives. One of the 
most well known articulations of this concept of oppression comes from Marilyn Frye’s analogy 
of oppression as a bird cage.6 She argues that if one looks at just one wire of a birdcage, no 
matter how thoroughly, it will seem impossible that such a small wire could impede a bird’s 
flight. It would be so easy for the bird to get around it. And a close examination of each wire 
would yield the same conclusion. But, once one steps back and sees the network of wires, 
                                               




specifically arranged in the proper shape, then one can understand why the bird is stuck in the 
cage. “It is perfectly obvious that the bird is surrounded by a network of systematically related 
barriers, no one of which would be the least hinderance to its flight, but which, by their relations 
to each other, are as confining as the solid walls of a dungeon.”7 This is like oppression, she 
argues, because there will be many small practices or policies that, examined very closely, do not 
really pose much of a hinderance to the oppressed person. But, a group of institutional policies 
and practices taken together have the effect of vastly limiting an oppressed person’s options.8  
From this simple metaphor, we already have the beginnings of a theory of oppression. 
First, the oppressed person has obstacles to their freedom or development on all sides. Second, 
these obstacles are put in a kind of structure that makes the limitation possible. Third, if one 
focuses on one obstacle, it is possible to fail to see why the oppressed person is so limited. 
A similar picture emerges from Iris Marion Young’s articulation of the concept of 
oppression. She links the small everyday actions of well meaning people with the result of 
certain groups of people facing “some inhibition of their ability to develop and exercise their 
capacities and express their needs, thoughts, and feelings.”9 Essential to her articulation of 
oppression is the fact that everyday practices are involved in oppression, and there is not 
necessarily a clear cut, bad actor or even an obvious group of bad-acting agents responsible for 
the oppression.  She writes, 
In this extended structural sense oppression refers to the vast and deep injustices 
some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and 
reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions, media and cultural 
stereotypes, and structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market 
mechanisms — in short, the normal processes of everyday life. We cannot 
eliminate this structural oppression by getting rid of the rulers or making some 
                                               
7 Frye, “Oppression,” 5. 
8 Frye, “Oppression,” 5–7. 




new law, because oppressions are systematically reproduced in major economic, 
political, and cultural institutions.10  
 
Key to this aspect of oppression are several features: everyday actions of individuals, stereotypes 
or cultural representations, and major institutions of society like the economy, political 
structures, and cultural institutions. These cultural representations, small individual actions, and 
institutions work together to produce unjust effects on the group of people that they oppress, 
much like the wires of the bird cage are arranged in a certain way so as to keep the bird from 
being able to escape them. 
In addition to her general discussion of oppression Young attempts to capture the 
different types of limitations that oppressed people face. She identifies five “faces” of 
oppression: exploitation, marginalization, cultural imperialism, powerlessness, and violence.11 
This valuable discussion of oppression helps to give content to the term and to help understand 
the different ways that oppression can appear in people’s lived experience.  
These oppressive features operate through policies and practices, both formal and 
informal, that are often carried out by people who do not intend to oppress or by institutions not 
explicitly designed to oppress. In my terminology, a system is a collection of institutions, 
practices, and policies that work together to produce outcomes. So systemic oppression on this 
account is when a collection of institutions, practices, and policies that work together to produce 
the unjust conditions that Young identified. Young’s project in “Five Faces of Oppression” was 
to describe the ways that oppression appears or is experienced, but she emphasized that 
oppression often occurs through social structures so that there is not always one group 
consciously oppressing another. She notes that “We cannot eliminate this structural oppression 
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by getting rid of the rulers or making some new laws, because oppression are systematically 
reproduced in major economic, political, and cultural institutions.”12 Thus, though Young’s 
account is most noted because it contributes a helpful and multifaceted description of the 
experiences of oppression, she contends, along with many feminist theorists, that oppression is 
structural, that is, it exists above and beyond the actions of individual agents. 
Sally Haslanger offers a helpful explanation of how structural oppression works. Her 
theory focuses on examining policies and practices that unjustly burden people based on their 
group memberships. To begin to explain what she means by structural oppression, Haslanger 
distinguishes between agent oppression and institutional oppression.13 Agent oppression is 
perhaps the more familiar conception of oppression for everyday use. She defines it thusly: 
“[Agent] oppression is an act of wrongdoing by an agent [where] a person or persons (the 
oppressor(s)) inflicts harm upon another (the oppressed) wrongfully or unjustly.”14 But not all 
unjust harm is oppression, so it is likely that agent oppression will have to include some 
threshold of harshness and involve the abuse of power, especially social power.  She uses the 
example of rape, where when a man rapes a woman, the man who rapes the woman is 
wrongfully inflicting harm on her, likely by using social power related to gender dynamics. Or 
one might imagine an employer threatening to fire a precarious employee if the employee does 
not perform some kind of extra service for the employer not covered by their job description or 
original work agreement. This would be agent-based oppression because the employer would be 
abusing their power over the employee to unjustly harm the employee. One might also use 
violence or the threat of violence as a form of abuse of power, such as when Agent A steals a 
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wallet from Agent B at knife point. In contrast, if Agent A sneaks into the office of Agent B and 
steals a laptop (assuming that access is not gained because of some social advantage such as 
being Agent B’s boss), this would be an injustice but not a case of oppression.15 
In contrast to agent oppression, structural or institutional oppression occurs when “the 
oppression is not an individual wrong but a social/political wrong; that is, it is a problem lying in 
our collective arrangements, an injustice in our practices or institutions.”16  In these kinds of 
cases, there is an unjustified or unfair balance of power in the institutions themselves that 
produces the oppression.  Haslanger uses Jim Crow legislation as well as “disparate impact” 
practices (which are nominally colorblind) as examples of structural oppression. She also notes 
that cultural norms and informal practices, such as gender norms that assign child care to 
women, and “cultural practices and products that foster negative stereotypes of particular 
groups,” are examples of structural oppression.17 While abuse of power is a key part of agent 
oppression, “illegitimate imbalance of power” is at work in structural oppression.18  
To further illustrate the difference between agent oppression and structural oppression, 
take two instances in which an employee is oppressed. In the first instance, the employee works 
for a company that has transparent policies and practices, safeguards against employee abuse, 
well-functioning reporting policies, etc. She may, nevertheless, end up working for a supervisor 
who is extremely demanding, who, knowing she needs the job, threatens to fire her if she does 
not stay late without extra pay, perform personal favors for the supervisor, and keep the 
arrangement secret from the rest of the company. This would be agent oppression. In the second 
instance, the company has a culture of overworking employees, no policies or inadequate 
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policies for addressing this imbalance. It instead even gives supervisors incredible amounts of 
discretion, knowing that employees working under them are vulnerable.  In the second instance,  
it is possible that all the supervisors are well meaning: no supervisor straightforwardly demands 
working extra unpaid hours, but the norms of the company, the actions of all the supervisors and 
employees of the company simply trying to get along could produce similar results for individual 
employees. Certainly, we could still find some blameworthy agent who failed to place safeguards 
or who was callous or negligent in failing to respond to the circumstances that arose. But to fix 
the problem, it would require changes be made beyond changing the beliefs or actions of the 
blameworthy parties. The culture of the company would have to be remade. In scenario two, 
there might also be an abusive supervisor who takes the same actions as the supervisor in the 
first instance. In that case, the supervisor would be a part of a structural oppression because they 
are enabled by the power imbalance built into the company. But they are also an agent of 
oppression and are likely morally blameworthy. Still, stopping the negative effects on the 
employee would require changing more than the individual supervisor, but correcting the power 
imbalances in the company.  
This example highlights that, in cases of structural oppression, one might not be able to 
find a blameworthy oppressor that can account for the full range of oppression.19 Those who 
simply benefit from the institutional oppression of another group are not necessarily oppressors, 
but some may have a greater role in perpetuating the oppression and so will be more 
blameworthy. “In such cases an individual counts as an oppressor if their moral wrong-doing 
compounds the structural injustice, that is, if they are agents of oppression within an oppressive 
structure.”20 Such people may “perpetuate the injustice; they may be more responsible for 
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creating, maintaining, expanding, and exploiting the unjust social relationships” and thus be 
considered oppressors.21  
This account of structural oppression contrasts with what Haslanger terms the 
“individualistic approach” to oppression in which agent oppression is the primary type of 
oppression and blameworthiness essential to the account of oppression. She argues that it is true 
that individuals are often responsible for creating laws or influencing structures, but the systems 
that operate and distribute power to individuals in society are “maintained through complex 
social conventions.”22 These systems include “the government, the economy, the legal system, 
the educational system, the transportation system, religion, family, etiquette, the media, the arts, 
[and] our language.”23 Because power is distributed to many individuals within these systems, it 
is rare that a single individual acting alone will have the power to actually create the unjust 
relationships that the complex systems create. Thus, by focusing on an individualist account, one 
would not be able to see oppressive harms that are perpetuated by these social conventions 
because they will not find an agent who is responsible for all the harm that oppression causes.  
In contrast to the individual approach, the structural approach to oppression is not 
focused on finding a blameworthy agent, but instead on how to reorder the balance of power so 
that the bad effects do not continue. Haslanger notes that there is a distinction between someone 
who is privileged by a set of institutional power structures and a person who abuses their power.  
In the example above, a supervisor at the unjustly structured company may benefit from the 
overwork of lower employees. Still, because of company cultures and the pressures that 
supervisor themselves faces, they may be just getting along as best they can although the 
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structure produces benefits for them. That is to be contrasted with the supervisor who takes 
advantage of the imbalance, is particularly hard on supervisees, and actively works to maintain 
the structure by opposing changes or ignoring legitimate complaints. There are proper times 
when agents are responsible for oppression, and they are morally blameworthy. When there is 
nothing but individual agent oppression, the goal is to change the agent’s actions or to find a way 
to lessen the power that they have so that they cannot abuse their power. But when the 
oppression is structural, placing blame on individuals who are merely trying to navigate these 
systems is not philosophically correct, nor does it help to reduce or eliminate the source of 
oppression. Instead of focusing on the agency of individuals in these cases, one should focus on 
changing the structures themselves so that they no longer distribute power unjustly. But one can 
also go too far the other way, ignoring those who truly are abusing their power. The goal should 
be to distinguish between those who are agents of oppression in that they abuse their power and 
those who end up reinforcing structural oppression by simply attempting to navigate the 
oppressive structures.24  
Haslanger’s definition of structural oppression, which, simplified from her logical 
equation can be written as follows: [F=member of oppressed group, I =Institution, C=Context, 
R= Relation] 
(SO1) Fs are oppressed (as Fs) by an institution I in context C iffdf in C $R(being 
an F nonaccidentally correlates with being disadvantaged by standing in an unjust 
relation R to others) and I creates, perpetuates or reinforces R.25 
 
She gives the following example: 
Women are oppressed as women by cultural representations of women as sex 
objects in the United States in the late twentieth century iff being a woman in the 
United States in the late twentieth century nonaccidentally correlates with being 
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subjected to systemic violence, and cultural representations of women as sex 
objects creates, perpetuates, or reinforces the systemic violence. 26 
 
She notes that even if not every woman actually experiences the systemic violence, each woman 
is still oppressed along these lines because the being subject to the risk of the unjust harm is part 
of the condition of being oppressed. Some women, perhaps because of their relative privilege 
along race, class, sexual orientation, or gender identity, may be less subject to this violence 
(perhaps a wealthy white woman can take private cars rather than relying on public transit or 
walking, for example), she is still oppressed along these lines.  
2. Social Construction and Oppression 
Haslanger notably argues that policies and practices that oppress can create social groups 
by subjecting diverse people to the same collection of social constraints. I adopt this view, as will 
be apparent in my discussion of criminal oppression.  
Haslanger’s account is particularly interesting because she brings her account of social 
construction of social identities into a discussion of oppression. On her account, the same 
policies and practices that place some groups under conditions of oppression (limiting their 
opportunities, constraining them) can be the same policies and practices that construct them as a 
social group in the first place. Sometimes it is the case that policies and practices pick out an 
already-oppressed group for more oppression. For example, it is now become a widespread 
concern that facial recognition systems do not identify black faces as human with the same 
consistency that they can recognize white faces, which could have huge repercussions for all 
kinds of automations, including self-driving cars that use facial recognition to prioritize human 
safety. Practices that utilize such technology may pick out black people for less protection, etc. 
                                               




Young’s account is focused on this kind of analysis of oppression: given that we know that black 
people in the United States are oppressed, she wants to analyze what we (people involved in 
“new social movements since the 1960s”) mean by “oppressed,” given an already agreed upon 
set of oppressed groups.27 But, following Haslanger, it may be the case that a collection of 
policies and practices that consistently put certain people together, subjecting them to the same 
social constraints repeatedly, can create a social group. Haslanger seems to be arguing that this is 
in fact how races came to be in the first place.28 
 Haslanger’s account is extremely powerful because it articulates how policies and 
practices pick people out for unjust treatment that can amount to oppression. She focuses on 
groups of people who are “nonaccidentally correlated” with the given policies and practices, and 
it is this “nonaccidental correlation” that makes up the oppression because even those who are 
never actually picked out by the policies and practices but are nonaccidentally correlated with 
those practices are oppressed. Oppression on this account is belonging to a group that is unjustly, 
nonaccidentally correlated with harmful treatment.  
 What Haslanger’s account leaves open is how some groups of people become 
nonaccidentally correlated with unjust policies and practices. She tends to focus narrowly on one 
policy or practice (objectification of women, or even more narrowly, the actions of a particularly 
agency in Chicago during a particular decade) in her article. But, this fails to explain the aspect 
of oppression that Frye and Young note: the way that collections of individual policies and 
practices are organized in such a manner to limit the life possibilities of groups of people. Thus, 
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in addition to the focus on individual policies and practices, one must step back and ask why a 
whole variety of policies and practices are all targeting certain groups of people so that they are 
trapped.  
This leads me to an important clarificatory point.  Occasionally, skeptics of structural 
oppression argue that all of the so-called structural injustices can actually be traced back to 
individual actions that are blameworthy either because they intended to discriminate or because 
they were indifferent to discrimination that was evident. For example, some argue that the 
injustice or immorality of structural racism comes from the racist intentions or character of those 
who built such structures knowingly or at least negligently. Whether or not all oppressive 
structures were at one point originated by individual people with bad or racist intentions or 
characters is not something my account of oppression takes a stand on. For my project, this is 
beside the point. I am not hoping to identify the blameworthy source of the unjust outcomes that 
make up oppression. Instead, I am interested in explaining why small actions by individual, well 
intentioned and non-negligent people, institutional impacts, and cultural representations should 
work so well together so as to create the kinds of oppressive structures such as those visible with 
racism, sexism, and xenophobia. I will also try to show that a similar structure exists around 
those considered to be criminals. Whether all the harms or the full magnitude of the harms 
produced can be attributed to blameworthy individuals is not the central question. Instead, the 
question that the concept of structural or systemic oppression attempts to answer is why all these 
policies and practices, enacted by individuals consciously or unconsciously, across a number of 
institutions, could all seem to be designed to produce harms or unequal outcomes for certain 




 To summarize, systemic oppression has three elements, two of which are necessary and 
one which is not. First, it occurs when a related system of policies and practices results in 
mounting unjust social constraints (exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural 
imperialism, and violence) on a group of people. These policies and practices will include 
institutional design, cultural representations, and small, often seemingly innocuous actions of 
private individuals and civil society actors. Second, the oppressed group must be related to the 
policies and practices in a particular kind of way: being a member of that group has to be 
nonaccidentally correlated with being picked out for certain kinds of unjust treatment. Third, in 
at least some cases, the same policies and practices that oppress a group of people create and/or 
maintain the existence of that social group at the same time that they oppress. This is a feature of 
at least some kinds of oppression, but I will not defend the claim that it is a feature of all 
oppression (though I suspect that it is). 
3. The Social Group ‘Criminal’ 
 I identify a unifying concept of ‘criminal’ and the social group created by a group of 
policies and practices that I group together under the moniker ‘criminal justice system.’ Who 
counts as a ‘criminal’ on my theory and why?  In this section I adopt a sort of pragmatic 
approach in developing my account of this social group. Although I would rather not engage in 
metaphysics, my claims do depend on the existence of a certain type of social practice that I want 
to highlight and analyze. So, I will use the language and tools of social construction, particularly 
as developed by Haslanger and Ásta. 
3.1 Core Concept (or “Base Property”) of Criminal 
When I say that a certain person or group of people are ‘criminals,’ I mean that they are 




start by explaining what I take to be a relatively uncontroversial explanation of the common 
usage of the word ‘criminal.’ Typically, we think of a criminal as a person who has violated 
criminal laws. Criminal violations are a particular kind of normative violation.  In criminal law, a 
wrongdoer violates the community in addition to simply violating a victim. So, when a person 
assaults another person, that assault can be addressed from the perspective of the harm to the 
victim of the crime by, for example, using tort law to compensate the victim for the harm caused 
to them. But, if the assault is prosecuted criminally, the victim is simply a witness to the harm 
caused to the state. In this way, criminals have not just harmed a specific victim, but also the 
community, often represented by the state. Often but not always, criminal laws are more serious 
kinds of moral violations than everyday moral violations (lying to a friend, slighting an 
acquaintance, arguing unkindly with a family member). Often this is reflected in stereotypes 
about criminals as being particularly dangerous or violent, but the more central distinction 
between a typical moral violation and a criminal violation is that criminal violations are the kinds 
of violations that threaten the working of the community. Although the crime that come quickly 
to mind tend to be murder, rape, assault, and theft, there are numerous crimes that are not as 
serious as non-criminal violations. For example, in most jurisdictions in the United States, it is a 
crime to pass a bad check, but not to commit adultery. I suspect many of us would think that 
adultery is as serious as passing a bad check. Thus, the core concept of criminal is a person who 
has violated criminal laws and, in so doing, has violated the community.29  
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3.2 Criminals and Social and Political Exclusion 
Treatment as a ‘criminal’ is marked by exclusion from many spheres of public life. I call 
this phenomenon social and political exclusion.  Exclusion from the political community is a sort 
of logical corollary to the core concept of criminal. If a criminal is a person who has violated 
serious community norms (criminal laws), it can seem justified to exclude that person from the 
community in some way. Punishment theorist R.A. Duff notes that this is the stance taken by 
both politicians endorsing the “War on Drugs” and by retributivists who are “more sophisticated 
and somewhat more humane.”30 Yet, as Duff notes, this exclusion also seems to be at odds with 
many liberal, democratic principles that suggest that all members of society ought to have some 
level of basic inclusion. He expresses the tension thusly: 
We should simply note that criminal punishment poses one of the sharpest 
challenges to the politics of inclusion: if we cannot render punishment itself 
inclusionary, if it cannot treat and address those who are punished as full 
members of the political community, we must either accept the abolitionist 
argument that criminal punishment cannot be justified, or argue that those 
who commit crimes thereby exclude themselves from at least some of the 
benefits and rights of citizenship.31 
 
I will return to this tension about whether or not social exclusion can ever be justified in response 
to criminal wrongdoing in Chapter 3, but here I will make some preliminary statements about 
why, in criminal oppression, I view social and political exclusion as the foundational harm. 
Exclusion from the social and political community is the foundation that allows for the harms of 
exploitation, marginalization, cultural imperialism, powerlessness, and violence, explained by 
Young, to occur.  
Social and political exclusion is exclusion from the political community and the public 
goods that members of the community take advantage of in building meaningful lives. Duff 
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defines social exclusion by giving two necessary conditions. 32 In order for exclusion to be social, 
it must meet two criteria. First, the entity doing the excluding in social exclusion is not private 
individual but a social unit such as a person acting on behalf of the government or community. 
Thus, a private individual trying to prevent me from entering a public park is generally not social 
exclusion unless the state somehow reinforces the private individual’s actions. Second, the 
community is excluding the relevant people from certain social goods (access to the job market, 
voting, protection of laws, protection from violence), rather than private goods. Thus, police not 
letting someone onto private property is not social exclusion). I follow Duff in this definition, but 
I also note that private individuals may often be agents of social and political exclusion because 
their actions can be implicitly sanctioned by the state. One example is that when businesses 
explicitly excluded people based on race during Jim Crow in the United States, the government 
implicitly endorsed this activity until it was outlawed by federal legislation. Duff makes a similar 
point, noting that a shopkeeper under some circumstances can be seen as a public actor. I would 
push these examples further to include realtors who steer clients to neighborhoods based on race 
(they are excluding some people from some neighborhoods), practices of private individuals 
harassing people seen to be in the wrong neighborhood based on race, and similar activities by 
private actors that are part of historical practices that have worked together for generations to 
exclude people based on race, class, ethnicity, and so on from buying homes, walking down 
public streets, existing in public parks or places of public accommodation.   
One obvious way that the criminal justice system operates to exclude criminals is through 
punishment. As Duff notes, apart from capital punishment, a permanent and radical exclusion, 
incarceration is the starkest form of social exclusion currently practiced.33 In prison, a person is 
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excluded from the public, from family and friends, communities, and from all kinds of social 
goods like jobs and education that are out in the public.34 But other, less severe kinds of social 
exclusion can occur in less extreme forms of punishment. For example, when one’s driver’s 
license revoked, one is excluded from driving, which is a social good that can be an important 
means to allow one to work and pursue all other kinds of engagements in the social sphere.35  
Duff notes that, in addition to exclusion from specific social goods, punishments also 
include the message that one is excluded from the community, and he notes that this message 
may stick much longer than the punishment itself lasts.36 This is particularly troubling given the 
strong normative pull of equal political membership in modern democratic societies.  
 Some kind of social exclusion is a mark of many kinds of oppression: for example, Jim 
Crow laws and practices literally excluded black people from white American life and many 
benefits of belonging to the white public sphere. Ronald Sundstrom and David Kim have argued 
that xenophobia is most centrally a ‘civic ostracization.’37 The kind of social exclusion faced by 
criminals is very similar to these other forms of social exclusion, but the putative reason for the 
exclusion is different. While in racist exclusion, the reason is that there is something about 
belonging to the wrong race that makes one unsuitable for inclusion. Similarly, they argue that in 
practices of xenophobia, a person who belongs to a different nationality or ethnicity from the 
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norm is seen as proof that that person has values so different from the norm so as to make one 
unsuitable for inclusion in the community.38  
 ‘Criminals,’ like those suffering under xenophobia, are excluded based on a putative lack 
of shared community values, although the evidence that they do not share the values is that they 
are presumed to have broken a criminal law rather than that they are foreign. Criminals have 
supposedly demonstrated their lack of fitness to be members of the community, and therefore 
suffer similar social exclusion to the civic ostracism described by Sundstrom and Kim. They are 
literally physically excluded from society (incarcerated) in many cases, and in others, they are 
treated as moral outsiders by policing and collateral consequences of criminality.  
 The biggest difference between criminal oppression and xenophobia or racism is that the 
concept of criminality relies on personal moral failings to justify exclusion and oppression rather 
than a person’s membership in a racial, ethnic, or national group. In a liberal society, criminality 
thus is able to perpetuate similar kinds of effects but with a moral justification, at least in theory. 
This move from exclusion based on identity to exclusion based on moral failure is what makes 
criminality such an appealing vehicle for racism when, for many people in the United States, 
explicit racism is no longer socially acceptable. 
 But of course, there are times that criminal oppression, racism, and xenophobia 
compound one another.  Examples include the black rapist character from Birth of a Nation, 
conflating blackness with criminality (1915). Another century later, when he announced that he 
was running for president in 2015, Trump stated, “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not 
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sending their best. [..] They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing 
those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And 
some, I assume, are good people.” Here he conflated Mexican immigrants with criminals. The 
xenophobic idea articulated here is that people of different races or different nationalities do not 
share the US’s moral values and therefore must be excluded for Americans’ protection. For 
another example, take the term ‘illegal alien’: not only does this highlight the foreignness of an 
imagined group of people, and likely invokes racism as well, the emphasis on illegality offers 
another reason to exclude these people: the fact that they have entered the country illegally is 
taken as further evidence (beyond their national or ethnic outsider status) that they do not share 
American values such as rule of law. This individualized moral failing allows for a rhetorical 
denial of racism or xenophobia. With each of these examples, if we only analyze them in terms 
of racism, xenophobia, or both, we still will not be able to capture the work that “rapist” or 
“illegal” is doing. The labeling of ‘criminal’ allows for those who so label to avoid the illiberal 
act of excluding someone based on a group identity like a race or nationality. In a less obvious 
example, President Barack Obama’s slogan for his supposedly more humane deportation plan: 
Felons Not Families.  
Undocumented workers broke our immigration laws, and I believe that they must 
be held accountable -– especially those who may be dangerous. That’s why, over 
the past six years, deportations of criminals are up 80 percent. And that’s why 
we’re going to keep focusing enforcement resources on actual threats to our 
security. Felons, not families. Criminals, not children. Gang members, not a mom 
who’s working hard to provide for her kids. We’ll prioritize, just like law 
enforcement does every day.39 
 
The implication of this speech is that there are good immigrants who share our values (even if 
they are undocumented), and criminal immigrants who do not. This distinction elides the 
                                               




possibility of people who are both loving family members and people with non-immigration 
criminal records.  Pro-immigrant critics of Obama often note that he in fact deported twice as 
many people as George W. Bush during his tenure while at the same time employing softer 
language toward immigrants. This is an illustration of how employing criminality as a 
justification for exclusionary treatment can seem more humane but might not actually have 
humane results.   
A final note about social and political exclusion: On both Duff’s and Sundstrom and 
Kim’s accounts, it is evident that social and political exclusion is a matter of degrees. 
Deportation is a total form of exclusion, disenfranchisement an extreme political exclusion, and 
incarceration a strong exclusion from all civic, political, and even typical private life. Regularly 
encountering hostile police in the streets of one’s neighborhood has the effect of making one feel 
unsafe and unwelcome on the streets, but it is a lesser exclusion than incarceration or 
deportation, as one is not literally excluded. Moreover, as Duff notes, there are punishments that 
cut people off from some social goods (driving bans, perhaps restrictions on places one can work 
or live, people one can associate with), that are lesser social exclusions. Not every social 
exclusion will be unjustified, especially if they are much less in degree. Much depends on how 
these seemingly small social exclusions, such as driving bans, housing and employment 
limitations, and limits on people one can associate with, like the wires on Frye’s bird cage, can 
seem relatively insignificant when approached on at a time. But, when one steps back, they can 
form a pattern of exclusion that is extremely confining.40  
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3.3 ‘Treatment as Criminal’ Confers ‘Criminal Status’ 
People belong to the social group ‘criminal’ when institutions, through their policies and 
practices, treat them as if they are criminals, regardless of whether they have committed a crime. 
In addition to institutions, other members of the public, acting as employers, neighbors, 
landlords, or just private individuals, can also treat a person as a criminal. This non-institutional 
treatment can also confer41 the status of criminality on a person if it happens according to a 
pattern of associating some other social identities with criminality.  
 One way to understand the social group ‘criminal’ would be to use the externalist 
definition of a social group as articulated by Ann Cudd: “A social group is a collection of 
persons who share (or would share under similar circumstances) a set of social constraints on 
action.”42 This definition is reminiscent of Frye’s birdcage: those who are oppressed by many of 
the same wires will be members of the same social group. In many ways, this captures the result 
of having been placed in the social group ‘criminal,’ but the conferralist approach to social 
properties as articulated by Ásta captures the role that social actors play in creating the social 
group criminal and placing people into it. Treating someone as a criminal is generally a way of 
placing social constraints on that person (and potentially some enablements—being charged with 
a crime enables one to participate in arraignments, plea negotiations, et cetera).  
Ásta argues for a conferralist theory of the social construction of categories for human 
beings. She argues that social properties such as race and gender are conferred by others onto a 
person. “This property is a social status consisting in constrains on and enablements to the 
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42 Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 44.  Social groups that are not oppressed will likewise share a collection of 
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individual’s behavior in a context [….]”43 The conferral is of a ‘base’ property, some property 
that those doing the conferring “are attempting to track” even if they are in fact not tracking that 
property.44 As an example, she uses the idea of an umpire in baseball calling a strike. On her 
theory of social construction, what makes a pitch a strike is the umpire taking it as a strike 
(calling, “strike”). The umpire is trying to track the base property, that is, the ball arriving at the 
batter within the strike zone. Ásta argues that the pitch is a strike not in virtue of it being within 
the strike zone, but by virtue of the umpire taking it to be within the strike zone. In taking it as 
such, the umpire confers the status ‘strike’ onto a pitch, and the umpire is not calling the pitch 
based on whatever they feel like calling; the umpire is attempting to correctly identify the 
trajectory of the ball according to the rules of balls and strikes in baseball.45  
Following a conferralist account of ‘criminal,’ people enacting institutional policies and 
practices (like police officers or judges) take a person as a criminal when they treat them as a 
person who has committed a crime. This act of treating a person as someone who has committed 
a crime imposes constraints and enablements on that individual and makes the person a 
‘criminal’ in that context. For example, police officer, who is an agent of the law enforcement 
institution, takes a young black man in a certain neighborhood to be a criminal, so he subjects 
him to stop-and-frisk. It is the action of stopping and frisking that makes the young man a 
criminal in that situation. If the officer looked at the young man, believed him to be a criminal, 
but took no action in response to the belief, then the young man would not be treated as a 
criminal in that moment or be a criminal in that moment. But it is rarely the case that there will 
be literally no action that comes from this belief—the treatment as criminal could be as small as 
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a suspicious glance, a movement of the officer’s hand to his gun, etc. While I focus on treatment, 
Ásta’s account focuses more on ‘taking’ a person to have a base property (taking person X to be 
a woman, to be black). Many of her examples, however, do focus on an external action that 
demonstrates that a person has taken someone to have the property of being white or being a man 
or taken a pitch to have the property of being a strike. I think that most of the time, taking 
someone to have a base property will line up with treating that person as having the base 
property, just as an umpire taking a ball to be a strike will line up with him calling it a strike and 
therefore conferring the status of a strike to the ball in the context of a baseball game. The reason 
that I want to focus on treatment (over, to my mind, the more abstract ‘taking’) is that I want 
suggest that if a police officer does not take someone to have committed a crime, but, for 
example, is just a bully and so performs a stop-and-frisk on a random youth, that officer still 
confers the status of criminal onto the youth, even if the officer does not ‘take’ the youth to be a 
person who has committed a crime. My account, focusing on external ‘treating as’ behavior, may 
better describe Ásta’s approach because she takes her primary motivation for her ontological 
project to be the way social categories have tangible impacts on social life, what she terms 
“Social Construction as Social Significance.”46  
I suggest that the way that we understand a conferralist account of ‘criminal’ is that the 
social property of ‘being a criminal’ is conferred onto an individual when they are treated as a 
criminal, and that base-property is a person who has committed a crime and thus violated the 
community. ‘Treatment as a criminal’ will be spelled out in further detail below, but for now it is 
important to note that anyone can treat another as a criminal. No special authority is required to 
do so.  However, those acting with particular institutional authority relevant to criminality will be 
                                               




able to use different kinds of treatment to confer this identity, and often their conferral will have 
more serious and more formal implications (enablements and constraints). I cannot stop and 
frisk, prosecute, or sentence a person. Each of these treatments has serious, and the latter two 
have very formal constrains and enablements. But I can cross the street to avoid a person, call the 
police on them, or subject them to regular insults, such that they feel constrained in their ability 
to walk freely in my neighborhood. An employer can refuse to hire them. A landlord can refuse 
to rent to them, and so on.  
Why go through the complexity of ‘treatment as’ and conferral? Why not simply say, 
criminals are those who have committed crimes, and anyone who treats someone as if they have 
committed a crime when they have not is mistaken? This, roughly speaking, is what Ásta calls 
the constitution account, following a Searlean account of social construction where X counts as 
Y in C. On this theory of social construction, the baseball example is explained differently. The 
pitch counts as a strike when it enters the strike zone, and an umpire is mistaken when she calls a 
pitch that is outside the strike zone a ‘strike.’ Similarly, one could say Abe counts as a criminal 
when he has committed a crime, and to treat him as having committed a crime when he has not is 
a mistake. For example, if an employer believes that Abe, who has not committed a crime, is a 
criminal and denies him a job because of this, the employer has made a mistake, but the 
employer has not conferred any kind of status on Abe. Instead, a constitution social construction 
account would likely depend on something like, ‘Abe counts as a convicted felon for 
employment purposes when he has been convicted of a felony.’ To take another example, if in 
her neighborhood, Beatrice is known for buying stolen goods, and she actually does buy stolen 
goods, a constitution account would say something along the lines of ‘Beatrice counts a criminal 




neighborhood might correctly or incorrectly identify her as a criminal by avoiding her, seeking 
her out to sell stolen goods, calling her a criminal behind her back, or other actions. These 
actions do not change her status as a criminal, but either accurately or inaccurately respond to it.  
Ásta’s primary argument against the Searlean constitution argument is that she is 
interested, as am I, in the “social significance” of the social categories that people inhabit. For 
example, in baseball, suppose that an umpire is on the take. She knows that given a pitch was not 
a strike, but she could use this call to influence the game. She might not ‘take’ the pitch to be a 
strike, but if she calls it a strike, it is a strike because the game continues as if it is a strike. The 
calling it a strike is what matters to the course of the game, not if the umpire was mistaken or 
cheating.47 Ásta notes that if the trajectory of the ball and not the umpire’s call is what makes a 
strike, there is no reason to think that the umpire is the best suited to determine if a pitch is a 
strike — given modern technology, why not use a more reliable method to determine if the 
pitch’s trajectory was in the strike zone?48 Perhaps more importantly, the game proceeds 
according to what an umpire has called. The “social significance” of the pitch being a ball or a 
strike is determined by the call, not the actual trajectory of the pitch. Baseball fans and sports 
reporters might criticize the call, and in extreme cases, the call may be so criticized that a cloud 
sort of hangs over the results of the game. But, in the game, the ball counts as a strike. Ásta 
admits that there is room for debate on the metaphysics of the baseball strike: on her theory, it 
might seem counter-intuitive that the umpire cannot be wrong about whether a pitch is a strike 
(although they may be wrong about whether the baseball entered a particular area called the 
strike zone). Ásta argues that the constitutional social constructivist has to say that the 
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proceeding of the game does not depend on the number of actual strikes that occur (because the 
umpire might not call all of them), but on the number of strikes that are called.  
In a similar way, with formal ‘treatments as criminal’—if a person is convicted of a crime 
(the jury finds them guilty, or, more likely, they plead guilty), their life, much like the baseball 
game with the strike, will proceed as if they are a criminal. There will be a criminal record, a 
punishment, and all the repercussions that come from that. Although the case is much less 
definitive for the informal treatments as criminal, the results, including the kinds of social 
exclusion of not feeling safe on the streets of one’s own neighborhood in the case of black youth 
in heavily policed areas, in the case of not getting a job because one is or is supposed to be a 
felon, and so on.  
Using the conferralist account, there is the attractive possibility of being able to treat the 
base property of ‘having committed a crime’ as distinct from ‘being a criminal’ because in the 
social world we live in, the consequences of being treated by institutions and individuals as a 
criminal do not always track having committed a crime. Even if we only look at the very narrow 
set of ‘criminals’ who are convicted of crimes, we must be able to separate the base feature from 
the conferred status because there are simply times that the criminal justice system gets it wrong 
by convicting people who have not committed the crime with which they are charged. This says 
nothing of the huge number of crimes committed regularly in which the person who commits 
them is never treated as a criminal, let alone charged or convicted. The conferralist model does 
the best job dealing with the social reality that treatment as a criminal will have, as Ásta puts it, 
social significance, regardless of whether the person doing the conferring of criminal status 




Before I move on, I want to return to the example of a police officer stopping-and-
frisking a young man without reasonable suspicion. While it is important to note that the officer 
is conferring the status of being a criminal on the young man, the officer’s individual action 
should not obscure the institutional or systemic background that makes this possible in the first 
place. The system of criminal laws, police officers, the court systems, court cases and other laws 
that allow officers to at least get away with such practices, police training, and possibly cultural 
representations/stereotypes all are necessary in order for the police officer to confer this status on 
the young man.  Moreover, stopping and frisking young men of color is a part of a social practice 
embedded in policing through training, social norms, and other expectations. Thus, while one 
might argue, à la Haslanger, that the particular police officer is an agent of oppression, using his 
social power as a police officer to unjustly harm a particular young man, it is also necessary to 
take this as an instance of structural oppression. The officer’s actions are enabled by the 
improper allocation of power in the institution of policing, and the practices that uphold that 
power allocation include stop-and-frisk.  
The above example connects to the two distinct ways that social categories depend on 
social conferral. So far, I have discussed the conferral of a social category onto a particular 
person: the police officer stops and frisks the youth.49 But, for this to even be possible, the social 
category must exist as well, and Ásta argues that social categories on the conferralist account are 
themselves result of social conferral.50 The criteria for meeting the category come about through 
collective agreement, which can be through a formal policy or practice such as a law. So, the 
pronouncement of a court that a defendant is guilty makes the defendant a criminal because of 
collectively agreed upon laws and procedures spelled out relatively explicitly in statutes, codes, 
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and procedural rules. Another example would be the rules, determined by our state governments, 
about who can have the conferral of the status “spouse.” But, in more opaque situations, the 
criteria for the base property may be “negotiated, consciously or unconsciously, but the 
conferrers in the context.”51 In these “communal” categories, there is no official body that 
determines the rules.  For example, when an individual makes a decision about whether to call 
the police on a suspicious person, the criteria for what makes up the base property of ‘having 
committed a crime’ is negotiated by the community that person belongs to. Whether the potential 
caller has sufficient evidence that the potential ‘criminal’ ‘has committed a crime’ may be 
underdetermined by the social conventions, and the potential caller will have to improvise a bit. 
After all, it is likely that calling the police is not something that happens often enough that the 
informal social rules will be fully set. In contrast, determining which gender pronoun to use 
occurs relatively often, and the communal norms around when to use what pronoun are much 
more likely to be firmly established (although these norms may be re-negotiated as awareness of 
trans and gender-non-conforming people arises).  
Depending on the circumstances, one can be conferred the status of ‘criminal’ through 
formal or communal processes. This is often also the case with other social statuses, including 
gender, which can be legally recognized through relatively formal requirements at birth or 
changed through similarly formal procedures. Regardless of the official state pronouncement of a 
person’s gender, there will also be constant communal conferrals of gender. Depending on the 
circumstances, formal or communal conferrals can be equally consequential. With ‘criminal’ 
status, it is only through a court’s pronouncements can a person be treated as a criminal by 
carceral punishment. But communal conferral of ‘criminal’ status also has meaningful 
                                               




consequences and is more likely to be ubiquitous and difficult to clearly define and identify. This 
more informal kind of conferral requires no institutional authority, but may be strengthened by 
other forms of authority (a well respected member of the community calling the police may have 
more consequences, more psychological impact, or be harder to shake off than if a ‘nobody’ 
makes the call. But even ‘nobodies’ can treat others as criminals.52) 
While in general, the account that I have argued for is different than John Searle’s 
“constitutionalist” account of social construction (X counts as Y in context C), I borrow from 
him his response to a potential objection that social construction in general is a vicious circle. To 
use his famous example, money counts as money because we believe it to be money.53 Here, he 
argues that in fact, this is not simply self-referential because the word ‘money’ is a stand in for 
“a complex set of intentional activities.”54  It would seem I have a similar problem: I argue that a 
‘criminal’ is someone who is treated as a criminal. Similarly, in my account, the second 
‘criminal’ can be replaced with a wide variety of social roles that I have already gestured toward 
in this chapter: a moral outsider, a person who has violated the community’s important norms, a 
person not worthy of moral regard because of their moral character, etc.   
3.4 Ways of ‘Treating as Criminal’  
In criminal oppression, the criminal justice system is the locus of the policies and 
practices that work together to unjustly constrain ‘criminals.’ These are the most important 
sources of the conferral of the social identity ‘criminal’ because they have the biggest 
consequences in terms of conferring the status of being a criminal, with its attendant constraints. 
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They are the most likely to place the most impactful constraints on ‘criminals.’ I focus on a non-
exhaustive list of three categories of policies and practices that criminalize individual people. 
The exercise of these policies and practices since at least the 1970s in the United States has also 
created the social group ‘criminal.’ The ongoing assignment of people to the group ‘criminal’ 
maintains the status of the group. These policies and practices are oppressive when they are 
carried out in an unjust manner, including in a discriminatory manner, without strong enough due 
process safeguards, or with unwarranted violence or personal intrusion. 
The first category I call ‘policing’ and refers to policies and practices putatively directed 
toward the detection or prevention of crime. There are many policies and practices of policing, 
some of which are likely benign, but many of which are unjust in themselves. The unjust 
practices include police activities such as stop-and-frisk without actual reasonable suspicion, 
coercive means of obtaining “consent” for otherwise unlawful searches, and practices of labeling 
gang members. Many legal policies and practices are unjust and count as oppression, and many 
everyday activities of police are technically illegal but there are few realistic remedies or 
challenges to these practices. Policies and practices are not limited to police officials themselves, 
but include instances such as security guards following people based on race or class in retail 
stores, private individuals who call police or report others for perceived criminal activity, 
particularly based on race or class, and vigilantes who respond to perceived criminality on their 
own.55  
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The second category of activity is ‘adjudication and punishment,’ which includes courts, 
prisons, and their personnel. The central uniting activity of the punishment regime is the 
determination of guilt for and the punishment of crime. Aspects of determining guilt are fraught 
with injustices, including the practices of plea bargaining, insufficient funding for proper 
defenses, and other insufficient legal protections to preserve due process. Many if not most of the 
actual punishments are also unjust. Conditions of incarceration in the United States typically 
subject incarcerated persons to constant threats of violence and actual violence, lack of privacy 
in bathing and using the toilet, invasive body searches, and lack of adequate food, medicine, or 
hygiene products.  
The third category of practices is ‘collateral consequences of criminality.’ These are the 
official and unofficial social consequences that stem from one’s being taken as a criminal that 
fall outside of policing and punishment. These include legal consequences of convictions that are 
not technically punishments, such as felon disenfranchisement in some states, ineligibility for 
federal public assistance, and being barred from certain professional certificates, including things 
like barber licensing in some states. For immigrants, including everyone from legal permanent 
residents (green card holders) to the undocumented, there are often dire immigration 
consequences, including deportation and lifetime prohibitions for legal entry to the United States, 
that come as automatic consequences of conviction. Collateral consequences also include legal 
discrimination against those with a criminal record (including records of arrests for which there 
was no conviction) in housing, employment, and education. This can also include consequences 
for those who are only perceived as having a criminal record. For example, several studies have 




indirect and statistical routes to determining criminal history, including racial stereotyping.56 
Ultimately, in several studies, when employers do not have access to extensive criminal histories 
of applicants, they are much more likely to avoid hiring black employees.57 This category of 
policies and practices is arguably the furthest from the official criminal justice system because 
those who carry out these policies are not usually members of law enforcement or courts. In fact, 
those doing the conferring are often not acting in any public capacity, but as employers, 
landlords, community members, and neighbors. But the policies and practices of this category 
still arise from criminal justice outcomes such as arrests and conviction.  
Many policies and practices may fall into more than one of the above categories. 
Moreover, there are likely further social consequences not listed here that operate on the level of 
individual actions that are more mundane and difficult to identify. These might take the form of 
reinforcing stereotypes about criminals, avoiding certain neighborhoods or people, or even 
internalizing norms in popular television dramas that normalize the illegal behavior of police 
officers who are faced with the prospect of ‘criminals’ going free. These individual actions need 
not be individually blameworthy and, given current institutions, norms, and practices, might be 
reasonable. 
The collective result of these policies and practices is that those who are subjected to 
them, particularly on a regular or prolonged basis, are subjected to unjust constraints 
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(exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence). People who 
are subjected to these policies and practices are subject to treatment as criminals.  
3.5 Who is a ‘criminal’? 
The following points on who is a criminal follow from what I have sketched above but are worth 
emphasizing:  
It is neither necessary nor sufficient to have committed a crime to be a criminal. It is 
not necessary because many who are subject to treatment as criminals have not committed any 
crimes, or no criminal violation is the cause of the treatment as criminals. For example, people 
are subject to stop-and-frisk practices based on their age, race, and location with little to no 
actual evidence of having committed a crime. It is not sufficient to have committed a crime to be 
a criminal in the way that I use the concept. People who commit crimes, from illegal drug use to 
white collar crimes, but because of their race and class and other social locations, will never be 
treated as criminals. For example, even if campus police at Boston College have very good 
reason to believe that many of the white students they interact with are underage drinkers, the 
campus police will interact with these white students as if they are people to be protected, not 
criminals to protect others from.  
 It is not necessary to have been convicted of a crime to be a criminal. Similar examples 
as above apply: being followed around a department store, being given extra scrutiny on traffic 
stops, and having police called for normal activities are examples of when many black people in 
the United States are treated as criminals without conviction or arrest.  
Contrariwise, conviction is nearly always sufficient to make one a member of the social 
group ‘criminal.’ A court finding a person guilty of a crime is the most literal conferral of 




publicly and with the authority of a jury foreperson or judge that a person has committed a crime 
is treatment as well. In addition, repercussions that almost invariably follow conviction are the 
kinds of policies and practices discussed above that count as ‘treatment as a criminal.’ There will 
be literal legal consequences as well as additional social stigma attached to conviction that very 
often makes a convicted person significantly limited in other areas of their life, even if they are 
privileged along race and class lines. Actual incarceration is a real social constraint, the horrors 
of which can follow the incarcerated person long after release. Spending time incarcerated, 
especially in most types of facilities, will bring along with it a whole host of social constraints 
including lack of privacy, normalized violence, and dehumanizing treatment.  
In rare many cases, arrest or conviction for people who are otherwise privileged will not 
result in treatment as a criminal because they will be able to leverage their other areas of 
privilege to mitigate the worse parts of ‘criminal’ oppression. For example, Brock Turner, a 
white middle class young man attending Stanford was convicted of sexual assault but only 
served 3 months of a 6-month sentence in county jail.58 Turner will be affected insofar as his 
criminal record will likely prevent him from employment and his registry on the sex offender list 
will limit where he can live. Because of his race and class, however, he will likely not continue 
to be viewed as a ‘criminal’ by those who discover the arrest record or be later given extra 
attention by law enforcement because of this record. In limited contexts, he may be oppressed by 
a handful of the institutional practices, but his birdcage will have many more gaps between wires 
and opportunity to maneuver more freely. As Haslanger has noted, even some people who are 
members of an oppressed group are still subject to the oppression even if they do not actually 
suffer the harm. For example, a white, cis-het woman who is wealthy will still be oppressed as a 
                                               





woman even if her other privileged identities allow her to avoid street harassment by always 
being able to be driven around. Another woman might theoretically avoid street harassment out 
of sheer luck. They are both still oppressed because they are subject to harassment based on their 
gender, but the first woman has many resources to mitigate that oppression. We can think of 
Brock Turner in the same way. 
To reiterate, the key to understanding the social group criminal is that the social group is 
defined not by who has actually committed crimes but who is being treated as a criminal, and 
that means being excluded from civic and political life.  
3.6 Other social groups ‘nonaccidentally correlated’ with criminality 
As many examples that I have used demonstrate, those who are picked out for treatment 
as criminals by the policies and practices that I identified are picked out because of other social 
identities, including race, class, and gender. Because of historical and present-day conditions in 
the United States, people who are black, poor, transgender, immigrants, or Muslims may be 
treated as criminals because of that social identity.  These other identities are nonaccidentally 
correlated with treatment as a criminal, to use Haslanger’s terminology. With this in mind, I 
understand the social group ‘criminal’ to include people who have been treated as criminals, and 
thus been conferred the social identity ‘criminal,’ for a variety of reasons. Based on these 
reasons, there are four subcategories of ‘criminal.’ 
Category 1: People who are treated as criminal because of another social identity 
nonaccidentally correlated with criminality and are being treated as criminals despite a total lack 
of evidence that they have committed a crime. In this group, there are people who in many 
contexts are treated presumptively as criminals, for example, young black men in particular 




especially those with mental health problems. They have not committed any actual crimes, or at 
least, their being treated as a criminal is not meaningfully connected with reasonable suspicion of 
them having committed a crime. Young black men in particular neighborhoods who are subject 
to stop-and-frisk of is the most obvious example of this category, but it might also include 
homeless-looking people being denied service at Dunkin, a Latinx person being called ‘illegal,’ 
or a Muslim person being called a terrorist.59  
Category 2: People who have identities that are connected with criminality and they are 
being treated as a criminal in a context in which they have committed a crime that is very minor. 
By this, I generally mean crimes not inherently injurious to others, like drug-use or loitering. It is 
likely that, but for their social identity, they would not be criminalized for these activities 
because people with privileged identities get away with the same activities. For example, I 
regularly run through a park after dark that is closed after dusk, with a sign reading, “police take 
notice.” Police regularly kick out the homeless people enjoying the park, while I am literally 
jogging past. I have never even been exhorted to not break this rule. The homeless folks are 
technically breaking a law (not a criminal one), but so am I. This is the case with using illicit 
drugs, and in many cases also with selling illicit drugs. The kinds of crimes that I have in mind 
are often those whose origins are racist or classist, such as loitering, which was criminalized as a 
part of “black codes” after the Civil War. Moreover, the war on drugs is widely acknowledged to 
have has at least some racial and political motivation.60 Thus, these kinds of laws might not even 
be present at all (or would take different forms) but for racist motivations in the past.  
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Category 3: People who have identities connected to criminality and actually have 
committed serious crimes, including violent crimes. First, most people in prison have committed 
serious crimes. John Pfaff, an economist and law scholar who examines drivers of the increases 
in incarceration since the 1970s in the United States has told an illuminating story that 
contradicts some of the main narratives of Michelle Alexander. One of his key arguments is that 
the War on Drugs is only responsible for some of the growth in the American Prison 
population.61  His data indicates that the greatest driver of increasing incarceration in the United 
States is violent crime.62  
Most people in prison are either poor or non-white. For example, in 2014, in state 
facilities (not including federal), the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that 35% of state 
prisoners were white, 38% black, and 21% Hispanic.63  Another study has shown that 
incarcerated people from all races are concentrated at the lowest income brackets in the United 
States.64 Before they were incarcerated, inmates made 41% less than their non-incarcerated 
counterparts based on data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics in 2004.65  
                                               
and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I’m 
saying? We knew we couldn't make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to 
associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt 
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61 Pfaff, Locked In, 32–38. In fact, those incarcerated (in state and federal prisons) at the time of his book’s 
publication in 2017, only about 16% of those incarcerated where incarcerated due to drug convictions (and only 6% 
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62 Because his focus is on explaining the increase in the incarcerated population, Pfaff focuses on growth over 
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time) were convicted of violent crimes. Pfaff, 187. Moreover, he explains that in 2013, if one released all those 
serving time for drug possession, half of those convicted of property crimes and public-order crimes, and 75% of 
those convicted of drug trafficking, the prison population would have fallen from 1.3 million to 950,000.  
63 Carson, Prisoners in 2014.  
64 Rabuy and Kopf, “Prisons of Poverty.”  The researchers relied on a data set gathered by the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics gathered in 2004, the most recent collection of this data available.  




 Thus, this group makes up the majority of those actually incarcerated, although it is 
important to keep in mind that incarceration is just one way of being treated as a criminal. 
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that this group that is clearly treated as criminals (and a 
group that is more easily amenable to statistical analysis than those subject to other forms of 
criminal treatment), very many of them are in groups that are nonaccidentally correlated with 
criminality. There are many inferences that could be drawn from this fact, and not all of them 
support my argument that criminal oppression is a distinct type of oppression from race or class 
oppression. But, it does support my claim, articulated below, that those in category 4 play an 
outsized role in justifying oppressive policies and practices in liberal circles.  
Category 4: Finally, there are also people who have no identities or vectors of oppression 
that would lead them to be preconceived as a criminal. They are treated as criminals because 
they have committed crimes and have been caught. High profile examples are Harvey Weinstein, 
Brock Turner, and Larry Nasser. The only reason that they are being treated as criminals is 
because they engaged in criminal activities and actually got caught. Their race, class, and other 
social statuses in fact protected them from more harsh treatment as criminals (Turner) or helped 
shield them from being treated as criminals despite clear criminal activity for years (Weinstein, 
Nasser). These men and men like them play outsized roles in justifying the policies and practices 
that I have highlighted, particularly in left or progressive circles. It is appeals to otherwise 
unoppressed men, most often those who have committed sexual violence, that most people turn 
when arguing that incarceration, even as it is actually practiced in the United States, is 
appropriate punishment for these privileged oppressors.  
Before I turn to explaining how each of these subcategories of ‘criminal’ is oppressed, I 




instance of criminal treatment. There will be, for example, people in category 3 and possibly 
even category 4 who are innocent completely. Moreover, many people in category 3 have been 
in categories 1 and 2. In fact, it is likely that many people who are quite poor, particularly those 
who are poor and black or Latinx, who spend their lives moving between categories 1, 2, and 3. 
As Jeffrey Fagan, Columbia Law Professor and Epidemiologist, has explained, concentrated 
policing in New York City is best predicted by race, not crime rates. Concentrated policing leads 
to a feedback loop.  
“[T]hose racial and neighborhood differences in arrests per crime and the use of 
force have cascading effects that subsequently have profound consequences for 
health, mental health, housing, voting, and economic well-being [. . .] Financial 
burdens from misdemeanor arrests are associated with bankruptcy and foreclosure. 
And being detained prior to trial, which can occur due to financial limitations, 
makes conviction more likely during a trial and contributes to the “marking” effect 
of conviction on employment. This financial instability often makes offenders 
unable to pay fines, further adding to their criminal history in ways that have 
stigmatizing and further economic consequences.66 
 
This feedback loop of poverty, contact with police, inability to pay fees, fines, or bond, 
conviction, unemployment, and then poverty keeps many poor and non-white people in near 
constant contact with the criminal justice system.  
 There are also complicated cases that blur the boundaries between categories 3 and 4, 
such as the late Kobe Bryant, who, despite being black and credibly accused of rape by a white 
woman, seemed to largely shed the criminal identity by the time of his death. Bill Cosby could 
arguably be placed in category 3 or 4 because his tremendous social power based on his elite 
status protected him from treatment as a criminal for decades despite fairly clear evidence of 
serious crimes. But in nearly every case of the famous or infamous, these are the exceptions 
rather than the rules.  
                                               




There may be rare cases of extremely powerful individuals for whom oppression does not 
result from conviction at all—for example Martha Stewart was convicted but spent time in a 
lower security prison with less violence and more privacy, avoided much social stigma for being 
a criminal, and the collateral consequences of conviction she faces are likely to be meaningless 
apart from the fact that she cannot vote in some states (but she probably has the power/wealth to 
set her residency in any state she chooses, and thus is much less constrained by this consequence 
than the vast majority of convicted felons). In general, however, she faces very few of the 
external constraints due to being convicted of a crime.  
4. Conferring the Status of Criminal in the United States is Tantamount to Oppression 
Recall that at the conclusion of the first section, I noted that my conception of oppression 
includes the following: First, oppression occurs when a related system of policies and practices 
results in mounting unjust social constraints (exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, 
cultural imperialism, and violence) on a group of people. Second, the oppressed group must be 
related to the policies and practices in a particular kind of way: being a member of that group has 
to be nonaccidentally correlated with being picked out for certain kinds of unjust treatment.  
For members of categories 1 and 2, treatment as a criminal places unjust social 
constraints in a relatively straightforward way. Based on race, class, or another group 
membership, one is subject to treatment as a criminal. Race and class are not fair reasons to be 
subject to these policies and practices. The second criterion is also fulfilled because membership 
in these groups is the reason for being subjected to these policies and practices. For these two 
categories of ‘criminal,’ the challenge for me is not to explain why these people are oppressed, 
but to explain why their oppression should count as criminal oppression and not racial or class-




policing, exclusion from public places, arrests, and the like are types of treatment as criminals. 
At minimum, the criminal justice system is being used as a tool of racial or class oppression. In 
the next chapter, I will make the case that criminal oppression is not collapsible into racial, class, 
or other kinds of oppression.  
As for category 3, it is harder to argue that the obstacles or constraints are unjust because 
I have stipulated to the fact that people in this category have actually committed serious crimes, 
including violence against others. It seems therefore justified that they should face some kinds of 
obstacles. But, as I argued above, given the fact that most people who fall into this category have 
experienced exclusion by being in categories 1 and 2, they have not had the opportunities that 
many non-criminals have had. Likely that social exclusion of experienced by being members of 
categories 1 and 2 already pushed many of the people in category 3 into situations where crime 
was a more likely outcome. As the study on poverty and incarceration noted, the vast majority of 
people incarcerated are from the lowest socio-economic statuses in the United States. Moreover, 
many have significantly less education than their non-incarcerated comparators. For this reason, 
many philosophers of punishment make various arguments that those who have not benefitted 
from the social contract should not suffer the full consequences when they break the social 
contract.  
Even if one is convinced of the fact that we should not take social and political 
situatedness into account when determining if hard treatments are appropriate responses to 
crime, particularly serious crime, there is an additional argument. Here, I rest on the non-ideal 
theory aspect of my research. The actual policies and practices involved in policing and 
incarceration, are unjust no matter what the person has done. For example, the prevalence of rape 




fact, some contemporary retributivists object to the current conditions in prisons in the United 
States, and the retributivist insistence on proportionality in general would likely lead many to 
criticize much of the actual practices of incarceration in the United States.67 Here, I do not argue 
that theorists who justify punishment along retributivist or consequentialist lines are justifying 
inhumane treatment. Instead, I am arguing that the conditions in prisons are in fact so degrading 
that very few would find them justifiable even for the worst criminals.  
Surely it is most difficult to make the case that treatment as a criminal is unjust for people 
in Category 4 because they actually have committed crimes and there is no other evidence of 
oppression that can mitigate their responsibility for having committed such crimes. But, I again 
appeal to non-ideal theory and point to the actual practices that take place in incarceration.68 The 
constant appeal that I make to the violence, lack of privacy, and other inhumane treatment in 
prisons points to the underlying social and political exclusion that is paradigmatic of treatment as 
a criminal. It is not just that prison conditions are somehow just a bit too bad for the people who 
are in them, and we should scale back the amount of hardship suffered there because it is 
disproportionate to the crimes committed by most of those incarcerated. Instead, the way to 
understand the violence of prison, the intrusiveness and risk of the stop-and-frisk, and the 
exclusion from voting, housing, and employment protection from violence, physical safety and 
autonomy, and inclusion in social life are guarantees of social and political membership. When a 
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person does not have access to these social goods, particularly if they are excluded from many of 
these social goods, it is an indication that they have been socially and politically excluded so as 
to reach a level of exclusion where they are basically second-class citizens. The reason that our 
prisons are so violent is that our public morality dictates that that criminals are justifiably 
excluded from the privileges of our polity. Because they have violated our community’s most 
important norms, our social norms dictate that we are justified in excluding them from all the 
benefits of membership, including the protection of their basic rights. Though under law, those 
who are incarcerated are protected from cruel and unusual punishment by the Constitution, ways 
of enforcing these rights are few and far between.  
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to do many things: explain oppression and social construction, define 
‘criminal’ and the policies, practices, and people that confer the status of ‘criminal’ to individual 
people. But I have also attempted to explain why I think that we should look at criminal 
oppression as a special kind of oppression, something distinct from racial oppression or poverty. 
That is because the underlying logic of criminal oppression is different, and the logic is most 
evident when we look at the most vicious criminals among us who have no apparent excuses of 
other oppression to mitigate their violations. The conditions of our prisons belie this fundamental 
fact about our society: we have decided that people who violate criminal laws do not deserve to 
be members of our society any more, and they lose the right to complain about what happens to 
them in practice, even if they technically retain the legal right to do so. It should be of no 
surprise that the people that the already oppressed members of American society are the most 
likely to be thrown out of the community using this particular mode of exclusion as well. But 




moral justification. The logic of criminal oppression dictates the people we exclude from social 
and political membership, and the benefits that come with membership, have brought it on 





Chapter 2: On Race and Criminal Oppression 
 
0. Introduction 
In this chapter, I sketch a broad answer to the question of how criminal oppression relates 
to race and racism in the United States. In the last chapter, I asserted that some social identities 
are nonaccidentally correlated with criminality, and in the United States, being black is the 
paradigmatic case of nonaccidental correlation with criminal oppression. This is the case in 
major part because the criminal justice system and related social norms were explicitly used as a 
tool of racial oppression after slavery was declared (mostly) illegal. In the first section, I will lay 
out a brief history of the relationship between anti-black racism and criminal law practices in the 
United States, connecting the practice of slavery with incarceration and criminal stereotypes that 
operate today. Without America’s history of slavery, our present-day criminal justice system 
would look different. I draw on work by Angela Davis, Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Michelle 
Alexander, amongst others, for this brief sketch.  
Taking that history into account, I will use Sally Haslanger’s conception of secondary 
oppression to capture the relationship between racial oppression and criminal oppression as two 
types of oppression that can and do intersect. In secondary oppression, being a member of one 
type of oppressed group makes on susceptible to being oppressed by another group of policies 
and practices that subject one to a new type of oppression. While this conception gives a 
framework for understanding how two types of oppression can relate, it does not give a rich 
explanation of the relationship between racism and criminal oppression that I want to capture. 
One thing that I want to capture is that the way that black people are particularly picked out for 
oppression by the criminal justice system is not simply a matter of degree (i.e. that the criminal 




oppression for black people in the US is qualitatively different than criminal oppression of poor 
white people.69 To capture this aspect of the relationship between racial oppression and criminal 
oppression, I turn to the concept of intersectionality as developed by Kimberlé Crenshaw and, 
later, Kristie Dotson. This concept has become popular as a part of public feminist discourse, and 
as such, has taken on a variety of meanings. I will spell out very specifically the way that I use 
the concept, which I believe to be in close alignment with Crenshaw’s earliest texts on 
intersectionality.  
Finally, I will turn to Dotson’s distinction between the holistic approach to understanding 
intersectionality and the interlocking systems approach to intersectionality to address some 
concerns that arise from my insistence that we understand criminal oppression to be distinct from 
racial oppression. I will explain that by doing a system’s analysis, I focus on the structures that 
interact to oppress black people in the United States. This interlocking systems approach offers a 
different view than that of a person who is experiencing these oppressions. For that person, the 
holistic approach to intersectionality highlights that the experience of oppression is not of 
distinct systems, but a unified experience of oppression. When one is experiencing oppression 
based on membership in more than one oppressed group, they cannot parse out where one 
oppression ends and other begins. My analysis offers a different view of oppression with 
different advantages than a holistic approach can. One of the advantages it offers is the ability to 
see how an oppressive structure appears differently in different contexts. This discussion will 
help me address a second concern. This second concern is it seems that in saying all members of 
the group ‘criminal’ that I described in chapter one are oppressed, that I am making some 
equivalencies between black people who have done nothing wrong at all (e.g., black teenage 
                                               




boys stopped and frisked in Crown Heights) and (sometimes powerful, rich) white men who 
have done very bad things (e.g., Brock Turner, Dylann Roof). Here, I argue that the 
intersectional analysis allows me to make meaningful distinctions between these two groups 
while maintaining the attention to the unjust structures that make up the criminal justice system 
and criminal oppression. 
1. Brief History of the Criminal Justice System and Anti-Black Racism 
The criminal justice system in the United States is intimately tied with the history of 
slavery and anti-black racism. Black people in the United States, perhaps more than any other 
social group, have a relationship of nonaccidental correlation with criminality because of this 
history and its relationship with present practices. In the last chapter, I noted that there are 
several oppressed groups that also have a nonaccidental relationship with criminal oppression, 
including the poor, the disabled, LGTBQ people, immigrants, and likely others. Each of these 
groups has a historical connection, a story of how this identity became entangled with the 
structures of criminal oppression in the United States. To fully understand criminal oppression, 
each would have to be explored in depth. Anti-black racism, however, I believe has the strongest 
and deepest historical and present-day correlation with criminal oppression, and this is why I am 
devoting a chapter to its exploration.70 The close relationship between racial oppression and 
criminal oppression is evident in a number of historical developments. Among others, Angela 
Davis, Henry Louis Gates Jr., and Michelle Alexander have shown the historical links between 
slavery and the criminal justice system. All rely on the work of historical activists like Ida B. 
Wells and Frederick Douglass, and Davis and Alexander weave together the work of historians, 
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sociologists, and legal scholars to tell the story of race and criminality in the United States. In 
this section, I will highlight what I take to be the most important parts of this historical story to 
help understand why being black in the United States is nonaccidentally correlated with being 
treated as a criminal.  
1.1 Criminal Law and Punishment before and after the 13th Amendment  
Incarceration as a primary form of punishment for crime took root in the United States 
around the time of the Revolutionary War, replacing more common capital and corporal 
punishments as part of enlightenment-based humanitarian reform of punishment.71 While slavery 
was still legal and operating in the United States, in general, slaves were not treated as criminals 
or incarcerated because they were already lacking in the basic rights of citizens, the right to 
freedom of movement, the right to self-determination, and other rights that incarceration was 
meant to curtail.72 Likewise, non-slave (usually white) women, who experienced civil death upon 
marriage, were not treated as criminals or incarcerated because they were not seen has having a 
right to freedom of moment, so incarceration as a form of punishment could not apply to them. 
Instead, they were generally “punished” inside the home with corporal punishments for failing to 
perform the duties of wives and mothers.73 During this time, the view of incarceration was that it 
separated wrongdoers from the community so that they could experience solitude and penitence, 
thus reforming them so they could return to society.74  
It was only when slavery was abolished, and former slaves were legally (at least 
nominally) free that the relationship with incarceration began. Angela Davis points to the 
Thirteenth Amendment which states: 
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Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.75 
 
Thus, involuntary servitude, or slavery, could continue so long as those enslaved were convicted 
of crimes. As a result, “both Emancipation and the authorization of penal servitude combined to 
create an immense black presence within southern prisons and to transform the character of 
punishment into a means of managing former slaves as opposed to addressing problems of 
serious crimes.”76 After the Thirteenth Amendment, there was a dramatic change in the systems 
of punishment, as illustrated by the state of Alabama’s penitentiary system, where the prison 
population grew by three times between 1874 and 1877, and nearly all the growth was in black 
prisoners.77 Moreover, even as more and more former slaves were arrested, prisons were scarce 
in the south because people convicted of crimes were not sent to prisons, but leased out to coal 
mines, sugar and cotton plantations, and other places as workers.78 Similarly, slave codes, which 
has been used to prevent slaves from running away and to return them when they had, were 
repurposed into Black Codes, laws that only applied to black people and required that they have 
proof of employment, that they not “loiter,” and that they not disrespect white people lest they be 
charged with a crime. Thus, during this time, when criminal codes were created specifically to 
criminalize black people, being black made one subject to being treated as a criminal.79 Black 
Codes made it illegal for former slaves to be drunk, insult white people, be absent from work, or 
even possess firearms, making black people targets for law enforcement and criminal 
punishment.80  
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 At this time, newly freed slaves were arrested and convicted of a high rate of petty 
crimes, especially stealing small amounts.81 This reinforced a link between criminality and 
blackness in social stereotypes.82 Historians have been quick to explain that given the new social 
dynamics, it would have been necessary for newly freed slaves to turn to “petty thievery” to feed 
themselves.83  But more recently, scholars who were skeptical of the fact that newly freed slaves 
seemed to be so much more inclined to petty theft have argued based on historical research that 
in fact, many or most of these petty crimes were entirely fabricated for the purpose of controlling 
and re-enslaving huge numbers of newly freed slaves.84 As Frederick Douglass wrote in 1883, it 
was common to “impute crime to color” so that if a crime was committed, it was assumed to be 
committed by a black person.85 As a journalist, he reported on a situation in which observers saw 
a black man committing robbery, and the robber was shot and wounded, ending his attempt to 
flee.86 When authorities caught up to him, instead of finding the robber to be a black man, it was 
a white man who had painted his face black.87  
 Thus, before slavery ended, the criminal justice system in the United States was reserved 
for white people, and incarceration was seen as a rehabilitation for criminals so that they could 
return to society. Incarceration was a part of reforming prior forms of punishment, such as 
corporal and capital punishment, that were less enlightened. After the passage of the 13th 
Amendment, however, numbers of convicted people grew as former slaves were charged with 
crimes. Though they did fill prisons, they also were put into forced labor across the south where 
they were put into forced into “involuntary servitude” due to convictions of crimes. Whereas in 
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the south before the 13th Amendment, slaves were not regularly associated with criminality, the 
passage of black codes and the criminalization of newly freed slaves also began to sow the seeds 
for a new stereotype of the black person as a criminal.  
1.2 Convict Leasing and Chain Gangs 
According to historian David Oshinksy, “Between 1870 and 1910, the convict population 
grew ten times faster than the general one. Prisoners became younger and blacker, and the length 
of their sentences soared.”88 Once newly freed slaves were convicted of violating Black Codes, 
specially designed to keep them as second-class citizens, or of petty crimes they may or may not 
have committed, they were then subject to the same unpaid labor that existed during slavery.89 
Convict leasing was the practice of leasing out groups of convicts to private individuals, 
including those who had previously owned slaves, to do work. The prison was paid by the 
private party while the prisoners did free labor with treatment many historians describe as worse 
than that under slavery.90 Because the private parties purchasing the labor convicts did not own 
the convicts and could readily replace one with another, there was no incentive at all to protect 
the body of the prisoner (whereas slave owners often limited the severity of punishments to 
protect their investment, as slaves were profitable commodities), so conditions worsened.91 
Chain gangs were often seen throughout the South, where groups of prisoners performed hard 
labor chained to one another with heavy shackles, imagery that reinforced the connection 
between being black and being a criminal.92  
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1.3 Lynching and Rise of the Black Rapist Myth 
Along with the growing association of black men with criminals through Black Codes, 
convict leasing, and chain gangs, in the late 19th and early 20th century, the myth of the black 
rapist began to shape American society.93 This mythology consists of asserting that black men 
are particularly prone by their very nature to rape, especially white women.94 Many, including 
Frederick Douglass and, later, Angela Davis, argue that lynching black people, men in particular, 
was a common tool used by anti-black nationalists who sought to terrorize black people and 
maintain a hierarchy, and the myth of the black rapist arose as a justification for this practice.95 
In fact, before the Civil War, there was little concern that black men, including slaves, were 
sexual at all. They were often depicted as asexual and docile, and no one seemed to be concerned 
about white men leaving their wives and daughters with slaves to fight in the Civil War.96 
However, after the Civil War ended, the idea that black men were particularly prone to rape 
white women flourished.  
Ida B. Wells, a journalist and anti-lynching advocate, calculated that at least 10,000 black 
people were lynched between 1865 and 1895.97  The rape of white women by black men became 
a justification for lynching at the society-wide level despite the fact that, in specific cases of 
lynching, rape rarely the given justification. In a study done in 1931 by the Southern 
Commission for the Study of Lynching, between 1889 and 1929, only one sixth of lynching 
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victims were accused of rape.98 Frederick Douglass wrote that during Reconstruction, white 
nationalists justified lynching as a means of keeping black people from gaining political power, 
but as Reconstruction was undermined, this justification became less convincing.99 When black 
people were basically disenfranchised as Reconstruction fell, and lynching apologists could no 
longer credibly claim that black people posed any threat to white political power, white 
supremacists turned to the charge of rape as a justification for lynching.100 Public apologists for 
lynching, including US Senators, argued that they had to protect white women from the 
unbridled sexuality of black men, who were often compared to animals with animalistic sexual 
drives.101 White women were often complicit in this characterization, and some white women in 
leadership roles in the suffragist movement espoused such views.102 Still, some white women’s 
organizations did respond to calls from Ida B. Wells and Mary Church Terrell, the first president 
of the National Association of Colored Women, to end lynching in the 1930s.103  
Perhaps the most infamous example of this mythology comes from the film The Birth of 
a Nation, in which a black man, Gus, a former slave, is depicted as a rabid rapist chasing a 
virginal white woman who throws herself off a cliff to her death rather than be raped by the 
man.104 Her brother organizes the KKK to find Gus and lynch him. When it came out in 1915, 
President Woodrow Wilson watched it in the White House, and it was of such great popularity 
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that many scholars explain that it shaped the American narrative of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction for years.  
1.4 Civil Rights Movement and the Rise of Colorblind Racism 
In the 1940s and 1950s, the Civil Rights Movement fought back against Jim Crow and 
the explicit segregation in the South in areas such as housing, education, employment, and public 
accommodations. In the 1950s, largely heralded by the landmark Brown v. Board of Education 
Supreme Court decision outlawing segregation in public schools, de jure segregation waned.105 
With the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, slowly, 
Jim Crow laws and practices that explicitly segregated based on race disappeared and became 
illegal.106 But, as Michelle Alexander points to, a new language and system of social separation 
were already building.107 She argues that Slavery, Jim Crow, and Mass Incarceration are three 
different racial caste systems, and that as Jim Crow dissolved, criminality and incarceration rose 
to replace it.108 After the Civil Rights Movement, explicitly racist laws and language were illegal 
and unpopular, but there was still racist sentiment, and politicians still used this racist sentiment 
to gain power and maintain a racial caste system by appealing to “law and order.”109 During the 
Civil Rights Movement itself, the appeal to law and order regularly thinly veiled calls to vilify its 
leaders, who were, after all, breaking the law. The appeal to law and order continued after the 
victories of the civil rights era seemed to be set in stone.110  
The foundations for criminality to be used as a “dogwhistle” for racism were already in 
place. The Thirteenth Amendment still allowed for slavery for those convicted of crimes, and 
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though chain gangs and convict leasing had ceased, prison labor had begun to flourish in new 
settings. Moreover, the imagery and stereotypes of black men as criminals and rapist that 
developed as Reconstruction fell did not go away. At the same time, a huge increase in crime 
swept the United States in the 1960s and crime in some black neighborhoods rose sharply as 
well.111 The “tough on crime” Law and Order Movement appealed to many Americans, 
including some black Americans who were living in neighborhoods with significant crime.112  
Given this context, the Republicans, particularly Richard Nixon, employed the “Southern 
Strategy,” to appeal to white southerners, who up to that point had voted for Democrats, using 
implicitly racist messages.113 This strategy continued in the election of Ronald Reagan, who 
brought 22 percent of democratic voters to the Republican Party in 1980, with his twin promises 
of cutting welfare and cutting crime. He regularly used the stereotypes of the “welfare queen” 
and the “human predator” in his campaign speeches and in advertising, and these stereotypes 
implicitly referred to black people, while being careful to avoid explicit racial language. In 1982, 
Reagan announced his “war on drugs,” which had a disparate effect on black and Latinx 
Americans.114   
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1.5 Law and Order and the Anti-Violence Movement 
 In her book, Arrested Justice: Black Women, Violence, and America’s Prison Nation, 
Beth E. Richie defines the anti-violence movement as “the work that is done by individuals, 
groups, and organization to end male violence against women by looking at the root causes of 
the problems.”115 This movement began in the 1960s, building off of models of political activism 
from the civil rights movements, and first began making the claim rape and domestic violence 
were public problems rooted in “gender inequality” and the “subordination of women” rather 
than private acts of violence.116 Initially, this movement began with consciousness-raising groups 
that formed around a political analysis with a relatively monolithic conception of the category of 
“woman,” and argued that all women were equally subject to male violence regardless of race, 
class, ethnicity, or other identities. From these consciousness-raising groups, self-help coalitions 
developed primarily around women’s shelters for domestic violence and rape crisis centers in the 
early 1970s. These early centers were volunteer-led with little outside funding, and they 
remained highly political. At this point, a more complicated political consciousness began to 
arise. “Class based oppression, racial discrimination, and exploitation based on sexuality were 
targets in the work against the root causes of male violence, even though challenging gender 
inequality dominated as the undisputed primary political goal.” 117  
As this movement continued to expand, it recognized the role of the state and other 
institutions in perpetuating violence, from emergency room staff who ridiculed rape survivors to 
police who failed to protect victims of domestic violence and rape.118 Thus, the movement 
expanded its targets from just cultural notions of gender inequality, family and community 
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dynamics, to institutions. Leaders in this movement identified systemic gender disadvantages 
that made women susceptible to male violence: “a general lack of political representation, 
employment discrimination, systematic disregard for women’s contributions to the domestic 
sphere, as well as associated problems like lack of publicly funded child care, health disparities 
based on gender, constant threats to reproductive health services, and stereotypical media and 
cultural representations.”119 This opened up many more conversations about the ways that class, 
race, and sexuality contributed to violence against women, and it also presented new questions 
for realistic strategies to combat such a wide sweeping array of causes of this violence.  
Richie argues that at this point, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a split in the anti-
violence movement produced a more radical left wing of the group that remained committed to 
systemic change by focusing on power dynamics and more pragmatic, moderate liberal wing that 
wanted to provide services to women affected by violence. The second group was able to take up 
the Law and Order Movement’s successes by formulating violence against women as primarily a 
criminal problem, while the leftist movement focused on systemic, structural inequality. By 
aligning itself with the Law and Order Movement, the second group was able to get more 
resources and even have a large impact on legislation. While these legislative victories, including 
statutory rape laws, primary aggressor laws, new mandatory police practice around domestic 
violence calls, and rape shield laws did make some women significantly safer, little regard was 
taken for which women actually benefitted most from these laws.120 The most well known and 
significant piece of this legislation was the Violence Against Women Act, first passed in 1994, 
which foremost provided criminal justice tools for fighting violence against women, and also 
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added funding for shelters and other victims’ services.121 It is less well known, however, that it 
was passed as part of the now infamous Omnibus Crime Bill, which, among other things, created 
60 new federal capital crimes, ended Pell Grants for prisoners, provided extensive funding for 
new prisons and new police programs.122  
It is unquestionably true that these legislative advances helped some women in significant 
ways. But, Richie argues that, in focusing on male violence as a criminal matter instead of as a 
part of a bigger system of gender inequality, and because this view did not focus on the ways that 
gender-based violence appears differently in women’s lives based on race, class, and sexuality, 
the gains for some women were losses for others. She notes that, given the new realities of 
limited welfare and increased criminalization starting in the 1990s, black women and other 
women who are in precarious positions are not able to benefit from these advances. She cites 
“(1) communities suspicious of law enforcement because of aggressive tactics and occasional 
maltreatment; (2) . . . women whose gender performance, life circumstances, and /or sexuality 
threatens normative standards; (3) . . . women [who] attempt to protect themselves; and (4) for 
women whose victimization and risk of violence is so severe that they are forced to choose 
among very bad options to protect their own safety.”123 Because of increased mandatory arrest 
laws for domestic violence calls, many black women and other women of color no longer will 
call the police in cases of domestic violence.124 Radically different arrest rates for men of color 
in domestic violence cases raises questions of racism and stereotyping around gender-based 
violence.125 Moreover, combination of public welfare cut backs and increase in criminalization 
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means that having a family member use violence results in the whole family being kicked out of 
public housing. This means that poor women, disproportionately women of color, in public 
housing have strong incentives to avoid calling the police in domestic abuse situations.126 
Finally, the fact that the types of violence against women that are highlighted by these policies 
do not include state-based violence against women, including forced sterilization, rape by police 
and correctional officers, highlights the fact that many of the concerns of women of color, 
especially black women, are not addressed by these laws.127  
1.6 The New Jim Crow 
Michelle Alexander’s book The New Jim Crow has brought the connection between 
slavery, racism, and the criminal justice system to a broad audience. She argues that, under the 
guise of “law and order,” there has been a massive increase in the number of people incarcerated 
in the United States, and black and Latinx people are vastly overrepresented in this system.128 
Beyond simply incarceration, policing practices have expanded greatly, supported by Supreme 
Court rulings that chipped away at constitutional protections against searches and seizures and 
other Fourth Amendment Rights.129 This resulted in the ability of police to have wide discretion 
in who they pull over, stop and frisk, and interrogate, and they have many tools available for 
these practices.130 Empirical evidence suggests that with this discretion, they tend to over-police 
people of color.131 Sometimes explicitly racialized orders come from the top down, as with 
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Michael Bloomberg while he was mayor of New York City.132 Other times these disparities seem 
to result from something like implicit bias or implicit police practices and norms. 
 Evidence suggests that people of color are punished more harshly as well, and the 
Supreme Court has foreclosed the possibility of challenging racially disproportionate sentencing 
without evidence of racist intentions on the part of juries, whose deliberations are closed and 
secret.133 The wide discretion given to prosecutors is another place where implicit policies and 
practices as well as conscious or unconscious bias result in differing outcomes.134 And, these 
implications do not end when the sentences are served, as black and Latinx people are also more 
likely to be subject to the collateral consequences of convictions, arrests (even those that do not 
result in any conviction), and even of being assumed to be a criminal.135  
 Michelle Alexander opens her book with a poignant example of how the current criminal 
justice system in the United States has replaced slavery and Jim Crow and recreates the racial 
caste system in nominally colorblind ways. She introduces Jarvious Cotton.  
Like his father, grandfather, great-grandfather, and great-great-grandfather, he has 
been denied the right to participate in our electoral democracy. . . . Cotton’s great-
great-grandfather could not vote as a slave. His great-grandfather was beaten to 
death by the Ku Klux Klan for attempting to vote. His grandfather was prevented 
from voting by Klan intimidation. His father was barred from voting by poll taxes 
and literacy tests. Today, Jarvious Cotton cannot vote because he, like many black 
men in the United States, has been labeled a felon and is currently on parole.136 
 
This section has demonstrated that from the end of the Civil War through the present day, 
the criminal justice system in the United States has been intertwined with maintaining a 
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racial caste system that leaves black people in the United States subject to forced labor, 
violence, and second-class citizenship. In this way, criminal oppression in the United 
States is fundamentally intertwined with racial oppression, particularly anti-black racial 
oppression. I have also highlighted the way that the black rapist myth justified significant 
violence against black people, especially black men. Moreover, as the law and order 
movement mounted, violence against certain women was taken seriously, expanding the 
power of law enforcement and leading to more arrests of men of color without giving 
significant assistance to women of color who suffer from gender-based violence. With 
this history and present practice in mind, I want to articulate how the structural 
phenomenon of criminal oppression that I outlined in chapter one interacts with racial 
oppression.  
2. Criminal Oppression as Secondary Oppression for Black Americans 
In this section, I will apply Sally Haslanger’s concept of secondary oppression to the 
relationship between racial oppression and criminal oppression. Among other things, this means 
that being black makes it very likely that one will be oppressed as a criminal, but not all people 
oppressed as criminals are black.137 I will argue that Haslanger’s concept does capture the basic 
relationship between types of oppression that are “nonaccidentally correlated” with one another, 
but this relationship does not give enough information to capture the historical realities that have 
created the nonaccidental correlation between race and criminality that is present today. 
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To explain secondary oppression, let me first return to Haslanger’s discussion of 
oppression, which I first outlined in chapter 1:  [F=member of oppressed group, I =Institution, 
C=Context, R= Relation] 
(SO1) Fs are oppressed (as Fs) by an institution I in context C iffdf in C $R(being 
an F nonaccidentally correlates with being disadvantaged by standing in an unjust 
relation R to others) and I creates, perpetuates or reinforces R.138 
 
She gives the following example: 
Women are oppressed as women by cultural representations of women as sex 
objects in the United States in the late twentieth century iff being a woman in the 
United States in the late twentieth century nonaccidentally correlates with being 
subjected to systemic violence, and cultural representations of women as sex 
objects creates, perpetuates, or reinforces the systemic violence. 139 
 
She notes that even if not every woman actually experiences the systemic violence, each woman 
is still oppressed along these lines because being subject to the risk of the unjust harm is part of 
the condition of being oppressed. Some women, perhaps because of their relative privilege along 
race, class, sexual orientation, or gender identity, may be less at risk for this kind of violence, or 
it is not something that shapes her day-to-day experiences. One might imagine that a wealthy 
white woman who can take private cars rather than relying on public transit or walking, does not 
have to deal with street harassment on a daily basis as many women who take public transit do.   
Secondary oppression occurs when one type of oppression is nonaccidentally correlated 
with another kind of oppression. Being a member of one oppressed group makes a person likely 
to be subject to structural injustices that arise from a different set of policies. Because that group 
is unjustly disadvantaged by one type structural oppression, they are then more likely to be 
subject to another kind of oppression.   
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Let me explain how this model would work out in more detail.  The following is 
Haslanger’s definition of secondary oppression:  
(SO2) Fs are oppressed (as Fs) by an institution I in context C iffdf in C $R 
(((being an F nonaccidentally correlates with being unjustly disadvantaged either 
primarily, because being F is unjustly disadvantaging in C, or secondarily, 
because ($G)(being F nonaccidentally correlates with being G due to a prior 
injustice and being G is unjustly disadvantaging in C)) and I creates, perpetuates 
or reinforces R.)140 
 
She spells out a specific example of how secondary oppression could work:  
Blacks are oppressed as Blacks by child welfare policies in Chicago in the 1990s 
because in that context being poor results in having one’s family unjustly 
disrupted, and being poor nonaccidentally correlates with being Black due to a 
prior injustice, and the child welfare policies cause or perpetuate unjust disruption 
of families.141  
 
In this particular case, she uses the work of noted child welfare historian Dorothy Roberts, who 
has argued that child welfare policies in the United States perpetuate racial oppression. Roberts 
points to a history of explicit racism in these policies as well as to present day disparate effects, 
including worse treatment for black children, higher likelihoods of being removed from the home 
compared to other races, and pejorative attitudes toward black families. Roberts argues that even 
if the present-day realities of the system are only due to the fact that black families are more 
likely to be poor, and poor families are more likely to have their families split apart, this is still 
racial oppression because of the fact black families are poorer because of a history of racism, not 
for any morally justified reason. Haslanger attempts to capture this idea with her model of 
secondary oppression: current unjust practices that are nominally not connected to race can still 
be considered racial oppression if they fail to address a current inequality that was created by 
past racism. Thus, in her example, even if there is no trace of racial bias in the current system 
                                               
140 Haslanger, “Oppressions,” 326–7. 




itself, the fact that black people are disproportionately affected because of prior injustice is 
enough to make this a type of racial oppression (in addition to a type of class oppression).142  
This is one possible way of modeling the relationship between criminal oppression and 
racial oppression, with criminal oppression as a secondary kind of oppression for black people. 
In this case, criminal oppression, an oppression of its own kind, is nonaccidentally correlated 
with being black, and being racialized as black includes oppressive practices in the United States 
as well.  To apply it to my case of the criminal justice system, I would fill out the claim of 
oppression thusly:  
Black people are oppressed as black people by the criminal justice system in the 
United States in the present day because in that context being labeled a criminal 
nonaccidentally results in systemic violence including police brutality, 
incarceration, and collateral consequences of conviction, and being treated as a 
criminal nonaccidentally correlates with being black due to a prior injustice, and 
the criminal justice system causes or perpetuates the systemic violence at issue. 
 
By using this model, we can imagine that we are taking a snapshot of the way that criminal 
oppression and racial oppression look in the present day (2020-ish). Given the facts of the 
overrepresentation of black people in the criminal justice system, the presence of police brutality 
directed at black people (so powerfully brought to mainstream white consciousness by the 
Movement for Black Lives), and the disparate sentencing of black people, secondary oppression 
seems to capture the relationship between anti-black racism and criminal oppression. Being 
black is “nonaccidentally correlated” with being treated as a criminal. Moreover, this 
nonaccidental correlation is caused by a prior injustice: slavery, Jim Crow, and the racist (but 
nominally “colorblind”) Law and Order Movement, et cetera, described in section one. Thus, 
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when a black person is, for example, stopped and frisked, they are being oppressed qua criminal 
and qua black.  
 Secondary oppression is a good place to start when explaining the relationship between 
racial oppression and criminal oppression because it points out that membership in one group of 
oppressed people, in this case, being black, makes one likely to be subjected to another kind of 
oppression, in this case criminal oppression. Recall that even being subject to the risk of the 
oppressive policies and practices makes one oppressed even if they are not actually subjected at 
any point to these policies and practices. One way that this could manifest is that a black person 
in the United States would be totally justified in being psychologically affected by criminal 
oppression even if they are never followed by a security guard, incarcerated, or otherwise treated 
as a criminal. The likelihood that this could happen is itself part of the oppression. The history 
and present practices outlined in section one provide the explanation for why being black is 
nonaccidentally correlated with criminal oppression in the United States.  
 While secondary oppression provides a rubric for thinking about the intersection of race 
and criminality, it is insufficient to explain the relationship without the historical and present-day 
practices. Without this history, there is no content to the “nonaccidental correlation,” which is 
essential for understanding race and criminality in the United States.   
3. Important Objections 
Thinking of racial oppression and criminal oppression as primary and secondary 
oppressions presents a picture of two distinct oppressive structures that interact when particular 
individuals are picked out for oppressive practices. Neither system is reducible to the other 
system, but they are both activated when a black person is treated as a criminal. This particular 




person who is treated as a criminal, this analysis of two interlocking systems does not seem quite 
right. When one is profiled by a police officer, the person will not be able to point to parts of the 
experience and say, there I was treated as black, but here I was treated as a criminal. It may seem 
that being treated as a criminal is simply one of myriad ways that they are oppressed as a black 
person, and there is nothing that marks this treatment as different from all kinds of racial 
oppression.  
 Another related criticism of this approach is that it seems to suggest that black people 
treated as criminals, particularly when they have not committed particularly bad crimes, are in 
the same category as well-off, privileged white men who commit real crimes. I will use two 
examples. Under my theory, two white men who committed terrible crimes are ‘criminals’ and 
will thus count as oppressed, but both, in some ways, because of their other identities, were able 
to mitigate their oppression. The first is Brock Turner, the 19-year old Stanford swimmer who 
raped Chanel Miller while she was unconscious in an alley. He was found guilty by a jury, but 
the judge in his case expressed sympathy for him and sentenced him to six months in county jail, 
of which he served three.  The second is Dylann Roof, who shot and killed nine black members 
of Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina when he attended their prayer meeting. 
He clearly expressed extreme racist views, and it is unquestionable that these murders were hate 
crimes. He was apprehended completely unharmed as he fled the scene with multiple weapons. 
The police gave him a bullet proof vest as he was transported and got him a fast-food meal 
before he was interrogated. The leniency shown both men produced outrage in many parts of the 
public.  
What do these men have in common with Philando Castile, killed by an officer as he 




self-appointed neighborhood watch man who supposedly thought his skittles were dangerous? Or 
Sandra Bland who died in police custody under suspicious circumstances after being arrested 
with little cause during a traffic stop. As I work on this chapter, video footage of three white 
vigilantes chasing, shooting, and killing 25-year-old Ahmaud Arbury have surfaced, and the men 
were not even arrested until a huge national uproar, including celebrity pressure, forced the case. 
Breonna Taylor was killed by multiple gunshots from police when they stormed her apartment to 
serve an arrest warrant for someone who no longer lived there. Preliminary evidence suggests 
police indiscriminately fired into her apartment and two others.  
This is an important objection that I do not take lightly, and I want to clarify what my 
theory commits me to. Before I explain what these black victims of police and vigilantes have to 
do with Turner or Roof, I will use a discussion of intersectionality to explain what an analysis of 
criminal oppression can and cannot do, and what claims I am making (and which ones I am not). 
 
4. How Intersectionality Tells Us More About Racism and Criminal Oppression 
Crenshaw first introduced the concept of intersectionality in an article in 1989 in order to 
capture the way that black women’s experience of oppression differed from both black men’s 
and white women’s, and how the structure of law worked to obscure this particular kind of 
oppression. Since then, the concept has been used across many disciplines and been taken up by 
popular culture, activist projects of all kinds, and political candidates. There are so many ways 
that it has been used that it is important to be specific about how I am using intersectionality as a 
concept and how my analysis is “intersectional.” Recently, Crenshaw, with several other 
theorists, noted that intersectionality can be thought of as three types of engagements.143  
                                               




This field can be usefully framed as representing three loosely defined sets of 
engagements: the first consisting of applications of an intersectional framework or 
investigations of intersectional dynamics, the second consisting of discursive 
debates about the scope and content of intersectionality as a theoretical and 
methodological paradigm, and the third consisting of political interventions 
employing an intersectional lens.144 
 
The first engagement, which I call “analysis” as a shorthand, requires using the idea of 
intersecting oppressions to analyze a social situation; it is an application of the concept to 
phenomena in the world. In the second engagement, which I call “conceptual analysis,” scholars 
analyze the concept intersectionality, explaining what the concept means and how it works with 
other related concepts. Finally, when people engage in certain political and social projects 
intended to fight oppression along more than one axis, recognizing the ways identities can 
intersect, I call this “political praxis.”  
Intersectionality as analysis: When I explained the relationship of race and criminality 
by giving a brief history and then using a structural analysis to understand this history, I was 
practicing a kind of intersectional analysis. Crenshaw, Cho, and McCall define intersectional 
analysis thusly:  
[W]hat makes an analysis intersectional—whatever terms it deploys, whatever its 
iteration, whatever its field or discipline—is its adoption of an intersectional way 
of thinking about the problem of sameness and difference and its relation to 
power. This framing—conceiving of categories not as distinct but as always 
permeated by other categories, fluid and changing, always in the process of 
creating and being created by dynamics of power—emphasizes what 
intersectionality does rather than what intersectionality is.145 
 
They note that one need not go through a particular set of citations, note the right scholars or 
invoke any magical words to be doing intersectional analysis. When I explained in section one 
that the category of ‘criminal’ developed through forms of racism, that was an intersectional 
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analysis that recognized that the categories of ‘criminal’ and ‘black person’ are distinct but 
“permeated” by one another. 
Intersectionality as a Concept: Having performed an intersectional analysis, I will 
explain how my structural approach to understanding race and criminal oppression fits into the 
bigger picture of intersectionality by engaging in conceptual analysis of the concept of 
intersectionality, using both Crenshaw and Kristie Dotson’s work as a launching point. In this 
section, I will explain the particular conceptions of intersectionality that I have in mind. I will be 
undertaking the second engagement that Crenshaw and her co-authors delineate:  
A second field of inquiry focuses on discursive investigations of intersectionality 
as theory and methodology. This approach includes but is not limited to questions 
and debates about the way intersectionality has been developed, adopted, and 
adapted within the disciplines. It considers what intersectionality includes, 
excludes, or enables and whether intersectionality’s contextual articulations call 
either for further development or for disavowal and replacement.146 
 
I will unpack the essential features of intersectionality and explore two different models of 
theorizing intersectionality as explained by Kristie Dotson. Here, I will be analyzing and 
clarifying the concept and methodology of intersectionality itself.  
Intersectionality is a name for analysis that demonstrates how different axes of 
oppression intersect with one another. The classic example of intersecting axes of oppression is 
race and gender. Black women suffer both racism and sexism, and thus, understanding their 
oppression is a good place to start building a conception of intersectionality. One way to think of 
their oppression is that it is “additive,” meaning that black women experience racial oppression 
on top of gender oppression. This may be true, and some of the earliest work on intersectionality 
does suggest that black women’s oppression is worse than black men’s or white women’s. For 
example, in 1989, Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality” in an article on anti-
                                               




discrimination law, she used an analogy in which black women were at the bottom of a social 
hierarchy, with black men and white women above them, and those with no oppressed identities 
on the top.147 At first blush, then, it seems that Crenshaw is arguing that black women are the 
most oppressed because they are oppressed as black and as women.  
While the “additive” model of intersectionality has a sort of intuitive appeal, it is not the 
only way to understand intersectionality, nor is it the primary way that Crenshaw describes it. 
The more powerful and useful way to understand intersectionality is to recognize that all aspects 
of a person’s identity will shape their experience of oppression. For example, white women will 
not experience “sexism” without reference to race. Instead, their experience of sexism will be 
shaped by their race, even if their race is overall an axis of privilege. She gives an example from 
Sojourner Truth’s famous speech, “Ain’t I a Woman?” In that speech, Truth was responding to 
arguments from white men that women were too weak to endure politics, so they should not get 
to vote. Truth, a former slave, stood up, demonstrating her strong body with its scars from being 
beaten. The implication was that she was a woman, and she was not weak. She was not only 
putting down these men who thought so little of women, but she was also highlighting that 
“womanhood” actually was white womanhood. Her speech revealed that this common sexist 
trope of women being weak and frail is actually a racial stereotype as well. Black women were 
not, and are not, seen as frail and weak. That is a gender stereotype of white women. So, even in 
this example of white women’s oppression, the idea that they are weak, requires an implicit 
reference to race to make sense.   
Crenshaw gave another example of how race inflects gender discrimination by looking at 
an anti-discrimination court case, DeGraffenreid v. General Motors. In that case, a black woman, 
                                               




DeGraffenreid, claimed racial and gender discrimination when she was laid off.148 The court 
examined the two discrimination claims in isolation, saying there is no civil rights remedies that 
are special for ‘black women.’ The court said that because the other women in the firm were not 
fired, she could not have been fired for her gender, ignoring the fact that all the other women in 
the firm were white women.149 The court resolved the racial discrimination claim by dismissing 
it so that it could be consolidated with an existing racial discrimination case against the same 
employer.150 The court could not recognize that DeGraffenreid was discriminated against as a 
black woman, and that what she faced was different than the white women at her employers (or 
the black men that were in the other lawsuit). As Crenshaw explains in a Ted Talk, 
DeGraffenreid was caught between different stereotypes. What the court could not recognize was 
that the black men were all employed doing manual labor, for which, she as a black woman, was 
not seen as appropriate. Similarly, all the white women were receptionists, a position that the 
employer thought that she, as a black woman, was not right for. Only when you understood that 
she was discriminated against as a black woman, not simply as black or simply as a woman, 
could you understand her position. She fit into neither stereotype: the black man manual laborer 
nor the white woman receptionist, and therefore she could not fit into the workplace because she 
was a black woman.151 This is different than the additive model of intersectionality because the 
claim is not that she is oppressed as black and as a woman. If that were the case, then she would 
have been able to get some remedy by being lumped with the white women and some from being 
lumped with the black men in her anti-discrimination claim. Instead, because her oppression was 
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not like the black men’s (being kept in manual labor) or white women’s (being kept as 
receptionists), her claim was invisible to the court.  
In addition to recognizing that gender oppression is inflected by race, Crenshaw explains 
that racial oppression is inflected by gender. She points to the stereotypes of the absent black 
father advanced by the Moynihan Report, a government sponsored report that blamed racial 
inequality on the nature of black families. In that example, black men are being oppressed by this 
stereotype of the absent father, which is a racialized and gendered stereotype.152 Thus, even 
though being a man is overall a privileged identity, when one is oppressed as a black person, that 
oppression is affected by gender as well.  
Crenshaw critiques the response of the black community to the Moynihan report and its 
progeny because she says the community fought back against the falsehood of the absent black 
father without recognizing or resisting the concomitant stereotype of the irresponsible black 
mother.153 She explains that neither the black community nor white feminists expressed outrage 
at the idea that there is something wrong with a household headed by a black woman. And this is 
why she comes around to the argument that we should look to black women in our organizing 
against oppression, because where black women can enter, so can all women and all black 
people. This sounds like the additive approach, but it is not. The reason that she says that 
political organizing should seek to include black women is that there are already developing 
remedies for white women and black men. And black women could only have access to these 
remedies when their oppression looked like either a black man’s or a white woman’s. So, when 
she argues that black women are at the bottom of the social hierarchy, it is not because they 
simply have black oppression and women’s oppression added together. It is that their particular 
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oppression, inflected by subordinate race and gender, is not as visible as the oppression of people 
whose oppression is inflected with only one subordinated identity. So, while it is true that she 
sees black women as being worse off than black men and white women, this is largely because 
the movements organizing to fight racism are focused on black men’s oppression and the 
movements organized to fight sexism are focused on white women’s oppression.  
To summarize the key points that I take from Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality, 
one’s different identities are all at play in experiences of oppression. Even if one identity is a 
privileged one, it will still play a role in how one is oppressed by the non-privileged identity. For 
example, Hillary Clinton, a white, upper class, cis, heterosexual woman, was harshly criticized 
for choosing to continue her career while her husband campaigned for president in 1992.154 
White women assumed to be wives and mothers under classical sexist stereotypes, so the idea 
was that there must be something wrong with her for not wanting to conform to this stereotype. 
Michelle Obama was also criticized while helping her husband campaign, but as she explains, 
she was “the angry black woman” who was “emasculating her husband.”155 Both women were 
criticized for being active in their careers and strong public figures, but the gender stereotypes 
were also both racialized. Additionally, the stereotypes invoked in Clinton’s case were 
stereotypes about white, cis, heterosexual women—she was criticized for failing to live up to the 
ideal woman, who is white, cis, and heterosexual (and able-bodied, and so on).  
To apply this insight to the race and criminality discussion, it is not simply the case that 
those who are racially oppressed and criminally oppressed are more oppressed than people who 
are only criminally oppressed. That is true. But, the way that the oppression shows up will be 
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different. For example, the stereotypes of young black men as criminals (as gang members or 
drug dealers, or as particularly dangerous) are different than the kinds of stereotypes at work for 
poor white young men (petty thieves, meth-heads, or other stereotypes). Because black men are 
stereotyped as particularly dangerous, they will be more likely to experience the kind of police 
brutality highlighted by the Movement for Black Lives. For Muslims, different stereotypes will 
shape the way that they are targeted by police, for example, by the use of vast surveillance 
networks supposedly in place to prevent terrorism.156 Thus, recognizing the intersectional nature 
of racial and criminal oppression will highlight that a black person will not only be subject to 
more oppression than a white ‘criminal,’ but also that oppression will be qualitatively different, 
as the racial oppression will be inflected by criminal oppression and criminal oppression will 
always be inflected by race, even when that race is a privileged one. 
Kristie Dotson adds to this conception of intersectionality by describing two different 
ways of understanding oppression. She finds both methodologies of understanding 
intersectionality in the Combahee River Collective’s ‘A Black Feminist Statement,’ and she 
suggests that often they can seem at odds with one another. To attempt to capture this idea, 
Dotson argues that oppression is “multi-stable.” By this, she means that understanding 
oppression in one way will seem like a complete description of it, and it will be accurate. But this 
method will also obscure another accurate and complete understanding of oppression. 
Intersectionality is the name that Crenshaw gave to the practice of trying to uncover hidden 
aspects and experiences of oppression, though black feminists have been doing this for much 
longer than the term “intersectionality” has been around. There are two ways of understanding 
oppression that are both true, but they take different perspectives and that can make them seem 
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like they are at odds with one another. These two ways of viewing oppression are both reveled 
by different kinds of intersectional analysis, and this is part of why some discussions of 
intersectionality have become so contradictory. Dotson suggests that by clarifying these different 
approaches, each of which captures something true about oppression that the other hides, we can 
better understand debates about the nature of intersectionality. For my purposes, understanding 
these two different approaches to intersectional analysis help me respond to the criticisms I 
outlined in section 3.  
The first approach to intersectionality articulates oppression as multiple interlocking 
systems, and the second approach focuses on the holistic experiences of those in particular social 
locations where different aspects of their identity shape their experience of oppression.157 Of the 
interlocking systems approach, Dotson writes,  
Oppression, then, can be seen to function according to diverse systems of 
jeopardy that interlock and complicate one another. The descriptors – systems-
based, interlocking and manifold – fix oppression as a conglomerate of diverse, 
discrete systems that represent different and complicated sites of jeopardy 
according to a functionalization by description.158 
 
On this model, intersectionality requires examining distinct structures of oppression, for 
example, anti-black racism, sexism, poverty, sexuality, as well as  the locations where these 
distinct systems of oppression overlap. We see black women’s experience as the experience of 
people at the intersection of the race structure and the gender structure. Returning to the example 
of Michelle Obama, using the first method, we can think about the two oppressive structures that 
are at work in the experience of being stereotyped as an angry black woman: anti-black racism 
and gender oppression. In this interlocking systems method, we would analyze the structure of 
anti-black racism, thinking about all the institutions that keep this racial hierarchy in place, 
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including the history of slavery and Jim Crow in the United States. And we would do the same 
for gender oppression. We might focus on family roles and sexual violence and other tools that 
seem to keep women oppressed. And then we would think about how those two oppressive 
structures come together to oppress black women by showing how anti-black racism and sexism 
produce the ‘angry-black-woman’ stereotype.   
On the second model, we can analyze the experience that Obama had holistically, 
focusing on her experience. She did not experience being treated as an angry black woman as 
two distinct things: being a woman and being black. The holistic model does not analyze 
overlapping oppressions (plural), but the experience of oppression (singular) that is activated by 
different identities. Dotson writes of the holistic approach: ,  
Oppression can be understood, then, according to ranges of jeopardization, and 
that range can often be tracked according to the ways one’s readable social 
identities increase or decrease one’s risk and experiences of harm in a given 
geopolitical space. Therefore, noting the transformation of ‘oppressions’ (plural) 
into ‘oppression’ (singular) for the Collective is important.159 
 
In this methodology, we do not think of oppression as a laundry list of identities, but as a 
singular experience. When Michelle Obama was treated as an angry black woman, her 
experience was not compartmentalizable into gender oppression and racial oppression. Instead of 
being the target of distinct oppressive systems, in a holistic approach, being black and being a 
woman place Obama in jeopardy in different ways depending on the context, and she will be in 
jeopardy in different times and in different ways than Clinton. The holistic approach resists 
looking at racial oppression and gender oppression as distinct systems because the actual 
experience is seamless.   
                                               




Dotson prefers the holistic intersectional methodology because she says that it does a 
better job capturing the reality that intersectionality was meant to capture in the first place: it is 
impossible to parse out the pieces of one’s oppression that are due to one identity rather than 
another.160 To emphasize this point, we can think back to DeGraffenreid, whose oppression was 
not visible to the judge because he could not find the gender oppression or the race oppression. 
Dotson argues that the interlocking systems approach first disintegrates the oppression to analyze 
the distinct systems at work, and then tries to put it back together. This is why the holistic and 
interlocking system approaches seem, on the surface, to be conflicting accounts of oppression. 
Strict adherents to one model will be suspicious of strict adherents to the other because of how 
each model emphasizes something different. For example, Dotson suggests that the interlocking 
systems approach would focus on what all women share, looking at the system of gender 
oppression, and then thinking of the ways that race can inflect that oppression. Adherents of this 
model might be more hopeful about women’s solidarity across racial lines. On the other hand, 
the holistic approach would emphasize unique oppression faced by black women, and especially 
the ways and contexts that particular black women are in jeopardy and white women are not. It 
would also highlight the fact that black women are in more types of jeopardy in more contexts 
than white women.161 Adherents of this model may be more suspicious of the possibility of 
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women’s solidarity across race. Politically, the holistic approach will tend to lead to advocacy for 
identity politics to fight oppression. Dotson notes that this is the approach outlined Combahee 
River Collective’s statement. People who are subject to a wide range of jeopardizations will be 
particularly well equipped to fight oppression, on this model, and black women play an essential 
role in fighting both gender and racial oppressions. 
Although she thinks the holistic approach has more promise, Dotson still recognizes a 
place for the interlocking systems approach. Dotson explains that an advantage to the 
interlocking systems approach is that, in looking at the different structures of oppression, for 
example, race, class, and gender, one will find often unexpected “bridges across different 
experiences of oppression”162  For example, examining race and gender as two discrete power 
structures can allow for the recognition of the fact that the system of gender oppression affects 
women of all races, so that white women and black women will share the experience of being 
sexually objectified, though the experiences will be distinct because they will be inflected by 
race. As I noted above, such an analysis can reveal possibilities of solidarity as well.  
Thinking about these two methods or ways of thinking about intersectionality can shed 
light on the two potential objections to my project that I raised above. The first objection is that 
my approach to separating criminal oppression from racism, particularly anti-black racism, does 
not ring true to the experience of many black people who have been criminally oppressed. Being 
stopped and frisked does not feel like racial oppression and “criminal” oppression: that 
experience is impossible to sort out into distinct oppressions. And that is exactly what a holistic 
approach to intersectionality would say: there is no way to separate out something like ‘criminal’ 
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oppression from black oppression in real life. My account of the historical development of the 
current criminal justice system in the United States points also to the permeation of anti-black 
racism and criminal oppression, and for many who focus on the experiences of black people 
oppressed by police, for example, criminal oppression simply is a type of racial oppression. This 
makes sense on a holistic account because no one would be able to sort out the different systems 
at work in that experience.  Dotson notes that an interlocking systems approach obscures what 
the holistic approach highlights: the inability to truly disentangle the experience of oppression. It 
is thus unsurprising that my systems-based account does not capture what it feels like to be 
oppressed as black or as a criminal. That is a shortcoming of my account, and I as a white 
woman who has never been treated as a criminal, do not occupy the kind of identity position that 
is well suited for a holistic account. Following Dotson’s notes on this account, I emphasize that 
my account of these kinds of oppression is limited by the fact that it is an interlocking systems 
analysis. There is much that my account will not be able to illuminate because of my subject 
position and the tools (system’s analysis) that I am using.  
The second objection that I raised to my account was that I seem to be placing very 
different people in the same category. How can Trayvon Martin, Philando Castile, Sandra Bland, 
Ahmaud Arbury, and Breonna Taylor be in the same category with Brock Turner, a white rapist, 
and Dylann Roof, a racist murderer? First, I will note what I do not mean by this claim. To say 
that they are all in the category ‘criminal’ is not to say that they are morally equivalent. Nor does 
it mean that they are subject to the same ‘range of jeopardization,’ to use Dotson’s language. To 
say that they are in the same category does not illuminate anything about the divergent 




threatens to obscure the important differences in experience and jeopardization. But it can also 
highlight the way a system can work across widely different contexts.  
The usefulness of the interlocking systems approach is that it ought to illuminate new and 
perhaps surprising connections, “bridges across different experiences of oppression,” in Dotson’s 
words. This bridge that unites the different experiences of criminal oppression is that (even 
alleged) criminal wrongdoing is used as a justification to socially and politically exclude people. 
In the two examples that I introduced before the discussion of intersectionality, Brock Turner 
and Dylann Roof, each were treated, at some point after committing their crimes, as members of 
the community. They were treated as we ought to treat all people, even those who have done 
horrible things, because they are still members of the political community. But the general 
response from the public was that these men should not be treated with care. And the treatment 
of black men is often used as a backwards justification for why these white criminals should be 
treated worse.  
In my first example, when Brock Turner was sentenced to six months and served three, 
people were outraged because he was sentenced to more time, that he was not excluded more. 
The judge who sentenced Turner discussed his future, and considered how much Turner had lost 
already.163 Much of this outrage appeared as comparisons between Turner and black men 
charged with a variety of crimes, highlighting the stark differences between their sentences. In 
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one meme, Corey Batey, a black Vanderbilt football player who also raped an unconscious 
woman, was sentenced to 10–25 years.164 Black social activist Misee Harris noted that Batey, 
who had accepted guilt and apologized to his victim in court, still deserved harsh punishment. 
She stated, “Brock Turner only admits his guilt in underage college campus drinking and has 
never once even attempted to at the very least acknowledge his victim. Both very sad situations, 
however, both deserve to face the ultimate punishment for their actions.”165 Harris is not the only 
one who thought that Turner’s sentence was too short: a group of feminist advocates successfully 
organized and won a recall of the judge who sentenced Turner. But Harris, rather than suggesting 
that the vast inequality in these sentences meant that we should give Batey a lesser sentence, 
considering what kind of a future he might have, she wanted to make Turner experience the same 
long-term social and political exclusion as Batey.  As this is an intersectional analysis, I must 
note that Turner’s race and class status protected him from a more serious encounter with 
criminal oppression. If he were black, and likely if he were quite poor (his family was surely able 
to afford a big legal team), the outcome would have been different.  And by the same token, 
there Corey Batey’s race played a significant role in subjecting him to a much harsher sentence. 
But the focus on what criminals deserve came out in the response to Turner. Rather than calling 
for a shorter sentence for Batey, and for the judge to take into account his future, as Turner’s 
judge did, the focus was on more punishment.  
In my second example, Dylann Roof, who disturbingly shot and killed nine members of a 
black church in an attempt to start a race war, was apprehended by police without a hint of 
violence toward him. Police officers also put Roof in a bullet proof-vest to protect him when he 
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was being transferred and got him fast food before interrogating him.166 The care shown to 
protect Roof’s life and feed him, hardly indicators of great kindness, were met with anger on 
social media, and again, comparisons were immediately made to the way that black people have 
been treated by police.167 In one meme, a photo of 12-year old Tamir Rice is next to a photo of 
Roof. Under Rice’s picture, text reads “Toy Gun: Shot Dead.” Under Roof’s, the text reads, 
“Murdered 9: Apprehended Alive.”168 The general upshot of these criticisms of the police who 
apprehended Roof were not simply that a black person would have been treated worse, which is 
almost certainly true, but that Roof should have been treated worse. In these criticisms is the idea 
that, even beyond the scope of the actual punishment of Roof (who has been sentenced to death), 
there should be violence and lack of care for his physical safety while he is being apprehended, 
before facing trial or even being charged. Of course, legally, this is not the case, and de jure, all 
criminals are legally supposed to be treated as Roof was. And, as the criticism highlights, a white 
supremacist was treated the way the law is supposed to treat him. Again, I want to suggest that 
we ought to be arguing the other way around. There is inequality in the treatment of black and 
white ‘criminals,’ and the standard should be that we treat all people who are being arrested like 
those police treated Roof.   
Our criminal justice system has been used to keep black people as outsiders in our 
political and social lives, and popularly, we resist the moments when even white criminals are 
treated as though they are members of the political community.  As I noted in chapter one, the 
heart of criminal oppression is the idea that if one has committed a crime, they deserve to be 
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civically and politically excluded. This idea may have emerged as the criminal justice system 
began to be used against black people, but seeds of that idea were already present in the system 
of incarceration as a means of separating criminals from the community, even if for rehabilitative 
purposes. We should resist the connection between criminality and social and political exclusion 
in all of its forms. One might correctly note that many white people seem to be able to avoid 
treatment as a ‘criminal’ on my definition — a rapist and a racist murderer were treated without 
social exclusion in these particular moments. Turner was able to leverage his race and class and 
will largely escape criminal oppression. Roof will almost surely face the most radical exclusion 
of the death penalty and his years up until then will likely be under solitary confinement, another 
radical form of exclusion.  
To return to the two methodologies of intersectionality, my approach of interlocking 
systems does obscure the range of jeopardies that a holistic approach would highlight. 
Politically, we should be especially concerned about those who suffer under a wider range of 
jeopardies because they live at the intersection of race and criminality, or class and criminality, 
and so on. But understanding the system of criminal justice and the way that it operates in many 
different places with many different subjects helps illuminate the fact that this system uses a 
moral justification to exclude members of society.  
By clarifying the concept of intersectionality that my project has applied, I have 
responded to two important criticisms. First, one might argue that distinguishing between 
criminal and racial oppression does not accurately capture the experience of being an oppressed 
member of these groups. A black man experiencing police brutality cannot separate out being 
treated as black and being treated as a criminal. That is true, and it is a short-coming of the type 




people in the same group: innocent black people hurt and killed because of perceived criminality 
and actually guilty white people who end up being treated better than the innocent black people. 
I have argued that this is the strength of my project, not because I argue that they are morally the 
same or equally worthy of our concern or political activity. But I have shown how the logic of 
criminality is to exclude for putatively morally justified reasons.  This requires looking at the 
structures of criminal law enforcement as distinct from racist structures, as well as how they 
interact.  
Intersectionality as political praxis: Having discussed conceptual analysis and I want to 
gesture toward what Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall note the third use of intersectionality is— 
political praxis. Understanding the fact that the criminal justice system is oppressive and that it 
has a unique history of oppressing black people in the United States, those who are fighting 
against other kinds of oppression must be wary of using the criminal justice system or the 
stereotypes and social practices of criminal oppression, including social and political exclusion, 
to achieve these ends. Those who mobilize to end gender-based violence should take special care 
to avoid this system. I will take up the discussion I left off here to argue that the activists who 
worked to recall the judge who sentenced Brock Turner focused incorrectly on punishing Turner 
more rather than working to get more meaningful justice for Chanel Miller and other victims of 
rape.  I will take up this argument in chapters 4 and 5. I will take insights drawn from the 
interlocking systems of oppression approach, which highlights the way that the criminal justice 
system (as well as society at large) oppresses when it excludes with the justification that it is 
morally justified to exclude because the excluded person has committed a wrong against the 
community. But, I will also note the holistic approach to understanding intersectionality should 




jeopardization, which will be those who are oppressed as criminals and oppressed along racial, 
class, or other lines. I will argue that using the criminal justice system to fight gender-based 
violence re-entrenches the logic of criminal oppression as well as threatens to expand the ranges 
of jeopardy for those who are already the most in jeopardy  
5. Conclusion 
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I set out a distinct system of oppression, criminal 
oppression, and outlined the policies and practices through which it operates, what its chief harm 
is (social and political exclusion), and its unique logic of using moral blame as a marker for 
outsider status. In the first two sections of this chapter, I explained how the system of criminal 
oppression interacts with the system of racial oppression, in part by noting their historical 
intertwinement in the United States. I noted how gender featured in this history and present day, 
especially in the black rapist myth and the present-day criminal justice response to violence 
against women. In the words of Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall, I used the historical development 
of the criminal justice system in the United States to show that it is “not … distinct but is always 
permeated by other categories, fluid and changing, always in the process of creating and being 
created by dynamics of power.”169  In the second section of this chapter, I used the model of 
primary and secondary oppression to conceptualize the link between the two kinds of oppression. 
In the third section I raised two objections, and in the fourth section I explained how thinking 
about the two different methodologies of intersectional analysis, interlocking systems and the 
holistic approach, allow me to respond to these objections. My project is primarily one of an 
interlocking systems intersectional analysis, which makes it a good tool for understanding 
structural dynamics. But, it also can obscure the realities of the experiences of those who face 
                                               




oppression. With that being said, my project will be stronger at examining the structure, and I 
note the limitations of that kind of analysis for describing some aspects of oppression. Still, there 
is a great strength in interlocking systems intersectional methodology. By conducting this 
analysis, I have been able to highlight the way that criminal oppression can mask racism by 
giving a moral justification for the exclusion of people who are ‘criminals.’ 
Given what I have said about the similarities between those who experience primary and 
secondary oppressions of race and criminality and white people who have actually committed 
serious crimes, there is a lingering objection that my next chapter will respond to. One might 
argue that it is of course unjust and oppressive to socially and politically exclude people who 
have not committed serious crimes, particularly when it looks like criminality is an excuse for 
racism. But, the criticism goes, there are some people who are rightfully excluded from political 





Chapter 3: Criminal Law is a Political Institution  
Why Moral Desert is Irrelevant 
 
0. Introduction 
In the last chapter I discussed the relationship between racial oppression and criminal 
oppression in the United States.  In this chapter, I want to address a different concern motivated 
by the current prevailing justification of punishment in contemporary Anglo-American 
philosophy of law: retributivism. A retributivist might argue that one subset of the group that I 
labeled ‘criminals,’ that is, those who have been duly convicted of a crime, are not oppressed 
because exclusion from social and political life is what they deserve. Roughly, most retributivists 
argue that wrongdoers deserve hard treatment and condemnation because they have committed 
some wrong. Insofar as they have committed wrong, they are morally blameworthy, and the state 
ought to play a role in doling out the appropriate hard treatment and condemnation that their 
blameworthy actions call for. On such a view, it might seem particularly fitting that, having 
violated social norms, a convicted criminal is not treated as an equal member of society, but is 
instead socially and politically excluded, at least if they have committed a particularly bad act. 
One could hold this view while still pointing to many individual injustices that I have highlighted 
with the current system in the United States. For example, holding retributivists views is 
consistent with being opposed to stop-and-frisk, current police practices around use of force, 
solitary confinement, the death penalty, criminalization of cannabis or other drugs, and many 
harsh prison conditions. One might hold that while many of our current practices are unjust, the 
foundational harm that I have pointed to, that of social and political exclusion, is not itself 
unwarranted for those who have actually committed crimes, at least of a serious enough level.  
To counter this argument, I will make an ideal theory argument that, even in a completely 




and political exclusion is unjust. This is because criminal law is a political institution that exists 
as a part of the other social and political institutions that make up the basic structure of a society. 
Here, I appeal to a social contract model of political life, where criminal law is an institution 
within the social contract, and those who are governed by the contract cannot be kicked out of 
the contract for failing to follow the rules of the contract. There are appropriate sanctions for 
failing to follow the rules of the agreement, but such sanctions should be meant to foster future 
compliance with the social contract rather than exclusion from it. Criminal law should also be 
governed by the same principles that the social contract is founded on.  
In characterizing criminal law as a part of the social contract, I will draw on Vincent 
Chiao’s argument that criminal law is public law. I take him to be making a very similar 
argument to my social contract argument, with slightly different framing. Criminal law is a 
political institution that is subject to the principles of justice just as any political institutions are. 
First and foremost, a criminal law institution must be seen as conforming to the principles that 
govern the social contract that it is a part of. These are principles of fair distribution, not 
retribution. Moreover, criminal law ought not work to exclude people from the contract, but offer 
them reasons for abiding by the rules of the contract.  It can achieve this while still serving the 
purpose of serving as a last resort for maintaining rule of law. This argument will conclude that 
retributivism can only play, if anything, a secondary role in the function criminal law, and only if 
criminal law is first playing its primary role of maintaining the social contract. Any retributivist 
view that suggests that the primary function of the criminal law is for the state ought to punish 
people who are morally blameworthy because of their wrongdoing is inconsistent with the fact 




Having argued that retributivist functions and justifications cannot be primary for 
criminal law as a part of the basic structure of society, I next will argue that concepts of moral 
desert, particularly blameworthiness, are not fit for criminal law as a political institution at all. I 
will draw on Erin Kelly’s Limits of Blame, noting that criminal law is not well equipped to track 
moral blameworthiness, but only criminal culpability. Criminal culpability is distinguishable 
from moral blameworthiness because the former focuses on whether the wrongdoer has 
objectively violated criminal laws, determined by the society as a whole, while the later requires 
a subtle and nuanced attention to subjective features of an actor’s motivations, will, and potential 
excusing conditions. This makes moral blameworthiness, which contributes to social and 
political exclusion, inappropriate for criminal law and punishment. The nature of criminal law, 
with its reliance on due process, equality of treatment, and rule of law, ought never treat a rule 
violator as a political outsider, but always as a member of society whose behavior can be brought 
back into alignment with the rules of the political community. This argument will draw from 
legal practice and doctrine in the United States as well as potential improvements to that law. In 
conclusion, criminal law in the United States, even when working according to its own rules, 
cannot track moral blameworthiness. Conviction of crime in the United States or in an ideal 
society does not track blameworthiness and therefore does not offer a reason to exclude the 
convicted person from social and political life. 
This chapter will proceed in two parts. The first part will develop the idea of criminal law 
as a political institution that is part of the social contract. This part will emphasize that the 
primary function of criminal law is to support the social contract and not to give wrongdoers 
what they deserve. In the second part, I will argue that giving wrongdoers what they deserve is 




analysis that is inappropriate for a political institution. In the conclusion, I will explain why such 
a political institution can only offer sanctions that fall within the realm of a political institution, 
not a moral one, which means that the sanctions cannot function to exclude rule violators from 
the social contract.  
1. Criminal Law is Political, not Moral, Institution 
In the first section of this chapter, I will argue that the criminal law is a political 
institution that is a part of the social contract, or, in Vincent Chiao’s language, criminal law is 
public law. While Chiao’s uses the framing of “public law” rather than social contact, I chose to 
use social contract theory because it is familiar to a political philosophy audience and highlights 
important features of political life: First, political life is a joint undertaking meant to benefit 
everyone involved. Second, one gains privileges and takes on burdens by being a member of the 
social contract. Of course, one of the downsides to social contract theory is that it can present an 
inaccurate picture of an optional participation in the joint endeavor. This is not accurate in any 
meaningful sense in real political communities, but the idea of society as an agreement 
emphasizes that terms of the contract should be such that they would be acceptable to the 
members of the community. These features are also part of Chiao’s account of criminal law as 
public law, but rather than speaking of an abstract social contract, he focuses the historical 
emergence of criminal law as a part of the modern administrative state, which developed to 
redistribute benefits and burdens more equally across members of society. I think that this is an 
accurate description, and my re-framing in terms of social contract is a matter of emphasis, not of 
contradiction. As I will note throughout my discussion of his work, I think something like a 
social contract theory is implicit in his conception of public law, even if the abstracted construct 




Chiao argues that criminal law should be understood as public law, that is, as institutions 
of public policy that work together with other public institutions to create a just society.  
Criminal law institutions subject citizens to extreme state-based coercion, and yet most 
philosophical justifications of these extreme exercises of state power are based on pre-political 
concepts of morality rather than theories of political justice, democratic principles, or appeals to 
widely shared liberal values.170  Chiao articulates a theory of criminal law that depicts criminal 
law as one among many political institutions in a modern society that is built to provide helpful 
social cooperation among equals.  
Chiao explains the historical emergence of criminal law as a public law in modern 
society, meaning that in the modern era, criminal law developed to replace private responses to 
criminal behavior with public ones. Modern criminal law developed at the same time that the 
“social provision” model replaced the “alms for the needy” model of dealing with poverty and 
other social ills. Social provision, as opposed to alms for the needy, is characterized by three 
features. First, it is statist, meaning the government rather than private individuals takes on the 
task of dealing with a particular ill (poverty, lack of education, crime). While the private sphere 
may play a role in distributing a good on this model, it only does so when the government or 
public decision-making body has delegated this function to the private sphere. Second, the social 
provision model treats poverty or other ills as problems to be managed collectively, meaning that 
the harms do not just fall where they may. Essentially, this second part is a social insurance 
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model where all members of a community seek to spread the costs of certain ills amongst one 
another, while also sharing benefits of good fortune. Finally, on this conception, members are 
entitled to benefits and protection from ills as a matter of right, that is, of justice and not of 
charity.171  
The social provision model shares much with the idea of the social contract. Members of 
society gain benefits from joining together to protect themselves from various harms. This 
requires contributing to the community as well. A system of distributing the benefits and burdens 
fairly gives rights to certain kinds of benefits and duties to take on certain burdens. These 
benefits and burdens must be acceptable to the members of the community, and the way that they 
become acceptable is if the distribution is dependent on acceptable principles. The idea of the 
social contract and the social provision model is to distribute benefits and burdens through a 
centralized representative of the political community, creating rights and duties.  
Criminal law emerged as a public system of addressing the harms of criminal behavior 
along a ‘social provision’ model. Modern criminal law developed in the United States and the 
United Kingdom relatively recently. Up until the 19th century, crimes were largely privately 
investigated and punished by families of victims, or the wealthy paid for private security and 
private prosecutors to round up those who did them wrong and bring them to a court to be 
punished.172 But, as other aspects of the government modernized and professionalized, so did the 
criminal law: 
In short, the century from the mid-1700s to the late 1800s witnessed a 
thoroughgoing transformation in the institutions of criminal law. The functions of 
preventative patrolling and investigating crime were taken over by organized 
public forces. The function of deciding whether and how to prosecute a crime – 
especially in North America – were similarly taken out of the hands of private 
parties and consolidated in the hands of public officials. In addition, punishment 
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became less exemplary and more uniform, less a matter of private, local control 
and increasingly a matter of national (or at least regional) legislation and policy. 
Substantive law incorporated regulatory offenses, with new offenses aimed at 
preventing harms rather than simply responding to willful and malicious attacks. 
The result was a criminal law, and a criminal justice system, that lost its local and 
private character and became “bureaucratic, largely impersonal, and increasingly 
centralized.”173 
 
Essentially, through the modernization of American criminal law, investigation, prosecution, and 
punishment became matters of public policy, shaped by public and political concerns, 
determined by legislators, and expanded beyond the scope of so-called mala in se crimes such as 
murder and assault.  
As Chiao argues, criminal law became public law. Criminal law as public law can be 
contrasted with the idea that criminal law is matter of the vindication of private, pre-political 
rights, implicitly or explicitly endorsed by most contemporary philosophy of crime and 
punishment.174 
Crime becomes a problem for society, rather than a series of private tragedies to 
be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Public officials determine which 
neighborhoods will be patrolled, which crimes will be investigated, and which 
types of victim will be prioritized, and they have the institutional and legal 
wherewithal to control the conditions in which punishments is meted out.175 
 
He emphasizes that crime began to include all kinds of violations of regulatory laws. For 
example, the institution of tax collection is ultimately backed up by criminal laws against tax 
evasion, welfare is backed by criminal laws against welfare fraud, and so on. Thus, criminal law 
plays an important role in assuring compliance with all kinds of other public institutions and 
non-criminal laws. Each area of law and public institution developed a corresponding set of 
criminal violations as last resorts to ensure compliance with non-criminal law. Criminal law acts 
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as a regulatory backstop to ensure compliance with all other laws in addition to working to 
prevent harms against the rights of individuals. 
The public law model of criminal law contrasts with the theories of many influential 
philosophers of punishment like Herbert Morris, Doug Husak, Samuel Scheffler, and John 
Gardiner, who argue that interpersonal moral rules of blameworthiness are appropriately taken 
up by the state. Most philosophers of punishment have justified criminal law institutions as 
individual morality backed up by the coercive power of the state. This view of crime centers 
mala in se laws as the core of criminal law, with regulatory criminal laws as peripheral laws 
whose justification is generally not important. Such positions do not see any problem with the 
state enforcing pre-political rights with the power of political institutions.176 Here, I think the 
social contract is helpful for understanding Chiao’s position. Pre-political rights are those rights 
prior to or outside the social contract. Chiao argues that this way of justifying criminal law fails 
to take account of the fact that the criminal law is not a stand-alone institution. It is part of the 
administrative state, that is, criminal law institutions are no different than other political 
institutions that actively distribute benefits and burdens rather than allowing burdens to fall 
wherever they may.177  
In general, retributivist theories of punishment argue that the state should back up at least 
some interpersonal moral rules with coercive punishment, seemingly ignoring the public and 
political role of criminal law. While one may argue that some types of retributivism, including 
negative retributivism (the idea that a wrongdoer loses their right to not be punished, even if 
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crimes (homicide). Moreover, they treat mala in se crimes as the core of criminal law, when such crimes do not 
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focus that takes for granted that the core of criminal law is interpersonal morality rather than social and political 




there is no positive reason to punish them), or weak retributivism (the idea that committing a 
wrong provides a reason to punish the wrongdoer even if, all things considered, the state ought 
not punish them), 178 do not have this problem because they do not require that the state punish 
wrongdoers, the point is still that the determination of what is a criminal wrong deserving a state 
response is a political rather than moral determination. The determination of what counts as a 
crime, how crimes can be investigated and by whom, the adjudication process of determining 
guilt, and punishment are each exercises of state authority and therefore must be justifiable to 
members of the political community. Even if the same act is prohibited pre-politically and under 
the social contract (e.g. killing another person), the reason that it is criminally prohibited is 
because it has undergone the political process of becoming part of criminal law.179 
The distinction between the moral and the political requires rejecting a natural law 
interpretation of the role of government where the function of our social cooperation is to 
enforce (in some form) the natural laws of morality (as suggested by St. Thomas Aquinas). 
Instead of this theory of law and government, Chiao implicitly adopts a social contract theory of 
the role of government, where members of a political community agree to limit their freedom for 
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state actually building an institution (with what he calls “the drawbacks of punishment”). Ultimately, he determines 
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criminal law is public law. There he argues that while blameworthiness offers a compelling reason for the state to 
punish, it might not offer an all-things-considered reason to punish given the immense costs of the criminal justice 
system. This seems to contrast with Chiao’s characterization of Husak as offering an account where one can simply 
use the exact same justification for individual blameworthiness to justify the state punishing someone. See Chiao, 
Criminal Law, at 29.  
179 This does not mean that there is no way to criticize criminal law. The political principles that make the social 
contact acceptable offer grounds to determine what laws are just and what are unjust. For example, murder is 
criminally prohibited because doing so protects the political equality of each member of society in a society that is 




the sake of the benefits of social cooperation, but they only chose to do so knowing that there are 
some principles that will guide this social cooperation. Chiao’s implicit rejection of natural law 
is evidence in his strong reliance on the idea that the government cannot simply enforce pre-
political morality. Additionally, as will become clear, his reliance on the idea that the 
government exists for the purpose of coordinating shared life indicates a kind of social contract 
theory implicitly. Moreover, this kind of social contract will be more like a Rawlsian social 
contract than a Lockean one because of his reliance on the distinction between the political and 
the moral. By this I mean that the sort of social contract (or social coordination) Chiao 
presupposes in his defense of criminal law as public law is not drawn up to enforce pre-political 
natural laws, as Locke can be interpreted as endorsing. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
take on the debate between natural law and contemporary social contract theory.180 Chiao’s 
project is distinctive, however, because he addresses criminal law from within the contemporary 
political philosophy landscape rather than as a distinctive category of law unrelated to other 
aspects of the basic structure of society.  
Once criminal law is seen in the context of the basic structure of society, retributivism 
loses much of its appeal. An “orthodox” retributivist view of criminal law and punishment frame 
punishment as an appropriate response to moral wrongdoing in the private sphere. The “orthodox 
view,” a retributivist view, of criminal law and punishment is that the practice of punishment is 
“hard treatment motivated by, and expressive of, resentment directed at morally wrongful 
conduct,”181  and thus the purpose of criminal law is to “vindicate rights and condemn 
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wrongs.”182 On this view, “[t]o justify the criminal law, therefore, is to explain when criminal 
punishment is, and when it is not, a morally appropriate means for making manifest a shared 
reactive attitude of resentment at moral wrongdoing.”183 Notice that these are all related to 
individual moral wrongdoing. But to think of criminal law as public law is to think of it as an 
institution that functions to facilitate social cooperation and to spread the burdens of criminal law 
violations more fairly throughout the political community.  
Chiao argues that the function of the criminal law is primarily to support social 
cooperation, and its justification is derived from the value of the type of social cooperation it 
supports. In social contract terms, criminal law promotes compliance with the social contract, 
and therefore it is only justified if the social contract is a justifiable one, that its, its terms are 
acceptable to those who are governed by it. He progresses through seven premises that build on 
one another to make his argument. First, Chiao argues that the primary function of this institution 
is to “promote[] social cooperation under stable political institutions”184 and so the stability of 
political institutions takes priority over these other things, vindication of rights, deterrence.  The 
first premise captures the idea that sanctions for rule violations are good means for the end of 
social cooperation. He writes, “(1) Negative reciprocity, that is the use of sanctions conditional 
on defection from a shared rule, is instrumental to ongoing cooperation.”185 The idea is not 
necessarily that sanctions to deter people from breaking the rules, although it does that, but 
game-theoretical models and empirical research across cultures emphasize that negative 
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reciprocity encourages social cooperation by  assuring cooperators that others will not defect 
from the agreed upon rules.186  
For social cooperation, there need not be a state, but in general, as social cooperation 
develops over bigger and more heterogenous groups, the likelihood of needing a centralized 
institution to clarify rules and perform negative reciprocity arises. This is basically what 
happened in criminal law in the 18th and 19th centuries in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. This produces the second premise: “(2) Whatever it is that makes them legitimate, 
public institutions that engage in generically coercive rule enforcement are engaged in a practice 
of negative reciprocity, that is, a practice of sustaining social cooperation.”187 This premise 
argues that no matter what kind of social organization that you have, if it sanctions those who 
purposefully violate the rules of the organization, then this sanction functions to sustain the 
social cooperation. It might also do other things, such as express disapproval, but it will always 
shore up social cooperation because negative reciprocity serves this purpose whether or not it is 
intended to.  
The third premise follows more or less directly from the second: “(3) Whatever else they 
are, criminal justice institutions are institution that stabilize ongoing social cooperation, 
paradigmatically cooperation with legal norms established by public institutions.”188 This third 
premise follows from simply naming the institutions that are tasked with sanctioning deliberate 
rule violations in modern societies “criminal justice institutions.” Rules are set out by public 
institutions like legislatures and regulatory agencies. Chiao notes that the criminal law is not the 
only institution that supports rule-following. Many other institutions within a society can also do 
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so without negative reciprocity. Indeed, the more individuals are integrated into the society’s 
other institutions, the less likely they will be to violate the rules. For example, public education 
and social safety nets might support rule-following more effectively than negative reciprocity. 
Social science in fact indicates that as societies become more integrated, with advanced 
regulatory regimes, rule violations are fewer and negative reciprocity plays a decreasing role in 
assuring social cooperation.189 
His fourth claim is perhaps the most important.  “(4) Stabilizing cooperation with public 
institutions is the most basic function of criminal justice institutions.”190 To support the claim 
that stabilizing cooperation is the functional (not moral or conceptual)191 priority of criminal law, 
he compares two hypothetical constitutional conventions.  It the first case, the hypothetical 
framers eschew the goal of punishing wrongdoers based on moral blameworthiness because they 
disagree about how to define moral blameworthiness in their heterogenous society. But, they 
determine that they must create a system to sanction those who violate the rules that allow for 
community cooperation, which will include rules against harming other members as well as rules 
that simply facilitate cooperation (e.g., what side of the road to drive on), in order to promote 
social cooperation.  “[B]y contributing to the possibility of long-term social cooperation, 
coercive rule-enforcement contributes to the very possibility of organized social institutions, and 
this is true even if those institutions do not, strictly speaking, ever ‘punish’ anyone.”192 It is 
possible, then, to have a system of sanctioning rule-violators that does not require a notion of 
moral wrongdoing. One would be sanctioned because they violated a rule, not because their 
action was morally bad. To get any complicated scheme of social cooperation off the ground, 
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some kind of generically rule-enforcing institution is required to assure everyone that others will 
comply with the rules. 
Compare that to a similar group of framers who want to create an institution to punish 
wrongdoers. In order to set up a system of retributivism, they would have to decide what the 
important rules are, how to determine if one has broken them, what the punishments ought to be, 
and who adjudicates these matters. In so doing, they would also be promoting cooperation with 
the system itself. In essence, no matter how they organize it, it will also function as a system of 
promoting social cooperation through negative reciprocity. Thus, “generically coercive rule-
enforcement” is functionally prior to retributivism in a system of negative reciprocity because 
you could not set up a system of social cooperation without it, but you could set up a system of 
“generically coercive rule-enforcement” without retributivism. Indeed, to have a system of 
retribution in a society, one would necessarily have a generically coercive rule-enforcing 
institution. This is not to say that retributivism in general requires generically coercive rule-
enforcement, but if there is a social institution that performs retributivism, it will include 
generically coercive rule-enforcement, which, in turn, works to stabilize social cooperation.  This 
is why it is functionally primary—there is no way to build a criminal law system that is not also 
reinforcing compliance with the greater political community it is a part of. Criminal law does not 
function in a vacuum, but as one institution in the basic structure of society. It will reinforce 
compliance with the rest of the basic institutions even if it is also designed to do other things.  
From the primary function of the criminal law, stabilizing social cooperation, Chiao 
moves to the justification of criminal law. Because criminal law will serve the function of 
promoting social cooperation, even if it is designed to be retributive, then justifying the criminal 




have noted, is extremely coercive. It is only justified to use coercion to enforce a system of social 
cooperation if one can justify the social cooperation system itself. The reasons to use coercion to 
promote a system of social cooperation are the reasons to support the system itself. 193 
Regardless of what the other intended goals of a criminal justice institution are, it will work to 
support cooperation with a set of institutions because it is a generically coercive rule-enforcing 
system. Thus, we must insure that those institutions should be supported if we are going to 
support the institution that promotes them. This gives rise to his fifth premise about criminal law: 
“(5) The criminal law is worth supporting only if the institutions whose rules it enforces are 
worth supporting.”194 He notes that “worth supporting” is a standard that is less than “perfectly 
just,” and mainly means that they are worth supporting if they are better than available 
alternatives or that they are worth supporting because it is better in the long-run than not 
supporting them. Again, this is highly reminiscent of many social contract theories which argue 
that the social contract is justified when it produces a better society than if no social contract, or 
system of cooperation, were in place. It is also reminiscent of the idea that the terms of the social 
contract have to be acceptable to those who are governed by them (acceptability is a different 
standard than perfectly just). 
Premise number five gives a necessary but not sufficient justification for the criminal 
law. This is because even if the set of institutions that the criminal law supports is worth 
supporting, one cannot take any means to support them. The means the criminal law takes to 
support the system of cooperation must also be just and justified. This gives rise to the sixth 
proposition: “(6) The criminal law is worth supporting only if its use in a particular context 
would be consistent with the principles that make the institutions whose rules it enforces worth 
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supporting in the first place”195 If you put proposition 5 and 6 together, you get a “a fully 
political standard of justification”: 
“(7) The criminal law is worth supporting if and only if: 
a. The institutions whose rules it enforces are worth supporting, and 
b. Its use in a particular context would be consistent with the principles that make 
those institutions worth supporting in the first place.”196 
The standards that support the criminal law are the same ones that support every other political 
institution. Thus, blame, moral responsibility are only justifications for the criminal law if they 
are consistent with the principles that justify the system of social cooperation in the first place. In 
theory, a criminal law system could be set up to give people what they morally deserve and still 
be politically justified, but only if the system did so without violating the principles that make 
the system of social cooperation justified in the first place.  
 Chiao does not hold that there is one given set of principles of justice that must apply, but 
instead holds that the fully political justification can work regardless of the types of principles of 
justice a given society chooses to follow, whether libertarian, utilitarian, or egalitarian. Though 
he does not name it, Rawls’s famous principles of justice (Justice as Fairness) could also provide 
the relevant principles.,  
Chiao argues that one could begin with any broadly liberal political principles and then 
determine what a politically justified criminal law looks like under this system. To illustrate this, 
he explains how this fully political justification would unfold in a society governed by the 
principles of “anti-deference,” a brand of political egalitarianism marked by two features: “each 
person has an equal opportunity for influence over the laws and policies they are subject to; and 
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subject to that democratic principle, effective access to the capabilities that count, in that society, 
as constitute of basic equality.”197 In a slightly more broad scope, these two principles can be 
conceived of as political equality (equality in creating the procedures of the society) and 
substantive equality (equality in the benefits and burdens of society). He develops the role of 
criminal law in such a society, noting that in such a society, the criminal law would have to be 
limited by four principles. First, equality of opportunity for input is paramount, considering that 
criminal law is so coercive. This principle rules out felon disenfranchisement and likely prisoner 
disenfranchisement. But it also requires real, substantive equality of opportunity for influencing 
the creation of law, including strong education and a robust democratic decision-making process. 
Second, criminal law cannot be carried out in a way that includes subordinating one group to 
another, which racialized stop-and-frisk policies exemplify. Thus, a criminal justice system 
cannot perpetuate existing inequalities or oppressions and still be justified.  
Third, criminal law must meet the quality of optimization. This is basically the idea that 
criminal punishments generally target the most basic capabilities of members of society, and so 
they can only be justified if they meet two conditions:  they protect the capabilities of other 
members of society, and criminal punishment is the best way to protect those capabilities. In 
short, because of the extreme level of coercion involved in criminal punishment, criminal law 
ought to be used only when it optimizes the basic capabilities of all members of society. Notably, 
this means that we must choose less coercive institutions whenever possible. For example, ample 
evidence suggests that money spent on early education in particular communities drastically 
reduces crime in the long run. The optimization principle would require that money be spent on 
early education, which is less coercive than criminal law, rather than on the institutions of 
                                               




criminal law. This example highlights also that viewing criminal law as a public institution 
amongst others means that the financial costs of the system of criminal law should be weighed 
against spending on other social programs and public institutions.  
Finally, he argues for ‘inclusive aggregation,’ by which he means that even those who are 
guilty of committing crimes should have their interests equally taken into account when 
determining criminal justice policies. This does not mean that those who violate the criminal 
laws cannot be punished, but that we have to take their political and substantive equality into 
account when we make policy decisions about criminal law. This principle is an example of how 
viewing criminal law as a part of the social contract means that those who violate the social 
contract are punished within the social contract. They are not excluded from it. Not only is this 
the best way to promote rule following (negative reciprocity cannot be too punishing or it works 
against cooperation), but also because maintains the social and political inclusion of the rule 
violator. Negative sanctions must be limited by the principles that maintain the social contract.  
 These four principles of a fully politically justified criminal law are developed in a 
society that has justified the rest of its social cooperation around “anti-deference,” but similar 
principles would develop in any politically liberal society that adopts a version of justice that 
involves conceptions of liberty and equality. Using any politically liberal conception of justice 
would yield a guarantee against being excluded from the scheme of cooperation altogether, as 
doing so would undermine social cooperation itself. Moreover, any system that recognizes 
criminal law as one amongst many political institutions and values liberty will likely require a 
preference for less coercive means of gaining rule compliance, given the fact that enforcing 




Finally, blame and moral desert are not present in the political justification of criminal 
law on this model. While, as I have noted, there is nothing about the political justification that 
absolutely excludes the possibility that the criminal law could also function as a retributive 
system that gives wrongdoers what they deserve based on a moral evaluation of 
blameworthiness. Still, I share with Chiao the doubt that retributive aims would end up in fact 
being consistent with any set of liberal principles of justice. This model indicates that we should 
not view criminal law as an institution where the state addresses pre-political moral wrongs on 
behalf of members. Instead, criminal law punishes violations of the rules established by the 
system of social cooperation as a matter of last resort—when no other institution can effectively 
promote social cooperation. The criminal law is an institution that acts within and on behalf of 
the social contract, and it cannot act so as to kick members out of the social contract. Any 
punishment or sanction ought to be in furtherance of the political principles that justify the social 
contract.  
In conclusion, there are two main arguments that support the view of criminal law as a 
political institution that is part of the social contract. First, criminal law functions to reinforce 
cooperation with the political structure as a whole. Therefore, the criminal law cannot have only 
an internal justification (internal to the nature of criminal law alone) because the system it 
supports will need to be justified as well. Retributivism cannot provide a justification for the 
whole political structure, so it alone cannot justify criminal law. Second, the operation of 
criminal law imposes burdens and provides benefits for the society beyond just the rule-breaker 
and the immediate victim (when there is one). These benefits and burdens need to be justified to 
the entire political community, and they ought to be fairly distributed. Thinking of the criminal 




requires justifying the workings of a particular criminal legal structure to the political community 
it serves. Among other things, this means that money and other investments spent on criminal 
law are investments that cannot be spent in other areas of the political community, including 
education, healthcare, the arts, infrastructure, and so on. In Rawlsian terms, criminal law is part 
of the basic structure of society, and as such, it should be subjected to the principles of justice 
that make living in the community justifiable.  
 
2. Blame is Inconsistent with Criminal Law as a Political Institution 
In the model that I articulated above, blameworthiness does not play a role in justifying 
criminal punishment because the inescapable function of criminal law is promoting social 
cooperation, and that function must be justified regardless of what kind of system of criminal law 
is present. Criminal punishment is instead viewed as sanction for breaking the rules of an 
established system of social cooperation. In essence, criminal law punishes wrongs determined 
by political institutions, not pre-political wrongs. But, at the end of the last section, I left open 
the possibility that a criminal law institution could be politically justified according to Chiao’s 
two requirements and might also have a moral retributivist function, so that, in addition to 
promoting cooperation or compliance with the social contract, the criminal law also condemns a 
certain subset of morally blameworthy actions. That is, the criminal law could operate as a 
political institution and at the same time a moral retributivist one. 
In this section, I will argue that criminal law cannot track moral blameworthiness and 
therefore cannot act as a moral retributivist institution. It can give people what they deserve, but 
only by the terms of the social contract, not what they deserve according to an interpersonal 




agency, not by a moral system that determine right and wrong action. Though the legislators 
might appeal to moral values, (e.g., the dignity of persons, the harm of violence, etc.) in making 
criminal laws, these laws become political by being enacted by a legislature or by a regulatory 
agency. Therefore, the wrongs that are punished are punished as political wrongs, not moral 
ones. The distinction between criminal liability and moral desert is central to understanding the 
modern criminal system.  
In this section, I argue that being criminally liable for a crime (being found guilty, or 
more realistically, pleading guilty) in the United States is not enough on its own to show that one 
is morally blameworthy. Therefore, neither the function of criminal law nor its justification can 
rest on punishing the blameworthy. I will for the most part discuss the criminal legal system in 
the United States as if it is actually following its own doctrines. Thus, this is not quite an ideal 
theory model, as we are discussing an existing criminal law system, but it is an idealized version 
of the United States’ legal system, one that ignores (for this chapter of the dissertation only) the 
history of racism and classism, the failings of due process in real life, and the fact that most 
criminal convictions are not the result of carefully adjudicated trials with equally financed 
parties, but instead the results of coercive plea deals. The idea is to show that, on its best day, the 
American criminal law system is not capable of determining moral blameworthiness, but only 
criminal liability. And moreover, criminal legal systems require justiciable rules that can be 
applied equally by looking at objective facts, not by adjudicating the subjective motivations, 
psychological backgrounds, and other burdens faced by criminal defendants. 
This argument is developed from the argument that Erin Kelly makes in her book The 
Limits of Blame: Rethinking Punishment and Responsibility. There she defends a position that 




the wrong itself to determine punishment rather than on the character of the wrongdoer, is the 
only legitimate course for a criminal justice system to take. In making this argument, she 
distinguishes between minimal rationality—the level of culpability that a person must have to be 
criminally liable, and a thicker notion of moral culpability that is required to blame a person for 
the wrong that they have committed. She argues that our criminal justice institutions, as political 
institutions, do not function in such a way that they are even able to make determinations about 
blameworthiness, even if we wanted them to. They can make judgments about criminal liability 
by determining if a law violator is minimally rational so that their actions can be attributable to 
them at all. The fact that criminal law is incapable of making fine-grained determinations of 
moral blameworthiness is due to the fact that criminal law is a public institution that must rely on 
justiciable legal standards which are too blunt of instruments for making distinctions between 
people’s culpability based on nuanced features of people’s psychology or background. Nuanced 
features of psychology, background, motivation, and social obstacles are all features that play 
important roles in assessing blameworthiness and moral desert. Thus, what the criminal law can 
offer is only an assessment of criminal liability, a public and political adjudication, not a moral 
one.  
Given the fact that the most we can get from our criminal justice institutions is a 
determination of criminal liability, not moral blameworthiness, Kelly argues that we must be 
more modest about what punishments and attitudes are appropriate responses to criminal 
liability. She introduces the concept of Just Harm Reduction as a principle of criminal law and 
punishment that justifies punishment for wrongs while remaining agnostic about blame. 
Punishment is focused on reducing the harms from rule violations in a society, limited by rules 




2.1 Blameworthiness, Moral Culpability and Excuses198 
Retributivism is the idea that punishment should track blameworthiness. “[T]he notion at 
the core of a retributive conception of justice is that wrongdoers are due a punitive response that 
is proportional to their blameworthy wrongdoing: wrongdoers should suffer harm because and to 
the extent that they are culpable for having doing wrong.”199 There are other theories that would 
suggest that blame is useful for other ends (blame is a good tool for getting people to change 
behavior, for example), but retributivism would call for blaming responses because blame is the 
fitting response for committing a wrong. Blaming and punishment are simply appropriate 
responses to moral wrongdoing, and they are permitted or even required regardless of the costs 
or benefits of such responses. 
Virtually all notions of blameworthiness are connected to the idea of moral culpability—
the wrongdoer must have been morally culpable, that is, somehow their will or their character 
must be connected to the wrongdoing they are blameworthy for. Michael S. Moore, for example, 
argues that people are blameworthy for moral wrongdoings that are made even when highly 
emotional, and even if the person could not have acted differently because they were 
overwhelmed by emotion, they are still blameworthy for their wrongdoings because their 
emotions are attributable to them.200 Similarly, David Schmidtz argues that we are responsible 
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for any internal features of ourselves even if we did not chose them because we often praise 
people for characteristics like beauty, talent, intellect, and so we can blame people for negative 
characteristics they did not chose.201 Therefore, we are responsible for actions that arise from 
character traits we do not chose, like laziness, weakness, or selfishness.202 Kelly argues against 
Schmidtz that moral blameworthiness is different than praise for abilities, as punishment and 
blameworthiness are about moral failures.203 On Moore and Schmidtz’s views, we are 
blameworthy for wrongdoings even when our character, strong emotions, or other unchosen 
causes mean that we could not have acted otherwise. 
Kelly argues that instead, moral culpability should rely on the idea that the blameworthy 
person could have acted differently when they committed the wrongdoing. 204 We blame 
someone when they could have done better, and we can also blame them when they act from 
character flaws when we think that they are responsible for having those character flaws. Kelly 
argues that as individuals interacting with others, we typically take for granted that those we 
interact with have the moral capacity to choose the right actions. Theories that upset this 
presumption—that people sometimes commit a wrong because of things outside their control 
(their background, their psychology, etc.)—are difficult to square with many moral responses, 
including blame. There is a tension between thinking that blameworthiness depends on the 
ability of someone to act according to moral rules and empirical evidence that suggests that our 
actions are impacted by unchosen psychological deficiencies, background conditions in our lives, 
and other outside influences. 
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One way of working around this tension is by adopting a minimal rationality position on 
moral culpability, much like Kant’s “ought implies can” principle, Kelly argues. To explain this 
principle, Kant uses an example of a person who claims that they could not have stopped 
themselves from an affair because of the power of their lust. Kant argues that saying that if the 
person would have stopped themselves if there were a hangman’s gallows outside ready to 
punish them immediately after the deed is done, then the person could have acted otherwise and 
therefore is morally culpable for the failure. He presses further, arguing that if a powerful ruler 
told a person that they must bear false witness against an innocent person or themselves be put to 
death, a rational person would agree that it is possible to resist the ruler and do the right thing, 
even if that person does not think that they themselves could do it. The thrust of this argument is 
that even when it is very hard to do the right thing, and virtually no one would be able to do it, it 
there is still a possible world where that person could do it, and therefore they can be blamed for 
failing to do the right thing. If there is a reason, any at all, to act morally, then it is possible.205  
Kelly argues that the Kantian “ought implies can” principle seems distant from the real 
world, where we encounter evidence that people’s choices are often meaningfully limited by the 
circumstances they find themselves in. This Kantian minimum rationality position is basically 
what the criminal law relies on for criminal liability, as I will note in the next section, but Kelly 
suggests that we have many reasons to discard it as sufficient for blameworthiness. “Ought 
implies can,” would seem to be in conflict with a lot of empirical evidence to the contrary. First 
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of all, there are all kinds of situations in which we recognize that a person has genuinely 
committed a wrong, but we have reasons to excuse them, or at least to mitigate blame.  
Examples extend from the ordinary to the extra-ordinary: the parent under 
emotional strain who abuses her child, […] the inmate who brutalizes another 
person to avoid appearing weak, the solider in a field of battle who shoots an 
unarmed civilian on orders from a superior, […] the compulsive who tells a lie. 
We might excuse such agents, wholly or in part, from blame for their morally 
faulty actions.206 
 
These examples demonstrate that when faced with examples of wrongdoers, we often apply a 
more nuanced approach to culpability than Kant’s picture grants. First, rather than a black-and-
white appraisal of blameworthiness, we are likely to see blameworthiness in a matter of degrees. 
Second, Kelly makes the proposal that blameworthiness ought to be understood with more 
attention to fairness — it is much harder for some people to do the right thing because of 
psychological makeup, stressors, deprivation, social injustice, and a variety of other factors. The 
fact that it is much harder for some people in some circumstances to do the right thing should 
lead us to excuse or mitigate blame, which does not require that we ignore the wrong or fail to 
recognize it as such.207 Third, we should also account for evidence in the social sciences that our 
environment can deeply affect our actions. A classic example of this is the Yale study in which 
most students were willing to inflict harsh pain on others when an authority figure told them to 
do so.208 Fourth, abuse, violence, oppression, illness, and poverty often present hurdles to acting 
with good will—“Hardships muddle the waters of blame.”209  Nearly all of us are ‘minimally 
rational,’ that is, upon reflection, we know what morality requires most of the time, and a narrow 
reading of Kant’s argument is that this is enough for us to be able to conform ourselves to it. But 
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this view of moral competence is not a realistic view of what most humans are actually capable 
of when put in demanding circumstances. We should be wary of applying blame based on a thin 
notion of moral capability expressed in the ‘ought implies can’ of minimal rationality.  
What lessons can we draw from this discussion of blame? Philosophers disagree about 
what kind of culpability is required for blameworthiness. Some philosophers argue that we are 
morally culpable for things we do not chose, like character traits we are born with. Kant argues 
that if we could have acted differently if we are minimally rational, that is, if we have the rational 
capability of recognizing what morality requires of us, we are blameworthy for wrongdoing. 
Kelly herself argues that we are only morally culpable when we actually could have acted 
differently, but she argues that actually making this determination of whether one plausibly could 
have acted differently is incredibly difficult given the evidence that we have that all kinds of 
outside conditions influence our behavior. She argues that we cannot use a Kantian minimal 
rationality test to determine blameworthiness (i.e. if someone is minimally rational, they are 
morally culpable for any wrongdoing) because we have so many reasons to think that the actual 
possibility of the person conforming their actions to morality is dependent on many 
conditions.210  
I pause here to note that the fact that there is deep disagreement about what is required 
for moral culpability gives a reason against using blameworthiness as a foundation for a political 
institution that is as coercive as the criminal justice system. If there is reasonable disagreement 
about how to determine if someone is blameworthy, it follows under a liberal society that this is 
not a desirable foundation for the use of the state’s coercive power. Similarly, expecting people 
with significantly bigger hurdles to meet the same moral requirements as those without such 
                                               




hurdles should lead us to a deeply nuanced, individualized approach to blameworthiness that 
includes mitigating blame.  Interpersonally, we may be able to be more sensitive to these factors 
and chose a variety of responses, from blame to compassion to withdrawal. As I will show in the 
next section, criminal law is not so sensitive to these complex conditions nor can it operate with 
such nuanced responses given the necessary rigidity that comes with rule of law and due process 
concerns. 
2.2 Criminal Liability does not entail moral culpability or blameworthiness 
Kelly argues that if we examine what kinds of evidence criminal law looks at in the 
United States, and the types of evaluations necessary for criminal liability, criminal law actually 
does not offer the right kind of evaluations to determine blameworthiness. At most, criminal law 
entails that a person found guilty was minimally rational when they committed a wrongdoing, 
but as I argued in the section above, minimal rationality is the most demanding view of moral 
culpability and is inconsistent with our practices of moral excuse.  
Criminal liability for a criminal wrong act does not require a robust showing that the 
person could have acted otherwise or that they did not act in circumstances that mitigate blame 
or call for excuses. Instead, the law finds liability where a wrongful act was “voluntary,” and the 
standard of voluntariness is one that is easily met and can be determined by objective 
observation. Acts committed, for example, while sleepwalking, as a result of a seizure, or 
physically forced by another, are not voluntary. This standard, however, is very thin.211 In many 
ways, it resembles the Kantian minimal rationality model.  
Moreover, motivation for an act, which would be relevant to determining 
blameworthiness, is nearly always irrelevant in determining criminal liability because criminal 
                                               




liability is actually tracking wrongfulness not blameworthiness. While we might not find Robin 
Hood blameworthy (or less blameworthy than, for example, Bernie Madoff) stealing (even from 
the rich) is stealing. As long as the acts committed violate a criminal statute, both Robin Hood 
and Bernie Madoff would be equally subject to criminal liability.212 Except for very few criminal 
laws in the United States, (hate crimes, treason) most crimes are not determined by motivation, 
but instead by simple voluntariness: did the wrongdoer intend to perform the physical action? If 
so, they committed a criminal wrong.213  
Even when determining mens rea, or a guilty state of mind, courts generally do not allow 
fact finders (juries or judges, depending on the case) to examine individual features of the 
psychology of a defendant to determine guilt, as many of us would if we were determining moral 
blameworthiness. For example, in State v. Patterson, the defendant’s conviction of criminally 
negligent homicide (“criminally negligent” is the mens rea) was upheld when she withheld water 
from a boy in her care for four days, and he died of dehydration. But, the defendant had an 
extremely low IQ and was trying to prevent the boy from bedwetting, and she did not understand 
that she could kill the boy by withholding the water. Nevertheless, the court found that a 
reasonable person could have foreseen the risk, the standard for determining negligence, so it 
was irrelevant that she could not. She was held criminally liable despite the fact that her low IQ, 
or her inability to understand that she was harming the boy would at least mitigate if not excuse 
her blameworthiness. The courts found her criminally liable, but most of us would excuse or at 
least mitigate her blame because of her psychological features.214  
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In fact, looking to the requirement of mens rea, meaning “guilty mental state,” in 
criminal law as a locus for blameworthiness is misguided.  Nearly all crimes have a mens rea 
element that requires that the government demonstrate that the accused has a certain mental state 
when they committed the actus reus, or guilty act. Mens rea, however, is like the voluntariness 
standard in that having a sufficiently guilty mental state is not difficult to establish practically 
speaking. While mens rea differ from crime to crime, the “highest” standard in the Model Penal 
Code is usually considered “purposeful.” This simply requires that the actus reus was action was 
undertaken on purpose, or with the intention of doing the prohibited act. For example, in a 
homicide law using the “purposeful” standard, this would simply mean that the defendant 
intended to kill the person. Evidence that the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and shot the 
gun would be more than sufficient for a finding of purposefulness, and yet such a fact would not 
tell us very much about the motivations, pressures, or other subjective factors operating on the 
defendant. Establishing even the most stringent mens rea does not require showing that the 
accused acted with ill will. Criminal statutes that rely on common law mens rea terms such as 
“willfully” or “with knowledge” to simply mean intentionally or knowingly, which are relevant 
for making determinations of blame, also do not provide enough information about the other 
circumstances to warrant a determination of blame.  
Even the most morally laden sounding mens rea, from common law, the term “malice 
aforethought,” has been defined by statute and case law into much narrower terms because the 
term itself offers little guidance to juries who have to determine if a particular defendant met that 
mens rea. These definitions and narrowing rulings tend to offer more objective and externally 
measurable standards for juries to apply, speaking in terms of intentions to act or other language 




“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.”215 While 
this sounds like language that could only be fulfilled with explicitly blameworthy action, it is 
defined with less moral language in the next section. “For purposes of Section 187, malice may 
be express or implied. . . . Malice is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention to 
unlawfully take away the life of a fellow creature. . .Malice is implied when no considerable 
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and 
malignant heart.”216 Explicit malice is fulfilled by “manifest deliberate killing” (which could be 
demonstrated by objective evidence that a defendant pointed a gun and shot, without any 
information about what the defendant was thinking or why they shot). Implied malice, however, 
contains the kind of language that is suggestive of more than awareness of or intention to commit 
an act: “an abandoned and malignant heart.” Courts, however, interpret this kind of language to 
give guidance to juries. In a case interpreting this statutory language, the California Supreme 
Court further defined and narrowed the meaning of this statute. The court expressed concern 
over precisely this language.  
The statutory definition of implied malice, a killing by one with an “abandoned 
and malignant heart” (§ 188), is far from clear in its meaning. Indeed, an 
instruction in the statutory language could be misleading, for it could lead the jury 
to equate the malignant heart with an evil disposition or a despicable character 
instead of focusing on a defendant’s awareness of the risk created by his or her 
behavior. Two lines of decisions developed, reflecting judicial attempts to 
translate this amorphous anatomical characterization of implied malice into a 
tangible standard a jury can apply. Under both lines of decisions, implied malice 
requires a defendant’s awareness of the risk of death to another.217 
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The court went on to hold that implied malice “requires proof that a defendant acted with 
conscious disregard of the danger to human life,”218 which was shown by appealing to externally 
viewable evidence, not the internal life of the defendant. What this discussion of mens rea 
demonstrates is that in making determinations of criminal liability, the requirements must be 
justiciable. That means that juries (or judges, when they act as factfinders) must be able to have a 
standard that can be applied to knowable facts about a case. As the California Supreme Court 
noted, the language of “malice” or “malignant heart” does not leave the jury with a standard that 
can be fairly applied. The court is also concerned that juries might interpret “malignant heart” to 
mean bad character. This would be a problem because it is a constitutional tenant that one cannot 
be found guilty of having a bad character, but for committing bad acts. Rules of evidence as well 
as constant refinement of the law are specifically designed to prevent juries from finding a 
defendant guilty because the jury thinks the defendant is a bad person. The need for a justiciable 
standard, one that can be applied to facts about a case (not judgments of character) in a consistent 
way (not according to what this or that juror thinks is ‘malignant’), further strengthens the 
argument that the kinds of things one might evaluate in making a moral determination about the 
blameworthiness of a person, their character, their motivation, their attitude, are not essential 
(and may be prohibited) factors in determinations of guilt.  
In adjudicating criminal liability, moral excuses based on the particularities of a 
defendant are generally not relevant because juries are instructed to make presumptions about the 
mental states of individual defendants based on what the mental states of most people are like. 
Courts direct juries to ask what a “reasonable person” would do in the circumstances, which is a 
marker of objective expectations for what most people would do or would understand. Courts 
                                               




generally enforce an objective standard for what most people would be able to know or 
anticipate, rather than allow for the nuances of individualized psychology to inform the jury of 
blameworthiness of a defendant.  Patterson is just one example of how using an objective 
standard requires the court to hold someone criminally responsible when it is unlikely that most 
theories of blameworthiness would hold the person morally responsible.219 And, though they 
make up a tiny fraction of criminal laws, strict liability laws like statutory rape clearly hold 
people criminally responsible for actions in ways that completely ignore the kinds of judgments 
about character or intent that would ground most blameworthiness evaluations.220  
At first blush, one might argue that many affirmative criminal defenses such as 
provocation, duress, and the insanity defense do allow for findings of moral excuses. Affirmative 
defenses are those in which a defendant admits that they committed the crime in question, for 
example, they did violate a homicide law by killing another person, but there are reasons that 
they should not be held liable. Though the structure of affirmative defenses certainly mirrors the 
concept of moral excuses, Kelly argues that the practice in criminal law is not nearly as fine-
grained as we would expect an evaluation of moral excuses to be.221 Just as in the Patterson case, 
provocation and duress are mitigated by an objective person standard.  Rather than consider 
whether a given individual was provoked or felt that they had no other choice than to act as they 
did, the court asks that juries consider whether a reasonable person in that state would have felt 
provoked or under duress. For example, in People v. Cassasa,222 the defendant was found guilty 
of second-degree murder, but his lawyers attempted to argue that he was under extreme 
emotional distress because the homicide victim had broken up with him, and he was extremely 
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disturbed by this situation. The New York Court of Appeals (the state’s highest court) said that 
the fact that he was extremely emotionally disturbed did not give him access to the defense of 
provocation, because a reasonable person under such circumstances would not be extremely 
emotionally disturbed.  His distress was “so peculiar to him” that it did not allow him to meet the 
second prong of the provocation defense.223 The second prong says that “there must have been ‘a 
reasonable explanation or excuse’ for such extreme emotional disturbance, ‘the reasonableness 
of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under 
the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.’”224 These are not the kinds of 
individualized evaluations that a determination of blameworthiness would take because we often 
excuse people when we understand that particular features of their background, their psychology, 
their immaturity, or their mental illness might make them minimally less culpable, or even totally 
excused.225 The law does not allow for such cases, and in fact, it would likely be undesirable if it 
did. 
Another example of how the law does not track moral excuses is the insanity defense. 
Most states follow the classic M’Naghten test for insanity, which comes from a 19th century 
British case. This test requires that the defense show that “at the time of the committing of the 
act, [the defendant] was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as to 
not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not 
know that what he was doing was wrong.”226 Only those who cannot understand their actions are 
deemed criminally insane, and those who suffer from severe mental illness will never be able to 
meet the standards of the M’Naghten test. Put quite simply, those who will be allowed the 
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insanity defense are extremely few and far between.227 In one infamous case, Clark v. Arizona, a 
17-year-old boy was held criminally liable for killing a police officer even though he believed 
the police officer to be an alien because of a paranoid schizophrenia episode. The Arizona state 
court found that he knew that killing the police officer was wrong because the officer was plainly 
dressed in a police uniform and declared himself to be a police officer.  This is another case in 
which the objective scenario, a ‘reasonable person’ approached by a uniformed police officer, is 
prioritized over the individualized psychology of the defendant, who believed his town was taken 
over by aliens who were impersonating government officials.228 Thus, considering things like 
mental illness, except in even the most extreme cases, does not mitigate criminal liability, though 
in many cases it would mitigate if not completely excuse blameworthiness.  
Kelly also notes that fact that criminal liability does not track moral blameworthiness is 
also supported by the high percentage of incarcerated people who have mental illnesses. One 
comprehensive study suggests that more than half of all incarcerated people have mental 
illnesses, and others have significant intellectual disabilities.229 While surely not every instance 
of mental illness or intellectual disability would mitigate every determination of moral 
blameworthiness, these numbers, paired with the objective standards for culpable mental states 
and excuses and the high bar for insanity, point to the conclusion that many people are found 
criminally liable who would likely not be found to be morally blameworthy on a variety of 
theories of moral culpability and excuse. 
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2.3 The Criminal System ought not be reformed to track blameworthiness 
One could argue that this is a problem with the current implementation of the criminal 
justice system in the United States, and we can and should build a system that better tracks moral 
blameworthiness.230 Perhaps we should expand criminal defenses like provocation, duress, and 
insanity to better match theories of moral culpability and blameworthiness that are informed by 
empirical information about when people are able to act in accord with the law or when they are 
unable. This view is incorrect because the nature of due process in law and the empirical 
difficulties in making accurate, repeatable determinations of whether or not one could have acted 
otherwise make such a project inappropriate for a legal institution.231 In short, criminal law 
requires justiciable standards, and those are not standards well suited to evaluation of moral 
blameworthiness. 
A brief attempt to modify the insanity defense to be broader demonstrates why criminal 
law is not the kind of institution that can make fine-grained determinations of blameworthiness. 
In the United States in the 1960s, criminal law experts made a concerted effort to remodel the 
insanity defense to accommodate a broader view of insanity. As Kelly explains, criminal justice 
reformers put forward the Model Penal Code (MPC), which offered new, modern definitions of 
nearly all crimes and defenses in the United States in an attempt to provide more clear, uniform, 
and humane criminal codes.232 The MPC, first published in the early 1960s, is not itself law, but 
it was put forward in hopes that states would adopt all or parts of the new code, which many 
states did.  The MPC formulation of the insanity defense introduced a broader definition that 
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some states and the federal government attempted to take up. The MPC insanity defense is as 
follows: “a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a 
result of mental disease or defect he lacks he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law.”233 These two 
prongs, often called the cognitive and volitional prongs, offer two ways for a defendant to show 
that they were not responsible for their conduct: (1) because they could not appreciate that it was 
wrong (cognitive); or (2) because they could not actually make themselves do the right thing 
(volitional). The volitional prong seems to codify the idea that one is not liable for an action if 
they could not have acted otherwise.234  
  While many criminal reform advocates support the broadening of categories of excuse, 
including the insanity defense, Kelly is skeptical that doing so with the purpose of trying to make 
criminal law match up with blameworthiness is a worthwhile pursuit.235 The court in United 
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make tough decisions about moral culpability, but they actually have indirect effects on the relative bargaining 
powers of prosecutors and defendants. In principle, however, the fact that the criminal law is generally a blunt tool 
that is not subject to nuance is accurate, and this supports the overall claim that the criminal law is incapable of 




States v. Lyons, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained why the volitional prong of 
the MPC test, while in theory more in line with empirical evidence about the role of external 
pressures in decision making, is not legally practicable. Previously, the Fifth Circuit had adopted 
the MPC version of the insanity defense. In Lyons, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the so-called 
“volitional” prong, which allows a person to claim insanity if they can show that they could not 
conform their conduct to the law, was stricken from federal law. They did so for several reasons. 
First, the medical community does not possess the ability be sure when a defendant could or 
could not conform his conduct to the law, and when medical experts attempted to testify about 
the conditions under which individuals were suffering, they could not offer anything beyond 
conclusory evidence to assist juries in making this decision.  Second, the court worried that this 
vagueness left the defense too open to manipulation and mistake.236  
The court’s explanation points to the biggest problem with equating criminal liability 
with moral wrongdoing: in criminal wrongdoing, there must be a justiciable standard that a jury 
can apply to a particular defendant. To be justiciable, it must be general enough to apply 
consistently across a wide range of cases. There cannot be unending exceptions and nuances. It 
also must measure things that juries can actually get accurate information about. The standard 
cannot rely on knowing directly what is going on in the mind and heart of a criminal defendant.  
This is the same for the excuses of provocation or duress. The criminal law cannot treat people 
who committed the same acts differently based on particularities of their circumstances ad 
infinitum. This is especially the case when we lack the ability to get accurate, consistent evidence 
about the capacity of an individual to conform their conduct to the law. When courts attempted 
to bring the volitional prong of the insanity defense into the law, the lack of availability of 
                                               




reliable evidence meant that the standard could not be equally applied to all cases. Determining if 
a person was actually capable of conforming their conduct to the law is full of counterfactuals 
and nuanced judgments about the person’s background and how much of that background they 
should be responsible for. The criminal courts are not capable of that kind of decision without 
departing significantly from the rule of law. 
But ascertaining moral blameworthiness seems to require a more nuanced individualized 
approach. This is unsurprising as theorists who discuss blameworthiness generally build from the 
interpersonal rather than from the political. As human beings, we generally know better how to 
evaluate competencies and moral failings of those in our interpersonal sphere. A friend who is 
normally kind lashes out at us, and we suspect that there is something that explains his unusual 
attitude. The family member who is consistently unreliable elicits frustration rather than blame 
because we understand the difficulties she has in her life. We may find a particular person to 
simply be cruel with no explanation or excuse available, and we may blame that person and 
avoid them if at all possible. We may even encourage others to do the same. But criminal law 
cannot be attentive to this kind of analysis because it is a political institution that must apply 
justiciable standards focused on the rules passed by democratic institutions, and not moral 
evaluations, excuses, and choices for compassion that mark individual moral assessments of the 
actions of others.  
Not only do we have more nuanced information as private individuals in our 
interpersonal sphere, but we lack the kind of coercive power that the government has. If my 
judgement that someone is simply cruel and has no excuse is wrong, my resentment or exclusion 
may be harmful to her, but not in the way criminal punishment can be. While I can withhold 




plans with her. I can disassociate myself with the person who seems to simply have a cruel 
character. But the state’s instruments—punishment—are much too blunt. The state in fact cannot 
chose to disassociate with a person because of their crimes. In fact, the state generally builds 
stronger associations with criminals though incarceration, parole, and keeping of private 
information.237 The state cannot forgive or show compassion. These are moral responses of the 
individual. 
For these reasons, Kelly argues that criminal law should focus on wrongfulness instead of 
blameworthiness. Blameworthiness is a contested concept. And on the more lenient view, which 
requires that a person needs to be actually able to conform their conduct to morality, we lack the 
ability to make clear-cut determinations of culpability.   Kelly argues that wrongfulness is act 
focused, while blameworthiness is agent-focused.238 Wrongfulness is determined by the harm 
caused to the victim or by other features of the act, not by features of the person who commits 
the act. We determine wrongfulness by examining an act or behavior, and we can do this without 
making a determination about the moral competency of the wrongdoer. For example, we can 
establish that a person who steals in order to feed their child (when there are no other realistic 
alternatives) has committed a wrong while recognizing that they are not blameworthy. The act 
was wrong because the person who was stolen from had their property taken from them, even if 
we excuse the thief in this case. Though there may be disagreement about what constitutes a 
wrong, criminal law ought to focus on the objective act, whether it violates a criminal statute, 
with special attention to whether it has harmed another person. Criminal law is not well suited to 
attending to the subjective qualities of the actor, including motivations, psychological 
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background, and other outside influences that can ground determinations of blameworthiness. 
Because criminal law is a blunt instrument, criminal liability is properly distinguished from 
moral culpability and blameworthiness.  
2.4 Principle of Just Harm Reduction 
From Kelly’s conclusion that blame is not a valid justification for criminal law, she 
moves to a positive theory of the function and justification of criminal law. She argues for ‘Just 
Harm Reduction,’ which focuses on using criminal law to reduce the harm of rule violations in a 
society.239 Just Harm Reduction is a cautious and morally modest response to criminal 
wrongdoing without exaggerating the responsibilities of wrongdoers. Like Chiao’s approach, 
Kelly’s proposal is based on the idea that criminal law must distribute burdens and benefits 
according to principles of justice. We can justify distributing more burdens to individuals who 
have violated laws on her account because the criminal violator has already shown that they do 
not respect the rule, and so punishment is needed to deter them from violating the rights of others 
again. The criminal rules have to be known ahead of time and be publicly justified in order to 
provide a just basis for punishment.240 This is very similar to Chiao’s political justification of 
criminal law.  
 Kelly notes that this kind of political justification of criminal law is respectful of the 
rationality of individuals. “Just harm reduction must be sensitive to a person’s capacity to make 
choices that satisfy the requirements of law, even when a person has disregarded those 
requirements in the past.”241 Punishment for violating the publicly justified rules is appropriate, 
but it cannot be the kind of punishment that removes the ability of the criminal violator to change 
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behavior in the future. Thus, long sentences, incarceration conditions that degrade an agent’s 
capacities, and permanent exclusion from society are all unjust and unjustified in a system of Just 
Harm Reduction. This is reminiscent of one of Chiao’s discussions of the need for negative 
reciprocity to secure social cooperation. In game theory, the best way to achieve social 
cooperation is to punish a rule breaker, but only in the very short term.242 If the punishment lasts 
far into the future, so that the rule breaker is not allowed to rejoin the social cooperation 
repeatedly, there is no more reason for the rule breaker to conform to the rules. Thus, the whole 
reason for the punishment breaks down. Negative reciprocity, that is, sanctions for breaking 
rules, is self-defeating when forgiveness is withheld for too long, preventing the rule-breaker 
from rejoining the social cooperation.243 Kelly adds that punishments or sanctions that do not 
allow criminal wrongdoers to rejoin society not only work against social cooperation, but also 
fail to respect the agency of the person involved by rejecting the possibility that the person can 
change their actions.244 We have pragmatic reasons as well as agent-respecting reasons to fashion 
punishments that bring rule breakers back into the community with new tools and reasons to 
follow rules. This is pragmatically and principally preferable to fashioning punishments that 
exclude them from society literally and figuratively.  
To return to Kelly’s discussion of what level of culpability is necessary to establish for 
criminal liability, people who have been found, through due process, to have violated a criminal 
code should be criminally liable so long as they have the capacity to be deterred by punishment. 
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Criminal liability does not hang on moral blameworthiness as many people have the capacity to 
change their actions in response to sanctions though they at one point had other reasons (of 
psychology, background, opportunity, education) that prevented them from being fully able to 
have chosen otherwise when they committed the crime.245 In other words, punishment is only 
legitimate under the Just Harm Principle for those who can be deterred by it. One example of 
when this deterrence would be defeated is when people are punished or treated as criminals 
regardless of what they do.  In these circumstances, punishment, even for a legitimate rule 
violation, is not justified because it cannot act as a deterrent.246  Similarly, those whose actions 
do not even meet the legal level of voluntariness due to mental illness or those who are too 
mentally ill to appreciate punishment cannot justifiably be punished. 
General deterrence may emerge from punishing specific individuals who have been 
found guilty on this model, but we cannot punish people who have not been found criminally 
liable through due process because to do so undermines rule of law, undermines the overall 
deterrence logic, and violates basic principles of liberty. Moreover, Just Harm Reduction must be 
subject to public reason, and punishment of those not found criminally liable is not publicly 
justifiable. Much like Chiao’s approach, Kelly situates the criminal law in the context of the rest 
of the political institutions that make up society. Punishing those not found guilty is inconsistent 
with any principles of liberalism that govern a contemporary society. To emphasize this feature, 
the modifier “Just” is added to the “Harm Reduction”: we cannot do anything to reduce the 
harms of criminal wrongs, but we can work to reduce them within the limits of the principles of 
justice that undergird the society. Punishing those who have not been found guilty is a violation 
of virtually any conception of liberty.  
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The Just Harm Reduction approach to criminal law can include public acknowledgement 
of the harms done to the victims, which many philosophers find to be of value (and which I will 
discuss at length in the next chapter). The focus, Kelly argues, should be on condemning the bad 
act, as a way of reinforcing the norms of the community and the respect for its members that 
these norms reflect. But this does not require public blaming of the criminally liable person, and, 
as discussed above, blame is an inappropriate response to criminal liability.247 Just Harm 
Reduction endorses “using the criminal justice system to incapacitate, deter, and rehabilitate 
criminal wrongdoers, and, when possible, to redress the harmful effects of crimes on their 
victims. These purposes together constitute a morally adequate response to victims. I submit that 
victims have no right to a retributive form of justice that would go beyond these aims.”248 The 
criminal law cannot determine moral blameworthiness, nor can it apportion suffering appropriate 
to that blameworthiness, and so, no matter how much victims may want such a response, it is not 
possible or politically just to give that to them. The criminal law can reinforce the laws by 
sanctioning rule violators, and it can express the fact that the rules are important for protecting 
individuals’ rights. 
Throughout her book, Kelly moves between careful analysis of existing legal doctrine in 
the United States, theories of blame and punishment, and political philosophy. But she also 
highlights at each step the rhetoric that has become common in the United States, including 
statements from politicians, bureaucrats, and thought leaders, that draws upon retributivist 
thinking. She argues that we ought to be particularly wary of this view of criminal law because it 
demonizes so many people, dials up our punitive responses, and overestimates what our system 
is actually capable of.  
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Fear of crime should not be allowed to offset the importance of our shared 
responsibility to advance this broader social justice agenda. There is a disturbing 
tension between our shared responsibility to address the social injustice 
underlying much criminal behavior and the retributivist’s focus on individual 
culpability for crime. Our understanding of criminal justice should not be at odds 
with our collective responsibility to secure the broader terms of social justice.249 
 
As I have noted, a retributivist understanding of criminal law is not philosophically at odds with 
protesting many concrete injustices of our contemporary criminal justice system. One can 
endorse a blame-centric view of crime and still support ending the death penalty, solitary 
confinement, and many drug policies on the basis because these policies could be said to be 
disproportionate to their crimes. And one could also argue against the racialized policies of stop-
and-frisk by noting that the vast majority of those targeted are not blameworthy for any wrong. 
But, in real life, the main arguments against strong criminal law reforms come from the view that 
injustice committed against criminals is not morally pressing and does not deserve our outrage. 
This, I believe, is rooted in the idea that those found criminally liable are morally culpable for 
wrongdoing and thus deserve at least some of what they experience.  
3. Conclusion 
 Criminal oppression relies on the logic that a person who has committed a crime is has 
shown themselves to be unfit for membership in the political community. The deep injustices 
that appear in the American criminal law system, including police brutality, violence and 
degradation in incarceration, and legal and social norms that prevent criminals from getting jobs, 
housing, education, the franchise, and other social goods all stem from this political outsider 
status. It might be tempting to justify that some of the people I have called ‘criminals’ in chapter 
one deserve to be political outsiders, even if they do not deserve the all of the particular 
                                               




injustices that the United States’ uniquely violent criminal system perpetuates. Moral desert, 
moral culpability, and blameworthiness, however, are not appropriate parts of a system of 
criminal law in a modern society.  
 Criminal law is like any other political institution: ideally, it aims to fairly allocate 
benefits and burdens in a society. It itself produces benefits and burdens which also must be 
fairly allocated in a society. When we partition criminal law off as a magically unique system, 
unbounded by the political justifications that rightfully limit our other institutions, we can fail to 
notice that punishment is costly. Not only do prisons cost money, but police forces, courts, and 
parole officers do too. There are non-financial costs to law enforcement’s presence in a 
community, and there are benefits as well. There are costs for the incarcerated and their families, 
and there are benefits that other members of society have in feeling secure not only that they are 
safe from crime, but that they are unlikely to be subject to criminal punishment. The distribution 
of benefits and burdens should be justified according to the political principles that govern the 
society, and in a society of free equals, moral desert cannot play a justificatory role in this 
distribution. 
 Because criminal law is a political institution, it is a mistake to believe that violating 
criminal law is the same as a moral violation. Punishment then ought to be thought of as a 
sanction against rule violations rather than as a doling out of what a person deserves because of 
their character. Both Chiao and Kelly explain that the criminal law is not the right kind of 
institution to address morality. It punishes rules of a political community, not pre-political moral 
wrongs, and because of due process constraints and epistemic limitations surrounding the moral 
capabilities of defendants, it is not a fine-grained enough institution to determine 




terms, a political institution that is part of the social contract. From Kelly, I take the idea that 
blameworthiness cannot be determined by using the tools that criminal law has at its disposal. 
From both theorists, I take the idea that the criminal law must be subjected to the same systems 
of political justification that the rest of our political institutions are. Here, I leave aside the merits 
of the particular value of the “anti-deference” egalitarianism that Chiao used to fill in an example 
of a political justification of criminal law would look. And, while there is much that recommends 
Just Harm Reduction model, I will refrain from adopting it in its details for the purposes of this 
chapter.  
 Criminal law is our most coercive state institution. We ought to be doubly sure, then, that 
it is justified by our political principles. While the particular conceptions of justice in modern 
society differ, by in large most modern conceptions prioritize some conception of liberty and 
equality. Blame doled out by a political institution is inconsistent with these principles. As Kelly 
notes, retributivists are quick to argue that blaming the morally culpable is a way of showing 
equal respect. But in reality, blame is an exclusionary reaction.  
[B]lame—at least in its more punitive realization —is a moralized form of social 
condemnation that sets the morally culpable apart, either temporarily or 
permanently; the moral engagement of blame belongs to a form of social control 
that bears a close relationship to the exercise of social expulsion.250  
 
Social expulsion is a rejection of equal political membership. Blame is inconsistent with 
the exercise of criminal law as a political institution because blame works to set a person outside 
of the political community. But the proper role of criminal law in an ideal society is to sanction 
rule breakers with the ultimate goal of supporting social cooperation of everyone, including the 
rule breakers. Judgments of moral culpability, blame, and excuse are the domain of interpersonal 
morality, not criminal justice. When we act as if the criminal law can determine moral 
                                               




culpability and should give people what they morally deserve, our system has tended toward 
excessive punishment, inhumane treatment, and the justification of intrusive and violent law 
enforcement for the sake of stopping the morally depraved. Not only is that not the domain of 





Chapter 4: Criminal Law as Public Policy Tool for Fighting Violence Against 
Women? 
 A Feminist, Expressivist Justification for Punishment of Rapists and Domestic Abusers 
 
0. Introduction  
In first several chapters of this dissertation, I argued that the American Criminal Justice 
System is an oppressive structure that has created a new class of oppressed people, those 
oppressed qua criminal. I have argued that this type of oppression is intimately linked with racial 
oppression, but that it is not reducible to a form of racial oppression. I have also argued that we 
ought to abandon retributivism as a justification for criminal law and punishment in the United 
States, and that criminal conviction is not sufficient evidence of moral culpability. Instead, I 
argued in the last chapter that we ought to think of criminal law in an ideal society as a political 
institution that helps support social cooperation with the greater political community. Criminal 
law and punishment then are not ends in themselves, but support the goals and policies of the 
political community. Erin Kelly notes that in criminalizing and punishing certain behaviors, the 
political community can expresses disapproval of those kinds of acts, although she is careful to 
note that this is distinct from expressing blame for those who have committed the acts (as we 
cannot know just because they are criminally liable that they are morally blameworthy).251 
Vincent Chiao explains that, because criminal law is public law, calibrating particular aspects of 
criminal law is a matter of weighing public policy concerns using an example of how to define 
sexual assault in Canada.252 The Canadian Supreme Court dealt with a complex problem of 
whether or not someone could be guilty of rape if the person believed that the would-be victim 
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was consenting if the would-be victim did not consent. Ultimately the court made the 
defendant’s subjective belief in consent an affirmative defense in which the defendant would 
have to convince a fact finder that they had objective reasons for the subjective belief. He argues 
that if this change made prosecutions for rape easier and therefore resulted in lower rates of 
sexual assault in Canada, on his theory, this benefit should be weighed against the costs—and 
not just financial costs. Essentially, some new class of people would be subject to conviction and 
punishment, and we would need to be sure that this cost was justified by the benefit with 
reference to our overall political principles. The example highlights the fact that, if we focus on 
the ideal theory of criminal law as a political institution, the door is left open for using this 
political institution as a tool ameliorate inequality. But, because I have argued that the criminal 
justice system in the United States is oppressive, I argue that we cannot use it in this way.  
As I shift from arguing that ‘criminals’ are oppressed in the United States to unpacking 
the implications of that oppression, I will address an argument for using criminal law as a public 
institution to support gender equality. Specifically, in this chapter, I will build what I take to be 
the most favorable argument for using the criminal law to fight against rape, domestic abuse, and 
other forms of violence against women. Anecdotally, I have found that many mainstream 
feminists are eager to join a movement to end mass incarceration, focusing mainly on shortening 
sentences for drug offenders and other non-violent criminals. At the same time, feminist activists 
have been pushing for more incarceration and law enforcement involvement when it comes to 
rape and domestic violence. In this chapter I offer what I take to be the most coherent and 




Jean Hampton has argued that addressing the injustices of the criminal justice system is 
simply at cross purposes with addressing violence against women,253 which she calls “one of the 
most important — perhaps the most important, tool in the oppression of women.”254 In this this 
chapter, I will explain why rape is so often raised as an objection or limitation to radical 
reformation of the United States’ criminal justice system, and I will articulate what I take to be 
the best argument in favor of using the criminal justice system to fight gender inequality in the 
form of gender-based violence. Particularly, this question is raised by feminists (academic or 
otherwise) who have worked to combat violence against women, and they are genuinely upset 
about the prospect of leaving rapists unpunished. 
In this chapter, I aim to create the most defensible position that I believe feminists can 
build to justify prosecution and incarceration of those who commit rape and domestic violence. 
This position attempts to address the structural nature of violence against women by using the 
social meaning of punishment to stigmatize this violence.255 I think that something like this 
theory undergirds the public calls by feminists and women’s rights advocates who call for better 
enforcement of laws against rape, sexual assault, and domestic violence. Here, with the help of 
feminist political and legal theorist Jean Hampton’s work, I hope to articulate and systematize 
this type of justification. In the next chapter I will show its limitations. In short, this is a model 
that combines expressivist retributivism with a focus on justice for the victims with a public 
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education theory of punishment that ultimately would deter people from committing violence 
against women by changing the norms around rape and domestic violence.  This model is 
centered on the claim that punishment, at least in part, is an institutional communication about 
the values of the community and of the lives of women.  
I will proceed by first examining why rapists pose a particular challenge to my position 
that criminals are oppressed. Second, I will examine a high-profile case in which feminist 
activists responded to a convicted rapist receiving a light sentence with a strong call for harsher 
sentences for rapists on the grounds that harsh punishments express the value of the victim. 
Third, I will explain how this feminist activism can be backed by a theory of punishment, and I 
will explain that theory drawing from Jean Hampton’s work. I will close by gesturing toward 
some particular problems with this theory that I will take up in more depth in the final chapter of 
this dissertation.  
1. Why the Rapist? 
The most common question that people, philosophers and non-philosophers alike, ask me 
when I tell them that I think criminals are oppressed is, “What about rapists?” Why the Rapist? 
Out of all the possible crimes, this is the one that all kinds of people invoke. There are at least 
two reasons for this.  First, along with murder, rape is the worst of the typical crimes that come 
to mind. So, by asking this question, people are often trying to ask how someone who has done 
something that nearly everyone agrees is morally abhorrent can be oppressed. They are thinking 
of the “worst of the worst” criminals.256  
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Secondly, particularly when feminist theorists or practitioners ask, they are thinking of 
the issue of a countervailing oppressed class. When I suggest that incarcerated people are 
oppressed, a legitimate feminist response might be that the same person who I am claiming is 
oppressed has been involved in the oppression of women. Moreover, the objector might respond 
that the importance of taking the oppression of women seriously by punishing rapists is at least 
as legitimate as trying to end oppression against those who are incarcerated. In fact, Jean 
Hampton makes just this point in her “Punishment, Feminism, and Political Identity: A Case 
Study in the Expressive Meaning of the Law.”257 There are two claims that I think are wrapped 
up in one: first, a rapist cannot be oppressed because they will likely be getting what they 
deserve, and second, regardless of whether or not the circumstances of criminal law or 
punishment are oppressive, we cannot give them up as tools for fighting the oppression of 
women, in particular, by punishing those who commit violence against women.  
So, if people ask about rapists because they are asking about the most violent criminals 
and/or those who commit crimes against women as a part of gender-based oppression, there are 
at least three rationales that such objectors would have for imprisoning rapists. All three are 
typical punishment justifications, but they take on special significance because of the severity of 
the violence of rape and the fact that it is a part of systemic violence against women. The first 
reason that we might need to incarcerate rapists is incapacitation. In this argument, rapists have 
shown their propensity to harm people (usually women), and with domestic abusers, there is 
ample evidence that they will harm their partner again, as stalking and partner murder are often 
the endgames of serious domestic abuse. This argument then is that, for the safety of the victim 
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and other potential victims, the rapist or abuser must be locked up. This argument also might be 
raised with murder or other violent crimes, with slightly different details, as the contexts of 
murder, recidivism rates, and other factors will differ. I will call this reason for demanding 
incarceration the incapacitation rationale. Sometimes the term ‘incapacitation’ can feel too 
theoretical, so I often think of this as the idea that the government should do what it can to keep 
women safe.  
A second and related reason is the deterrence rationale. This is a typical argument for 
punishment for all kinds of crimes, but I think that often when feminists raise it in regards to rape 
or domestic violence, they are making a more specific argument about these kinds of crimes. 
They argue that rape and domestic violence are extremely common crimes in the United States, 
and that rape and domestic violence are not prosecuted at the same rates as other crimes. They 
argue that at least one cause of this lack of prosecution and under-punishment is that the victims 
are women, and we take violence against women to be normal or acceptable. In other words, 
because we do not value women’s lives, we do not punish those who perpetrate violence against 
women very much. In turn, the lack of meaningful investigation and punishment fails to deter 
others from committing violence against women, thus reinforcing the normalcy and acceptability 
of violence against women. They would argue that it follows that we especially need to punish 
(and punish harshly) those who rape and abuse because lax punishment in the past has 
contributed to the extremely high rates of these types of crimes against women, and it has 
reinforced their normalization. This is different than the safety or incapacitation rationale 
because it is intended to deter future crimes, both those that the person being punished might 
commit (specific deterrence) but also those that anyone in the society might commit (general 




in structural sexism because it picks out that rape and domestic violence are part of bigger 
structures of sexism, so that crimes against women are, in part, caused by and reinforce structural 
sexism. 
While the above rationales can be seen as broadly consequentialist because the purpose 
of incarceration is to achieve some other end, be it incapacitation or deterrence, many people 
who ask this question might feel that their concern is more that rapists deserve punishment in the 
form of incarceration. This is broadly a retributivist rationale, the argument that people who 
commit certain types of wrongs deserve to suffer or to undergo hard treatment because of the 
wrong that they have done. Cases in which another person is deeply harmed, such as rape or hate 
crimes, seem to draw the most intuitive support for retributivist theories. In this case, the extreme 
moral harm of rape gives strong intuitive motivation that the rapist deserves incarceration. Like 
incapacitation and deterrence, retributivism is a theory of punishment that is used to justify 
punishment for all kinds of wrongdoing, but when rape is concerned, there are special 
motivations for retributivist arguments. First, rape is a deep kind of violence, and one which 
rightly outrages most people. Second, some feminists might argue that because rape is a kind of 
sex-based oppression, it is particularly deserving of hard-treatment. Similar arguments can and 
have been made to explain why those who commit racially motivated violence especially deserve 
harsh punishment. In fact, it usually these types of crimes that retributivists are quick to refer to 
when justifying their positions: rape, race-based violence, and genocide. While these kinds of 
arguments are largely supported by appeals to moral intuition, these intuitions are quite strong 
and may be motivating to a broad range of people, from feminist philosophers to members of 
juries. There is something about group-based harms that seems to elicit especially strong feelings 




One type of retributivist theory of punishment is the argument that punishment has an 
important expressive function, which, broadly speaking, argues that when a government 
punishes, it expresses condemnation of the crime it is punishing. In this case, an expressivist 
argument for the punishment of rapists is connected to the idea of rape as a type of oppression 
which especially needs to be denounced by the state in the form of punishment that expresses the 
depth of the moral wrong. It is retributivist in the sense that the expression of condemnation for 
the wrong is deserved regardless of the consequences. Like hard treatment, expression of 
condemnation is simply the fitting response for moral wrongdoing.  
Political activists often rely on this idea when they make a converse claim: the lack of 
punishment for crimes demonstrates that the government or society as a whole do not truly care 
about these crimes because they fail to decry the moral wrongdoing. Advocates against gender-
based violence can be understood as making this claim when they argue that the government 
shows lack of concern for women when they fail to punish rape and therefore condemn it. 
Similarly, in the Movement for Black Lives, one of the central claims is that the government’s 
failure to punish those who kill black people (often police officers, but not always), demonstrates 
a lack of concern for homicide when victims are black. This lack of concern shows that black 
lives do not matter to the government or society, which is why the movement counters with the 
slogan “Black Lives Matter.” 
Expressivist rationales are typically seen as types of retributivism because the wrongdoer 
is said to deserve moral condemnation or shaming. But, there are also times that expressivist 
views of punishment are employed as a part of an overall consequentialist project. For example, 
one might argue that expressing moral condemnation though punishment will work to deter 




might use, the moral condemnation of violence against women through punishment (which has 
been insufficiently employed by our sexist institutions up until now) might alter the structural or 
institutional incentives so as to weaken structural sexism. By changing the government’s 
expression, increasing official condemnation of rape and other forms of violence against women, 
we can change social norms. Indeed, changing criminal law institutions would actually amount 
to structural change as failures to punish rapists or domestic abusers are exactly the kinds of 
structural flaws that contribute to or even constitute institutional sexism. 
This paper will focus exclusively on the expressive justification, both in its retributivist 
and its deterrence versions. The expressivist view, I think, is the most powerful justification for 
incarcerating rapists for feminists. The incapacitation rationale can be satisfied by less coercive 
and less demeaning policies than employed by the American criminal justice system. Whether 
punishments actually work effectively as deterrents is much debated by empirical studies. But, 
the arguments for deterrence that seem to be driving most feminist accounts focus on the 
importance of stigmatizing rape and other forms of violence against women by prosecuting and 
punishing those who commit such violence.  
2. Brock Turner: Case Study for the Expressivist View of Punishment 
 One striking example of a rapist whose light sentence provoked public outrage is Brock 




Stanford University.258 Two graduate students saw Turner on top of the Chanel Miller259 in the 
alley, and when they yelled at him, they observed that she was unconscious. They corralled him 
as he tried to run away, called for help, and later testified against Turner. Turner was charged 
with several counts of sexual assault. A jury heard the testimony of Miller, Turner, and the 
graduate students, as well as expert testimony about how intoxicated both Turner and Miller 
were based on blood alcohol tests.  He testified that both he and Miller were drunk, that they had 
danced and kissed at the party, and she had agreed to accompany him to his dorm.  He said she 
fell on the way, pulling him down on her, and they began kissing. He testified that, with her 
consent, he digitally penetrated her.  On her account, however, she did not recall meeting him, let 
alone kissing or consenting to sexual activity. The jury then found Turner guilty of three 
felonies: assault with intent to rape an intoxicated woman, sexually penetrating an intoxicated 
person with a foreign object, and sexually penetrating an unconscious person with a foreign 
object.260  
The case drew national attention when Judge Aaron Persky sentenced Turner to six 
months in a county jail (of which he served three), as well as probation and registration as a sex 
offender.  Many viewed this sentence as problematically short and insufficiently light to be 
proportional to the harm that he had done to Miller. Moreover, many found Judge Persky’s 
                                               
258 Kate Manne has treated this example in her book Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny. She uses Turner as the 
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assault or harassment because of the implications of the allegations than for the victim of the assault. Manne, Down 
Girl, 195–211. I do not deny that this dynamic is at play in the Turner case, and I think that it is relevant that Turner 
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misogyny, and other structural inequalities. Nevertheless, here I argue that the form of expressive retributivist 
thinking at work in the non-ideal world can result in support for practices that themselves are deeply inhumane and 
damaging. I argue that no human being deserves such treatment, even if he is a rapist, murderer, or abuser.   
259 Chanel Miller, the woman who Brock Turner raped, has since identified herself and specifically asked that her 
name be used. She is tired of being referred to as simply “Brock Turner’s victim.” See her powerful account in 
Miller, Know My Name.  





comments at the sentencing hearing problematic because they seemed to downplay the 
seriousness of the sexual assault and the impact on the victim.  Judge Persky noted how much 
anxiety the media attention had produced for Turner, and he thought that he was less culpable for 
the attack because he was intoxicated. Judge Persky said that, though Turner seemed not to take 
full responsibility for the sexual assault, Judge Persky believed that Turner was being truthful 
about his subjective experience, implying that Turner had believed Miller had consented.261 
During sentencing, Judge Persky stated, “Obviously, the prison sentence would have a severe 
impact on him.”262 Outrage grew when Turner’s father’s statement was also made public. He 
lamented that his son was depressed, no longer wanted to eat T-bone steaks, and was unable to 
continue what had been a promising career as a swimmer.  The father said that his son’s life was 
ruined based on “twenty minutes of action.”263  
Later, Miller released her victim’s statement, which would have been heard by the judge 
as part of the sentencing, to the press. In it, she decried the judicial system, noting that the 
probation office seemed to give credit to Turner for his swimming scholarship in making its 
recommendation for a short stint in county jail.  In the statement, she explained how the sexual 
assault had impacted her life, including her inability to sleep at night, her struggles to go to work, 
and her general fear and anxiety.  She described the awful process that rape survivors go through 
when nurses take rape kits, which involves extremely invasive procedures that I will not recount 
in this paper. She recounted the litany of embarrassing, confusing, and blaming questions the 
                                               
261 It is worth noting that this this would imply that the judge disagreed with the jury, who could not have found 
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however, is a different question, one of legality, from the main argument put forward by detractors, which is that the 
judge simply did not take the crime seriously enough to punish it sufficiently harshly.  
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defense attorney asked her on the stand. She also described being re-traumatized when she heard 
Turner’s testimony that she had consented to this sexual activity behind a dumpster.264  
In response to the light sentence and the public comments, Michele Dauber, a law 
professor at Stanford, led a campaign to recall Judge Persky. Voters successfully recalled Judge 
Persky, who is the first judge in 80 years to be recalled in the state of California. Dauber 
explained why the success of the recall was so important: “We voted that sexual violence, 
including campus sexual violence, must be taken seriously by our elected officials, and by the 
justice system.”265 Although it may seem so obvious as to not be noteworthy, it is important to 
highlight the fact that Professor Dauber, and surely many others, think that the measurement of 
the severity of the crime is equal to the severity of the punishment to the punishing authority. A 
short sentence, therefore, conveys the message that the punishing authority, in this case, Judge 
Persky, does not think the crime was very serious. This statement voices the idea that 
punishments express society’s values by punishing more or less harshly crimes that the society 
considers to be more or less serious or harmful. On this view, punishments may also express 
something about the victim or the perpetrator. Harsher punishments may express a society’s view 
of the vulnerability of, for example, children, by punishing crimes against children more harshly. 
Thus, on this view, when rapes are not prosecuted or the sentences given for them are not as 
harsh as sentences for drugs, non-sexual violence like simple assault, or property, society is 
expressing the view that women, who are the most typical victims of rape, are not valuable. We 
might also find a similar view expressed in the Movement for Black Lives when police are not 
prosecuted or punished for killing black men and women who pose little if any threat to the 
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police. The defining phrase “Black Lives Matter” may be understood as countering what 
supporters take as the expression that a lack of punishment, light punishments (maybe a 
suspension or a firing), or non-prosecutions express the sentiment that the lives of the black 
people who were killed by police are not important enough to merit serious punishment for their 
killers.  
This idea is very similar to claims Jean Hampton makes in her article, “Correcting Harms 
Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution.” In this article, Hampton argues that certain 
types of wrongdoing create “moral injuries” to victims. In Hampton’s own words,  
When a serious wrongdoer gets a mere slap on the wrist after performing an act 
that diminished her victim, the punisher ratifies the view that the victim is indeed 
the sort of being who is low relative to the wrongdoer. When the American courts, 
until recently, responded to spousal abusers with light punishment or no 
punishment at all, they were expressing the view that women were indeed the 
chattel of their husbands. When the present day Canadian courts use a sentencing 
policy that gives certain types of sexual offenders lighter sentences, on average, 
than those given to people who have been convicted of burglary, they are 
accepting a view of women that grants them standing similar to-but slightly lower 
than-mere objects. Moreover, the widespread tolerance in the American South in 
the past [of racial violence particularly toward African Americans] demonstrates 
societal support for the message about relative value which [acts of racial 
violence] conveyed. Behavior is expressive, and the state’s behavior in the face of 
an act of attempted degradation against a victim is itself something that will either 
annul or contribute further to the diminishment of the victim.266 
 
In this statement, Hampton argues that the severity of a punishment or the lack of prosecution of 
a crime are expressions of the state about how it views those crimes and their victims. The article 
as a whole argues that the role of the state in punishment is to restore the moral status of the 
victim, which is diminished by the wrongdoer in certain kinds of crimes. The quotation above, 
however, is an aside, a conclusion that Hampton does not expressly argue for in this article.267 I 
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will use Joel Feinberg’s discussion of the expressivist functions of punishment to introduce the 
expressive functions of punishment. Here I will explain how these functions relate to the 
argument that the government does something of value when it punishes rape and expresses lack 
of concern for rape victims and perhaps all women as members of a group that is structurally 
vulnerable to rape. 
3. Feinberg’s Expressive Functions of Punishment 
 In his seminal article, “The Expressive Function of Punishment,” Feinberg argues that 
punishment can be differentiated from mere penalties because punishment is “a conventional 
device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of 
disapproval and reprobation, either on the part of the punishing authority or those ‘in whose 
name the punishment is inflicted.’”268 Punishment, then is an expression of condemnation, and 
the reason that punishment is able to convey condemnation is because of social norms that attach 
condemnation to certain punishments, particularly incarceration in our society. He argues that 
this is the case because punishment serves several important functions in society beyond 
deterrence and rehabilitation. Broadly, his view is a kind of retributivism because he argues that 
hard treatment is deserved based on a person’s wrongdoing, regardless of the other consequences 
of hard treatment. Moreover, he argues that the hard treatment itself sends the message of 
disapproval because “certain forms of hard treatment have become the conventional symbols of 
public reprobation” and that the “expressive aspect of …incarceration is precisely the element by 
reason of which it is properly characterized as punishment and not mere penalty.”269 He suggests 
that we should not think of the expressive aspect of punishment something that is added on top 
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which the moral status is returned to the victim. 
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of hard treatment, such as a judge proclaiming “we condemn you!” Instead, the very infliction of 
incarceration or other hard treatment is itself the condemnation because we as a society have 
developed this meaning through convention.270  
 Feinberg recognizes that in the actual criminal justice system, incarceration in particular, 
has come to mean more than simple resentment or disapproval. Cool resentment or disapproval 
are appropriate expressions of condemnation for modern democracies in Feinberg’s liberal 
theory, but he recognizes that our incarceration practices also express something less civic: 
“vindictive resentment” or even “hatred, fear, or contempt for the convict.”271 In other words, 
Feinberg recognizes that when we look at “our” practices (as an American writing in 1965), our 
punishments express much more than resentment or cool disapproval. They express revenge and 
hatred. “[T]o any reader who has in fact spent time in a prison” he argues that it will be clear that 
the expression is more than cool disapproval.272 Although there is a certain conventional aspect 
to punishment, some acts will only be able to bear certain kinds of conventional meanings: the 
brutality of some punishments may not be able to bear the coolheaded meaning of disapproval. 
They may reveal a more passionate meaning. This gesture at a critique of current practices is 
tempered by Feinberg’s suggestion that there are proper civil and cool-headed expressions that 
                                               
270 I suggest that there is an important entailment of Feinberg’s premise that punishment can express condemnation 
because that is its conventional meaning, though he does not note it. If punishment is successful in expressing 
condemnation because of social convention, this indicates that it is possible that we could have developed other acts 
that conventionally communicate condemnation or disapproval. Conventions can and do change, so the convention 
of hard treatment as an expression of condemnation may be changeable as well. Without going into too much detail, 
there is some (but not unlimited) flexibility as to what social conventions can become attached to natural acts, but 
the acts that make up hard treatment, which historically included corporal punishment, and today include physical 
confinement and execution, can probably never take on a positive valence. I am suggesting rather that we may be 
able to create other social conventions that have the meaning of social condemnation without incarceration or the 
infliction of physical pain. Thus, it is possible to imagine a society in which we do not measure the severity of a 
crime by length of the prison sentence. The length of a prison sentence is merely the most common social 
convention for measuring society’s condemnation of a criminal act in the United States now and in recent history.   
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hard treatment could convey, even if our current system often seems to slip into more vindictive 
responses.  
 Feinberg argues that the expressive function of punishment is what enables several other 
“derivative symbolic functions of punishment.” I turn to these functions because I believe they 
best voice what Hampton and activists like Dauber mean when they suggest that a failure to 
punish rape or domestic violence expresses society’s attitude toward women. The first function 
that Feinberg elaborates is “authoritative disavowal”: “Punishing [a wrongdoer] is an emphatic, 
dramatic and well understood way of condemning and thereby disavowing his act. It tells the 
world that the [wrongdoer] had no right to do what he did, that he was on his own in doing it, 
and that his government does not condone that kind of thing.”273 Here, punishment is a way for 
the government to distance itself from the act. With rape, we want the government to say that 
this is not the kind of action the government endorses, that it is not done with the support of the 
government. Without active prosecution and severe punishment, there is the sense that the 
government is not particularly concerned with rape: we get the sense that it does not officially 
condemn it beyond mere lip service.  
 The second function, which Feinberg calls “Symbolic Non-Acquiescence,”274 is similar 
to the first, but with the emphasis that failing to punish makes one complicit in the crime. This 
second function adds to the first the idea that the government speaks for the people it governs, so 
when it fails to punish wrongdoers, the people become complicit in the wrongdoing. Feinberg 
uses the example of a Texas law in which one would not be punished for murder if they killed 
their wife’s lover in the heat of the moment of discovering the lover in bed with his wife. 
Feinberg notes that many people in Texas were outraged that such a killing would not be 
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punished as murder.275 He argues, “The demand that paramour killings be punished may simply 
be the demand that this lopsided value judgment be withdrawn and that the state go on record 
against paramour killings, and the law testify to the recognition that such killings are 
wrongful.”276 This, he argues, left the people of Texas with the feeling that they were complicit 
in condoning the killing of paramours discovered in the act of adultery. This expression is 
extremely similar to the call for rapes to be punished more harshly—it is a call for the 
government to expressly condemn rape on behalf of the citizens of the community that the 
government represents.  
 Thirdly, Feinberg argues that punishment functions as the vindication of the law.277 
Punishment expresses the idea that the government really means the laws: not only are the laws 
technically on the books, but also, they are sincerely meant. This fits well with the idea that 
many women’s rights advocates demand that more rapes be prosecuted. Though many rape laws 
are on the books, the many unprosecuted cases show that the laws are not really important to the 
government. Similarly, the failure of grand juries to indict police officers for killing unarmed 
black people is one of the prime complaints of Black Lives Matter activists: if the laws are not 
actually vindicated, they are mere lip service. Feinberg argues, “A statute honored mainly in the 
breach begins to lose its character as law, unless, as we say, it is vindicated (emphatically 
reaffirmed); and clearly the way to do this (indeed the only way) is to punish those who violate 
it.”278 Punishment is the way to distinguish between lip service or empty platitudes and the 
government actually meaning that it takes seriously the crimes that it has enumerated. If laws are 
understood (as is common in the positive law tradition) as commands with threats, the threats 
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cannot be empty threats or the laws are not really operating as laws. Laws without actual 
punishment backing them would be dead letter.  In addition to being ineffective in influencing 
behavior (by, in the case of criminal law, deterring), unpunished law violations demonstrate that 
the government does not care enough about the law to express resentment or disapproval when it 
is broken.  
 Finally, the last symbolic function of the law on this account is the absolution of 
others.279 Feinberg gestures at several parties who may be absolved by punishing a wrongdoer. 
First, he suggests that if there has been a public scandal, punishing the wrongdoer absolves other 
suspects (at least officially) of the cloud of guilt that may have hung over them. He also argues 
that when an accuser is publicly considered to be a potential wrongdoer, the punishment of the 
accused clears the air for the accuser. This may be one of the most important meanings for those 
who advocate for punishment (and severe punishment at that) of rapists. For example, in the case 
of rape, often the victim is accused of lying, exaggerating, or simply for complaining about 
something that she has no right to complain about. With Brock Turner, there was little doubt that 
Turner raped Miller, but the comments of the judge and the father showed that they thought that 
what happened to her was not that serious, that she or the prosecutors were making too much of a 
small crime. The short sentence sent this message as well. Imagine, however, if Turner had been 
given a sentence of several years. In this case, the victim would be vindicated that her claim 
against Turner was valid and weighty and that her wellbeing and safety mattered to the 
government.   
 Oddly, Feinberg’s primary example of how vindication works is an example of how this 
expressive function of law was misused. He uses a literary example of a young woman who 
                                               




falsely accuses a young man of rape and then is absolved herself when a jury finds the young 
man guilty. In this case, she is absolved, though she does not deserve it.280  But, without turning 
to fiction or a tricky woman stereotype, a similar case could prove the same point. When Bill 
Cosby was finally found guilty of sexual assault after dozens of women accused him, though 
only one accuser’s case was actually adjudicated in court, in a way, all the victims were absolved 
of the question of false allegations. They were vindicated in their claims, most of which could 
not be brought because of the statute of limitations. One accuser stated, “This is fair and just,” 
and “I am victorious,” after he was sentenced to 3–10 years in prison.281  
 Feinberg anticipates that the criticism that one need not actually be punished, just be 
declared guilty, to perform this function. “Could not the state do this job without punishment? 
Perhaps, but when it speaks by punishing, its message is loud, and sure of getting across.”282 
Although analytically speaking, this is not a very satisfying response, the Turner case illustrates 
to some extent that this is true, at least in public perception. The jury found Turner guilty, but the 
failure to give a punishment that seemed to fit the verdict failed to satisfy the public. Punishment 
seems to add teeth to the criminal law, to prove that the government and the people it represents 
really mean what has been legislated, and that violation of the law is weighty and serious. A 
simple proclamation of guilt, perhaps because of the development of our social conventions 
around what incarceration means, does not convey weightiness in the same way that a severe 
punishment does.   
 Feinberg’s explanation of the expressive function of punishment supports the claim that 
failure to prosecute and particularly to punish rapists and domestic abusers demonstrates that the 
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government, and perhaps the society it represents, does not take these crimes seriously. As 
Feinberg explains, even if these things are technically prohibited, without punishment, we do not 
see the state explicitly disavow the behavior, and we do not see the people who the state 
represents disavowing it. Though laws against such actions are on the books, we do not believe 
that the state actually means that they are prohibited. Finally, we do not think that the 
government believes the victims worth vindication: their claims are meritless or unimportant. 
Perhaps they are lying, or their claims are not worth taking decisive action. When it comes to 
violence against women, swift and harsh punishment would demonstrate that the government 
totally disavows it, and that it values the wellbeing of the victims involved. At least, as Feinberg 
began his discussion, this is what most members of society would interpret the harsh punishment 
to mean because our conventions tell us that we punish with incarceration those crimes that we 
abhor. But Feinberg could not help but note that also, when we look at our actual incarceration 
practices, we see that those people we incarcerate, we hate. And this is why so many are 
outraged at the lack of harsh punishments for rapists. Our practices suggest that we hate drug 
offenders and do not mind rapists or domestic abusers so much. 
4. Hampton’s Dual-Purpose Expressivist Theory of Punishment 
 Throughout her career, Jean Hampton developed a theory of punishment based on the 
expressive function of law to ultimately argue that punishment can be justified first and primarily 
on a retributivist model wherein punishment effectively gets as close as possible to righting the 
wrong by expressing the moral value of the victim of a wrongdoing. Secondarily, the act of 
punishment is important moral education. It communicates to the wrongdoer that what they did 
was wrong, and punishment that inflicts some kind of pain is necessary to direct the wrongdoer 




community as a whole, in witnessing the punishment, is educated about why the wrong was 
wrong, and can even be educated about the moral worth of the victims and others like the victim. 
I think that this view, which puts retributivism as the primary justification and moral education 
as a secondary, consequential benefit, captures many of the intuitions of those who argue that 
rape and domestic violence are not punished often enough nor severely enough. Some feminists 
may find the moral education part of the argument more compelling, and may even completely 
disregard the expressivist retributivism here. Either way, I want to explain this view because I 
think that together, or separately, these are the best justifications for incarcerating those who 
commit violence against women. Because her view developed significantly throughout her 
career, I will make my best attempt to articulate the most complete, fullest arguments that 
Hampton gives, and where I can, even improve upon her arguments or make additional 
connections she may not have made as she was not engaged in specifically addressing the 
question I use her theory to address. 
4.1 Retributivist Vindication of the Victim 
The retributivist vindication of the victim283 piece of Hampton’s view begins by explaining that 
acts, including wrongdoings, criminal acts, and punishments, can have expressive functions. 
Laws perform an important expressive purpose in democracies as well. She states:   
A law can be not only a tool for the organization of the community (e.g., by 
promoting order, or coordination, or public wellbeing), but also a significant 
expressive force in that community, symbolizing the community’s sense of its 
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values and (what I will call) its “political personality”. Indeed, for countries which 
are not culturally homogeneous and in which the unity of the community is 
primarily purchased through the principles of its polity, the expressive nature of 
certain laws can be essential in the creation, maintenance or revision of a unifying 
identity for that society; this is an identity that not only helps to hold the pluralist 
society together but also helps people to have a sense of themselves as members 
of that political community.284 
 
Thus, for Hampton, laws express the value of a community, but also, in expressing the values the 
community shares, laws can themselves create the identity of political communities particularly 
in those nations, like the United States and Canada, where there is (at least purportedly) no ethnic 
people that undergird the nation.  
Hampton argues that, in addition to laws, acts have expressive values. In her 
interpretation of philosopher of language Paul Grice, she explains that conduct can have meaning 
in four ways: natural meaning, word meaning, speaker meaning, and conversational 
implicature.285 To explain these four kinds of meaning, she uses a particularly heinous act in 
order to show that one person can use act to diminish the human value of another person or 
persons. The story, passed down in a Black family who supposedly knew the victims, is told this 
way: a white farmer was somehow offended by a black farmhand and his four sons. The farmer 
caught the men, placed them in burlap bags hung from trees, and was about to light them on fire. 
One of the black farm hands asked for a cigar before he died. The farmer then castrated the man 
and placed his penis in his mouth and told him to smoke it. He then burned all the men alive.286  
This story is heinous not only for its dehumanizing cruelty, but also because of the racial 
terrorism implicit in it, and in the United States, most will have some sense of the background 
racist structures that likely allowed this white farmer to commit these murders with impunity. 
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For Hampton, this act demonstrates how conduct can diminish the human value of people. “The 
message conveyed by the farmer’s behavior in this incident is one that not only denies all of the 
humanity these men possess, all of their manhood, and all of their rights as sentient creatures, 
but also any part of creature of them that could be thought to make them worthy of any degree of 
respect.”287 The act was dehumanizing because it treated the men as if they did not have the same 
moral worth as other human beings. The farmer treated them as less than human, and indeed, he 
enjoyed treating the man he castrated as an object even in the face of a human request for 
comfort before death. Not only did the farmer convey that the men were less than other human 
beings, Hampton argues that conduct includes a corresponding elevation of the actor: the 
farmer’s conduct conveys the meaning that he is superior to his victims, elevating his own power 
and mastery over them by doing to them whatever he pleased in complete denial of their right 
not to be treated as trash or useless objects because of their humanity.  
From these features of this example, she defines wrongful actions that produce moral 
injury and thus require a retributive response:  
A person behaves wrongfully in a way that effects a moral injury to another 
person when she treats that person in a way that is precluded by that person’s 
value, and/or by representing him as worth far less tha[n] his actual value; or, in 
other words, when the meaning of her action is such that she diminishes him, and 
by doing so, represents herself as elevated with respect [to] him, thereby 
according herself a value that she does not have.288 
 
Again, Hampton’s definition of moral harm is based on the difference between the value that 
each human being actually has, regardless of any circumstances, and the way the wrongdoer 
treats that person so as to represent the victim as having less or no such value. This diminishment 
can also be achieved by violating the rights and norms that are entailed by having human value. 
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The very act of doing this is a statement by the wrongdoer that they are worth more than the 
victim because they are asserting that they have the power to deny this human status to the 
victim. Thus, the diminishment of the victim entails the statement of the superiority of the 
wrongdoer.  
Hampton argues that the farmer is able to communicate all these things without explicitly 
saying them because the acts themselves are expressive. Following Grice and using the farmer’s 
conduct as an example, Hampton explains the four different kinds of meaning that an act can 
convey. The first, the natural meaning, is not linguistic, but more evidentiary, as when we say 
“smoke means fire” we really mean that smoke is evidence that there is fire. When the farmer 
killed the five men in this manner, he meant it as evidence that they had no value as human 
beings at all.289 The second, word meaning, is the kind of fixed conventional meanings that 
words and other kinds of acts have. Thus, in contemporary America, showing someone a raised 
middle finger is meant to convey disrespect or anger. Burning alive and castrating, Hampton 
argues, have fixed conventional meaning. They have a conventional meaning of being 
particularly demeaning, cruel, and dehumanizing.290 Third, speaker meaning, is when a person 
uses other things beyond convention to make an intention known. Thus, a person could misspeak 
when trying to curse someone out and still convey the meaning intended by the attempted 
cursing. Hampton argues that the way in which the farmer burned the men as if they were trash 
was not a typical convention, as say, lynching was, but burning the men in burlap sacks 
conveyed the farmer’s contempt for the value of the men’s lives. Moreover, in making novel use 
of castration by his “joke” with the penis went beyond the typical conventions of racialize killing 
and conveyed a deep sense of his intentions. In so doing, not only did he castrate the man, but 
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implied through his actions that his penis was a mere object and had no meaning as a human 
organ deeply connected with manhood. 291  Finally, conversational implicature is also meaning 
that differs from explicit language spoken, for example, the use of sarcasm. Hampton argues that 
when the farmer used the form of responding politely to a request, “here, smoke this,” while 
actually performing a heinous and cruel act, the farmer used conversational implicature.292 Thus, 
the farmer used his act, and the meaning the act conveyed, to express that the men were below 
him. In so doing, he committed an act of moral injury, and a particularly heinous one at that.  
Given Hampton’s extended discussion of this particularly violent crime as an example of 
moral injury, one might be tempted to think of moral injuries as only being serious or violent 
crimes. But Hampton notes that it is the communication of moral superiority in an act that makes 
it a moral injury, not the seriousness of the crime. For example, she argues that taking a book 
from a university library without checking it out can be a moral injury because the library-rule 
breaker can keep the book as long as she wants without incurring fines, having the book recalled, 
or having to return the book on time. She is putting her own desires or needs for the book above 
those of other library patrons.293  
Hampton is careful, however, to distinguish moral injury from harm. Harms require 
correction, but moral injuries require retributive responses.  The wrongfulness of an action is 
distinct from the harm that it causes. Here, she refers to the fact that in the Anglo-American legal 
system we have a legal structure—tort law—which is responsible for correcting harms. Under a 
tort theory, the central goal is to identify a harm and the actor responsible for causing it. There 
often has to be some kind of wrongfulness in the actor, such as negligence (such as, for example, 
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driving a little too fast for prevailing road conditions), but under tort law, it is not necessary for 
the actor who caused the harm to have done something that draws moral condemnation. Indeed, 
there are times when an actor who causes harm is still liable for correcting it even when her 
actions are overall not morally condemnable.294  
This leads to the question of what makes an act wrongful such that the actor needs to do 
something other than simply correct the harm. To return to her example, the farmhand and his 
sons were harmed: they were burned alive, and one was castrated. Certainly, this involved 
tremendous amounts of physical and psychological pain in addition to loss of life. But if this 
same physical pain and death happened as a result of a natural disaster or even as a result of a 
negligently caused fire, we would have a different response to it: we would mourn the loss of life 
and feel anger or regret that the men suffered pain. Hampton suggests, “However, what makes 
the harm effected by a wrongdoing ‘worse’ for us, and hence the target of a special kind of anger 
in us, is the way it constitutes a treatment of the victim that violates entitlements which that 
person’s value requires other human beings to respect.”295 In this way, Hampton separates out 
moral injury from harm. Even the psychological harm suffered by the victims in this example is 
distinct from the moral injury that results from the violation of their human value. This 
diminishment occurred because the farmer represented the men as not having value by killing 
them, particularly in such a demeaning manner, and by violating the rights that are necessary 
correlates of that human value, including the right not to be tortured, maimed, and murdered. 
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Because wrongdoings inflict moral injury diminish the human value of another person or 
persons, Hampton argues that a proper response must address this diminishment. She explains 
that conduct deserves a retributive response when it “causes a moral injury, which means that it 
expresses and does damage to the acknowledgement and realization of the value of the 
victim.”296 Because acts can be expressive, some acts can express the idea that the victim is less 
valuable than she really is, or an act can prevent a victim from appreciating her own human 
value. This particular expression makes an act wrongful in a way that requires a retributivist 
response.  
Hampton defines a retributive response as follows: 
In short, retribution is a response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the value 
of the victim denied by the wrongdoer’s action through the construction of an 
event that not only repudiates the action’s message of superiority over the victim 
but does so in a way that confirms them as equal by virtue of their humanity.297 
 
The central goal of this response is to attend to the victim’s human value, and this kind of 
mending generally requires more than words or pronouncements. This is why she uses the idea 
of constructing an event; she notes that simply proclaiming (arguably even in an official venue 
like a court) that the act was wrongful and denied the victim’s rightful value does not address the 
diminishment. Instead, she argues that we must “respond by trying to remake the world in a way 
that denies what the wrongdoer’s events have attempted to establish, thereby lowering the 
wrongdoer, elevating the victim, and annulling the act of diminishment.”298 The idea of 
“constructing an event” and “remak[ing] the world” is certainly compelling, but what could this 
mean in the real world? Being incarcerated for a period is certainly is a type of event, and in 
many ways, when a person serves a prison sentence, at least they are remade.  
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But Hampton does not go this route. She writes, “Moreover, it is a mistake to focus, as 
philosophers have always done, on the punishment of felons to explain and give examples of 
retribution because constricting retributive responses for those who commit serious wrongdoings 
is extremely difficult, and there is good reason to believe that our legal system does not do a very 
good job of it.”299 She notes that in many cases, punishments (especially those that aim at eye-
for-an-eye lex talionis proportionality), end up instead morally injuring the wrongdoer as well.300  
When a punishment itself treats a wrongdoer as not having human value, it fails to be an 
appropriate retributive response and becomes another instance of moral injury.   
 Still, Hampton has left us with a grueling story of a heinous act and the call for the 
construction of an event that might respond to this grave moral injury. The murder of these 
farmhands was a racist hate crime, among the worst imaginable, and the victims’ human value 
utterly denied with the kind of cruelty that is attentive to detail, delivered with a kind of cool 
detachment that evades excuse. These kinds of crimes are often those appealed to by 
retributivists, acts that are not just violent, but that often have an element of group-based 
oppression in them: genocide, rape, racial terrorism, police brutality, domestic violence and 
family annihilation. Although Hampton argues that an act as non-violent and even impersonal as 
taking a book from a library without checking it out may also cause moral injury (because the 
library-rule breaker puts themselves and their desire to have the book above the needs or desires 
of other patrons), it is the most brutal acts that leave us reaching for some kind of response that 
can match the deep injury that they cause.  
 Interestingly, Hampton turns to punitive damages in tort cases as a better example of a 
retributivist response than typical criminal punishments. Specifically, she finds exemplary the 
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punitive damages awarded by a jury for defendant company Ford after it failed to recall Ford 
Pintos despite knowing that they were highly likely to explode, injuring and killing 
passengers.301  A passenger severely damaged in a fire caused by the explosions sued Ford, and 
during the case it was discovered that Ford knew of the problems with its Ford Pinto. Ford had 
calculated the cost of paying out injury and wrongful death suits, placing a relatively low value 
for each life it expected to be lost, versus the costs of removing the car from the streets. It 
determined that it would cost less to keep Pintos on the streets and pay families for the deaths 
caused by the car than to recall it.302 When the jury on this case received this information, it gave 
an extremely high punitive damages award to the carmaker. In fact, the jury awarded the total 
profits that Ford expected to make by not recalling the car and awarded it to the plaintiff:  exactly 
the amount that Ford had expected to save by not recalling the faulty car, and the jury made this 
explicit (125 million dollars).303 Hampton found this to be a fitting retributive response because 
it put the punishment in terms the company could understand, cost/benefit terms, while at the 
same time demonstrating that the value of the human lives lost to the faulty car design could not 
be captured by the costs of wrongful death lawsuits. Though a higher court found the award to be 
excessive and lessened it, Hampton holds this punitive response as an example of the right kind 
of retribution.  
 But money damages are certainly not appropriate for many cases. Indeed, when the 
wrongdoer is a human and not a company,304 money damages are often impossible. For example, 
how much money did the racist, homicidal farmer have? Certainly not enough for a retributive 
                                               
301 Hampton “Correcting Harms” 1687–89. 
302 Hampton “Correcting Harms” 1688. 
303 Hampton, “Correcting Harms” 1689. 
304 Arguably, on Hampton’s theory, the people working for Ford who made the relevant decisions deserve a 
retributive response as well. Even if one could get 125 million dollars from one of them, it is difficult to imagine that 




response. In circumstances where a crime has been committed, money damages might be very 
appropriate for correcting harms (to use Hampton’s distinction) by, for example, replacing 
damaged or stolen property or paying for medical costs including mental health treatment for 
trauma after an assault. But, Hampton argues that what is needed is a response to the moral 
injury, not a correction of a harm. For her argument, harm is a different moral category that 
deserves attention, but it does not exhaust the required response, especially from the state in the 
case of serious moral injuries. Therefore, punitive damages in tort cases do not provide a hopeful 
resource for proper retributive responses on Hampton’s theory. What she seems to find 
promising about the Ford case is the thought process involved in the jury’s response, which is 
unique. It cannot be the case that criminal punishments must be so inventive and almost poetic. 
There is no way to replicate the kind of response the jury in the Ford case found. 
One example in the criminal justice sphere that Hampton finds promising is a program in 
which perpetrators of rapes must, through court-mandated therapy sessions, confront what they 
did to their victims by listening to or reading victims’ accusations and engaging in role play 
where they imagine being rape victims.305 The purpose is not rehabilitative, though that was 
often a positive side effect noted by the programs, but to reshape the roles so that wrongdoer is 
no longer in the position of superior or master, but is instead feeling what the victim would have 
felt in some way. It is important to note that in this case, it is not a strict lex talionis, the idea that 
a wrongdoer should suffer the exact same ill he visited on another. This program does not 
include a rapist actually being raped, and Hampton is careful to delineate that the program she 
advocates does not actually put the wrongdoer in the position of his victim because to do that 
would be to morally injure him, diminishing his human value (which, no matter his crime, is not 
                                               




actually ever lessened). Again, there may be something of value in such a unique response, but it 
is difficult to imagine how to replicate such a punishment. Criminal law cannot be expected to 
respond to moral injury with novel and creative ways of reshaping the world. It is unclear 
whether or not such a program would even have the intended effect of putting the rapist back in 
his place.  
 Additionally, Hampton’s theory requires proportionality, which is difficult to square with 
these creative and almost singular retributive responses. “The more awful the wrong, the larger 
the purported gulf between wrongdoer and victim, and the more substantial and severe the 
punishment must be in order to defeat the wrongdoer and thereby deny his claim to 
superiority.”306 Though she does not argue for this point in detail, Hampton relies on our 
intuition that certain acts, such as racial violence or rape are more diminishing than simple 
assault, which in turn is more diminishing than the library-rule breaker, who only places herself 
above others in the case of unlimited access to a book, not violence. The retributive responses for 
these different acts must be proportionally calibrated on Hampton’s account. We might think that 
fining the library-rule breaker is a good punishment, as she was in effect able to access a book 
without due dates or fines, and, should it be effective, suspending her borrowing privileges, 
which she abused, for a time. But it is not so clear how we would calibrate an appropriate 
retributive response for people whose wrongdoings were so horrendous that to simply perform a 
lex talionis response would entail committing moral injury to the wrongdoer.307  
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 Illustrating the difficulty of crafting the retributive event that restores the human value of 
the victims and puts the wrongdoer in her place, Hampton shies away from fully endorsing any 
one retributivist response to the farmer who heinously killed the farmhands. She notes that in 
fact, the failure the state to punish the farmer was a statement of agreement with the degrading 
message of the crimes.308 She compares this to the state not punishing rapists, which she 
understands as an expression of the state’s lack of concern for the lives of women.309 She then 
explicitly appeals to the reader’s intuition about what fate the farmer ought to have met 
(presumably at the hands of the state):  
Indeed, if I asked you “What ought to be done to such a farmer?” surely you 
would demand the severest possible infliction of pain that you believe morally 
justified (and even those who do not favor capital punishment might find 
themselves wanting to respond “kill him”). What is it that produces this reaction? 
Surely it is not elicited in us because we believe that such behavior ought to be 
deterred: of course we want it deterred, but that goal has nothing to do with our 
fury at this man that our reaction expresses. Nor does that reaction betray any 
interest in morally educating or changing him for the better; maybe after some 
consideration we might agree that these goals are appropriate (so that killing him 
would be inappropriate), but regardless of whether he can be changed, we want 
him to pay severely for what he did to those men.310 
 
How much pain can we inflict on the racist, homicidal farmer and be morally justified? Our 
current social practices would certainly suggest that we could imprison him, even for life. But it 
is unclear how imprisonment can right the wrong of brutal racist murder. Can we have the state 
torture him? To the execution table or firing squad? On the one hand torturing him is certainly a 
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violation of his human value, and thus a moral injury. But simple limitation of freedom, even for 
life, seems not to fit the requirement of remaking the world so that his victims are returned to 
their place as valued human beings and he is returned to a place of human equality.  
Hampton recognizes that the current incarceration practices of the west are probably not 
the place to start with regards to an appropriate retributivist response. She cautions philosophers, 
stating that confining our thinking of retributivism to the kinds of punishments that felons 
receive in western societies’ criminal justice systems is a mistake because these institutions have 
not been good exemplars of the kind of retributivism that she advocates. But she struggles to 
articulate what a proper retributive response would actually look like, particularly when 
confronted with heinous acts of racial terror. She shows tentative optimism at the idea of rapists 
who are confronted by therapists with the horror of the pain of rape victims, but this program 
seems like it must be taking place within the confines of incarceration, and it is unclear whether 
it would really have the world remaking ramifications for the actual victims of the rapists. 
Instead, it seems to be more focused on reminding the rapists of their place rather than raising up 
the victims.  
The tension that Hampton’s expressive retributivism comes to is that, as much as she 
grasps at potential punishments that might be able to right the wrongs that she discusses, in very 
many cases, there simply is no act or event that will right the wrong that does not also morally 
diminish the wrongdoer in the process. In this particular iteration of her theory of punishment, 
she is demanding that criminal punishment achieve something that is simply not possible. There 
is no way to right the wrong of the racist murders of the black men she described.  
Hampton recognizes the difficulty in giving an appropriate response to violent crimes, 




many cases, she thinks that someone besides the state might be better suited to respond to 
everyday moral injuries. But, when it came to the racist, homicidal farmer, she argues that only 
the state “in its capacity as impartial moral representative of the entire community, is in a 
position to send the kind of profoundly humbling message, and the kind of profoundly humbling 
experience, that stands any kind of chance of vindicating the value of the victims.”311 She also 
explains that a liberal state would fail to meet its own standards if it did not respond to the racist 
farmer’s actions with a retributive response.312  Her discussion of how a state must balance its 
obligations of retribution with other principles (squaring punishment of hate speech with 
freedom of expression, attending to various obligations to differently situated citizens) 
recognizes that the state cannot have an unlimited imperative to punish moral injury. 
Nevertheless, she sees the state playing an essential role as a moral agent that uses acts to express 
the value of members of society.  
There are two ways of interpreting the particular role that Hampton has cut out for the 
state in righting moral wrongs, a strong sense and a weaker sense. In the stronger sense, the sense 
she seems to mean in this article, is that the state has the moral obligation in serious cases of 
moral injury (at least racist murders, rape) to actually right the wrong caused by moral injury 
through a retributive response that lowers the bad actor. Here the state is acting as a moral agent 
and representative of the whole community. This is the kind of view that Kelly and Chiao 
criticize in their respective theories of criminal law and punishment. As is evident by the 
difficulty in constructing an appropriate retributive response these serious injuries without 
morally injuring the wrongdoer, a system of criminal law cannot achieve a moral response to a 
pre-political wrong.  As I argued in chapter 3, criminal law systems work to support systems of 
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cooperation. It is unrealistic to expect that they can right moral injury, and if we expect them to 
be able to do this, our punishments will likely be extremely harsh, at least when confronted with 
violent crimes.  
But this political view suggests a weaker version of Hampton’s retributive response to 
victims. The state has an obligation to respond to violations of the rules of social cooperation. In 
any liberal society, that obligation will include rules that respect the liberty and equality of each 
member of the political community. The government has a strong reason to use criminal law and 
other political institutions to express the equal value of all, and that requires some kind of 
response to serious moral injury. This will look much more like what Kelly suggests the state 
owes victims of crime under her Just Harm Reduction model. As she concludes, a criminal law 
response to victims means “using the criminal justice system to incapacitate, deter, and 
rehabilitate criminal wrongdoers, and, when possible, to redress the harmful effects of crimes on 
their victims. These purposes together constitute a morally adequate response to victims. I 
submit that victims have no right to a retributive form of justice that would go beyond these 
aims.”313 On this weaker version of Hampton’s view, the state might use criminal law (not 
“retributive responses”) to acknowledge and promote the equal standing of a victim of a crime, 
particularly if that victim is from a group that has been subject to a history or recurring practice 
of inequality as is the case in violence toward black people and gender-based violence. But 
demanding that the state do the impossible, right the wrong of racist murder or rape, is 
demanding something that is not possible. 
 
 
                                               




4.2 Moral Education 
In her later work, Hampton begins to emphasize a different approach to justifying 
punishment.  She argues punishment can morally educate both the wrongdoer and the society as 
a whole. She differentiates moral education from rehabilitation by noting that rehabilitation aims 
to make the offender a functioning member of society by, for example, teaching him a trade or to 
read, or more generally, to get along well in society. A moral education, on the other hand, 
“attempts to teach both the wrongdoer, and the public at large, that there are important moral 
reasons for choosing not to perform the criminal offence.”314 For example, a moral education 
could instill in a thief respect for property rights. At the same time that the punishment educates 
the wrongdoer, it expresses and thus strengthens the social norm that property rights are 
important. If the wrong in question violence against women, which Hampton calls the most 
important tool of gender oppression,315 then the punishment expresses moral condemnation of 
violence against women and aims to educate the rapist or abuser of the nature of the wrong he 
committed. Here, she argues against what she calls a left-wing approach to punishment as 
rehabilitation only, which sees the roots of crime as poverty and inequality. Instead, she insists 
that “those who are guilty of a criminal offense have a moral problem.”316 In giving the 
wrongdoer a moral education, she argues that the punishment both improves the wrongdoer and 
treats him like a moral agent rather than a hapless victim of circumstances (a view that she 
condemns her left-wing critics for). She refers to this as specific moral education, and like 
specific deterrence, it is aimed at the individual wrongdoer and will hopefully have the effect of 
preventing the individual wrongdoer from committing this moral wrong again.  
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Just like deterrence, moral education has a specific form, which is aimed at the education 
of the wrongdoer, and a general form, which is aimed at society as a whole.317 When the wrong-
doer is punished, she is morally educated. At the same time, the punishment expresses to the 
greater community the importance of the moral norms at play, such as respect for persons, 
respect for property, the equal value of women or of racial minorities, depending on which crime 
is being punished. In turn, this education acts as a kind of general crime prevention by providing 
moral-social motivations for complying with the law in addition to simply punishment-
avoidance.  
Punishment is able to educate because punishment has expressive functions. Hampton 
writes: 
A free and democratic society expresses, and ought to express, through its 
punishment, its commitment to behavior that respects the freedom and equal 
dignity of all its citizens. To the extent that this commitment is conveyed through 
the operation of the criminal justice system, the larger society is benefitting from 
the moral messages this system sends, insofar as its values are reinforced in a way 
that may strengthen people’s allegiance to those values and deter behavior that 
violates them.”318  
 
Hampton argues that punishing those who commit crimes proportionately to their crime 
expresses of the equal value of each person in a democratic society. Punishing those who commit 
gender-based or race-based crimes in a way that acknowledges the moral injury done to the 
victim is a way for a democratic society to express the equal value of all genders and races.319 
From her argument, it follows that when a rapist is punished, that sends the moral message to the 
community that rape is not something that we allow because we value the life and bodily 
autonomy of the rape victim. This reinforces the norm against raping so that others will not only 
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avoid raping to avoid punishment, but also to avoid violating an important norm.  When society 
does not punish rapists or domestic abuser’s sufficiently harshly, that society is not expressing 
the equal value of women, who are the likely victims of such crimes. Not only this, but the lack 
of punishment fails to educate the public about the equal value of women. Punishing rapists and 
abusers more harshly would educate the public about the equal value of women and thus deter 
people from committing these crimes against women. 
 Punishments, which include both a moral communication and hard treatment, can educate 
in a particularly compelling way.  “Expressive punitive responses […] have the potential for 
provoking thought that can bring about a change in the wrongdoer’s way of thinking about 
himself and his society.”320 Hampton suggests that the act of being punished provokes the 
wrongdoer to think about why he is suffering hard treatment, hopefully leading the wrongdoer to 
repudiate his wrong acts. Punishment prompts this thinking on Hampton’s view because 
punishment is “an educative communication.”321 This ultimately is a benefit to the wrongdoer 
because it treats him as accountable for his wrongs, thus upholding his agency. It also benefits 
him by addressing the moral problem that he had when he committed the wrong. Poverty, lack of 
education, and other circumstances of oppression may often contribute to the likelihood of crime, 
and rehabilitation can attempt to ameliorate those conditions. But, punishment as educative 
communication attempts to explain to the wrongdoer that the wrong was a moral failing, not 
simply a causal implication of circumstance. Hampton, in reaching for words to describe how 
this might work, quotes Herbert Morris, a retributivist theorist, saying that the wrongdoer’s “soul 
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is in jeopardy as his victim’s is not.”322 This moral peril is then supposed to justify the moral 
educative function of punishment. In a way, we owe it to the wrongdoer to punish him in this 
particular kind of way in order to help him save his soul, or, less dramatically, to learn to be a 
more moral person.  
 In her earlier work on moral education, she likens punishment to an electric fence that 
sets up moral boundaries. She writes, “But on the moral education view, it is incorrect to regard 
simple deterrence as the aim of punishment: rather, to state it succinctly, the view maintains that 
punishment is justified as a way to prevent wrongdoing insofar as it can teach both wrongdoers 
and the public at large the moral reasons for choosing not to perform an offense.”323 The pain of 
the shock tells the wrongdoer not to commit the act again, and warns any who can see of the 
consequences of committing the act. But this is not merely social conditioning of associating 
proscribed acts with pain, Hampton argues, because human beings are able to reflect, and the 
pain of the shock should prompt the wrongdoer and the onlooker to reflect about why the 
punishment occurred and hopefully will come to learn a moral lesson.324 In this way, she argues 
that the moral education theory does not run into the same criticisms that a deterrence theory 
does because the punishment is aimed at doing something for the wrongdoer—it aims to educate 
him—and only secondarily educates the greater public.325 She also points out that her view relies 
both on moral objectivism (there has to be a correct moral truth to communicate to the 
wrongdoer) and human freedom (the person has to be able to choose how to act, not merely react 
as animals avoiding another shock at the fence without understanding why).  
                                               
322 Morris, “A Paternalistic Theory,” 268, quoted in Hampton, “Punishment, Feminism,” 40. 
323 Hampton, “A Moral Education,” 117. 
324 Hampton, “A Moral Education Theory,” 117–18. 




Additionally, Hampton argues that the focus on education provides a helpful upper limit 
on punishment. While deterrence theory would seem to justify any brutal punishment if it 
successfully deterred others from breaking the law, Hampton argues that the upper limit of moral 
education is much more appropriate. “On this view the goal of punishment is not to destroy the 
criminal’s freedom of choice, but to persuade him to use his freedom in a way consistent with the 
freedom of others. Thus, any punishment that would damage the autonomy of the criminal is 
ruled out by this theory.”326 This fits nicely with Hampton’s retributivist response theory, which 
insists that the retributivist response carefully balance the need for proportionality with the 
restraint that the punishment cannot itself be such that it morally injures the wrongdoer by 
treating him as if he does not have equal moral value with every other human being.  
Punishments that inflict some kind of pain (not necessarily physical) are essential for 
educative purposes.327 Hampton argues that the pain, like the electric fence, notifies the 
wrongdoer that society prohibits this action. But Hampton also argues that inflicting a certain 
kind of pain, the limitation on the wrongdoer’s freedom, will give him a dose of what he has 
done to the victim. “By giving a wrongdoer something like what she gave to others, you are 
trying to drive home to her just how painful and damaging her action was for her victims, and 
this experience will, one hopes, help the wrongdoer to understand the immorality of her 
action.”328 But, Hampton does not argue for a strict lex talionis type of proportionality (the literal 
proportionality of eye-for-eye, life-for-life punishments) in which the exact same harm done by 
the wrongdoer is visited upon her. This would often lead to the kind of moral injury described 
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above: we do not respect the wrongdoer as a rational human being by killing or raping her.  
Hampton argues that when wrongdoers steals or rapes, they  
are performing immoral acts in order to satisfy their own needs and interests, 
insensitive to the needs and interests of the people they hurt. The way to 
communicate to such people that there is a barrier of a very special sort against 
these kinds of actions would seem to be to link performance of the actions with 
what such people care about most—the pursuit of their own pleasure.329 
 
Because most wrongs that are criminalized in some way involve the wrongdoer placing illicit 
limitations on a victim’s freedoms (property crimes limit what the victim may do with her own 
property, and certainly violence and rape also involve some kind of limitation on one’s bodily 
autonomy), subjecting the wrongdoer to “disruption of the freedom to pursue the satisfaction of 
one’s desires,” points the wrongdoer to how unpleasant this restriction is, and therefore to the 
moral wrong that he has committed against the victim.330 In this way, Hampton argues, the 
wrongdoer can be moved from a mere acknowledgement that society prohibits certain actions to 
the knowledge that it is morally wrong to act in ways that limit the freedom of others. These 
kinds of limitations on freedom, incarceration, fines, and forced service do not morally harm the 
wrongdoer, argues Hampton, as strict eye-for-an-eye proportionality, but they do connect the 
type of harm committed to the punishment. And this punishment can be scaled according to the 
severity of the crime.  
The fact that this kind of moral communication is public means that the punishment can 
secondarily serve as education to the community.  In a passage partially quoted above, Hampton 
argues, “Our moral convictions as a community are implicit in the stand we take either for or 
against certain kinds of behavior. A free and democratic society expresses, and ought to express 
through its punishment, its commitment to behavior that respects the freedom and equal dignity 
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of all its citizens.”331 When the laws are upheld through punishment of violators, the values that 
undergird the laws are supported in the community as a whole, in part through deterring law 
violations, but also by demonstrating that the state takes these kinds of violations seriously. 
Hampton is certainly drawing from Feinberg’s functions of punishment, as punishment is a way 
for the state to communicate its commitment to the laws and the values in them. Therefore, if a 
state punishes a rapist harshly, it is communicating not only to the rapist that he has done 
something deeply wrong, but it is reasserting to the community at large that rape is very bad, and 
we value women and do not want them to be victims of rape.  
 For Hampton, the two justifications for punishment, retributivism for the victim and 
moral education, can work together to mutually reinforce one another.  
Ideally, one would hope that a punishment that is properly vindicative of the 
victim’s value will also be a communication that is morally educative for the 
criminal – if he will but listen to it. One would also hope that it is a message that 
the larger society will hear so that the community will see the value as a free and 
democratic society implicit in the punishment process of those who have behaved 
in ways that are violative of those values.332  
 
The primary purpose of a justification for punishment is to vindicate the victim who has suffered 
moral injury. The reason that punishment can vindicate the victim is because it is expressive: 
punishment can express in a concrete way that the victim’s human value, denied by the 
wrongdoing, is morally equal to everyone else’s, including the wrongdoer. Because it is 
expressive, it can also express that diminishing the victim is wrong, a message that both the 
wrongdoer and the community can hopefully hear. This message must be more than mere words, 
however, as the diminishing act, the moral injury, was more than mere words. As Hampton 
argues, the retributivist response must “remake the world” and one way of doing that is to limit 
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the freedom of the wrongdoer so that they can understand the pain of limited freedom (which they 
inflicted on the victim). This has the effect of putting the wrongdoer back in their place, 
dethroning them from the elevated place they put themselves in through their wrongdoing.  
5. Applying the Dual Expressivist Theory 
In “Correcting Harms versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution,” Hampton is 
tentative about her recommendations for actual policies that could turn her expressivist theory 
into practice. She cautions against turning to the typical incarceration practices of the United 
States and Canada as exemplars, as their policies are too likely to go too far in inflicting pain on 
wrongdoers, likely causing more moral injury in need of a retributivist response. She expresses 
some interest in a program in which rapists have to, under the guidance of mental health 
professionals, listen to the testimonies of victims of rape in order to try to experience, though in 
an abstracted way, what it is like to be raped (without actually undergoing the moral injury of 
rape, somehow). Likely the most telling example of how this theory would play out in real life is 
Hampton’s own position on a real legal issue in her native Canada. In her paper, “Punishment, 
Feminism, and Political Identity,” she recounts her role as an expert witness for the Canadian 
government when it defended its law prohibiting prisoners from voting while incarcerated. 
Hampton was asked by the government of Canada to testify on its behalf, supporting the 
disenfranchisement of those in prison serving a sentence of longer than 2 years.333 She agreed, 
and this paper is her explanation of why she agreed that disenfranchising these incarcerated 
people was just.  
Using both her retributivist vindication and moral education approaches to justifying 
punishment, Hampton argues that disenfranchising citizens who are behind bars is consistent 
                                               




with the democratic ideals of Canadian society. The law in question is not like many laws in the 
United States that disenfranchise felons after they have been released from prison. Rather, the 
legal and moral question was whether or not people convicted of relatively serious crimes 
(demarcated by the fact that they are serving sentences of more than 2 years) should be able to 
vote while they are serving their sentences.334 She hesitates before concluding that the law is just 
because she is concerned about the systemic discrimination apparent in the Canadian Criminal 
Justice System, where indigenous people were significantly more likely to be incarcerated than 
their white peers.335 She also expresses concern that denying voting rights to some people, here, 
incarcerated people, could send a message that the incarcerated people were insubordinate to 
others.336 Such a message of course would be undemocratic and could also be a moral injury on 
her own definition. But, she ultimately denies that either concern is substantial enough to 
override the retributivist vindication of the voter disenfranchisement.  
Hampton argues that both the left-wing experts, who argued that those incarcerated had 
committed crime in large part because of their socio-economic backgrounds, and the right-wing 
experts who insisted on individual responsibility alone, failed to understand an important view of 
the matter: the victims’ view.337 She (noting her position as the only woman expert witness and 
as a feminist scholar) argues that violence against women, one of the crimes that could result in 
incarceration for more than two years, is also a form of systemic oppression, even if race and 
class oppression contribute to their incarceration. She argues, “The traditional left-wing analysis 
of crime that laments the ‘criminalization’ of people by certain systemic forces in our society and 
calls for us to rehabilitate them, but then says nothing whatsoever about the victims, particularly 
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the female victims, of these ‘criminalized’ people, is blind to the way these offenders are actually 
encouraging and helping to enforce a form of oppression in our society.”338 Here, just as the 
person who asks, “What about the rapist?” Hampton argues that there are two kinds of 
oppression at issue in considering the negative consequences of criminal punishment in 
American (or in this case, Canadian) society. Although she recognizes that there are likely racial 
oppression concerns, she refuses to sacrifice the oppressed women’s cause. She argues that the 
feminist position forces her to take up the perspective of victims, particularly victims of gender-
based oppression. Once we take up this position, rather than asking whether the wrongdoer (the 
conservative position or the society (the liberal position) is the true cause of the crime, we focus 
on making the situation right for the victim.339  
Hampton also raises the issue of the communities that are disadvantaged, and the women 
who come from them, and asks how those women feel. She raises the concern that indigenous 
women in Canada have tried and failed to get their communities to take violence against them 
seriously.340 She also uses the example of a “woman from Watts” who was the strongest 
retributivist she had met, who said that her (presumably black) family was regularly the victim of 
crime, and the rehabilitation promised by well-meaning reformers never came.341 Hampton does 
not use the term ‘intersectionality’ but she argues that this is the result of taking a “single-focus” 
emancipatory focus,” looking at one kind of oppression, the oppression of the wrongdoers, 
without looking at how the wrongdoers oppress others based on gender. “To put it succinctly: 
when there are cross-currents of oppression in a society, how do we develop a theory that will 
give us a blueprint for dealing with them? No matter which group any of us comes from in our 
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societies, these cross-currents will be a burden for us.”342 This, she argues, is not an easy task, 
and there is no straightforward answer to that question.  
Nevertheless, she argues that it is just to prevent those who are incarcerated for serious 
crimes from voting because to allow them to vote would represent a failure to vindicate the rights 
of the victims of these crimes. Because voting is a type of political power, she argues, we do not 
want to give that power to people bent on destroying the community. Just as it would seem 
contrary to the very idea of political community to give a vote to someone who had committed 
treason, she argues that it is undemocratic to allow those who express the inequality of others 
through their crimes a vote. For example, to allow five white men who committed a racist 
murder of a black man to vote would be “insulting,” “repulsive,” and “upsetting.”  They would 
be participating in a democracy whose values (racial equality) they have repudiated with their 
actions. Likewise, allowing a rapist to vote would be to allow a person who has shown contempt 
for the equality of women to vote. She argues that disallowing participation in the electoral 
system is a good retributivist response precisely because the acts that are being punished are acts 
that eschew the values of democracy. Disenfranchisement is a retributive response “that negates 
[the crime’s] significance, lest the meaning of a crime go unanswered and the flouted values go 
unvindicated in a way what would surely encourage future harms to the nation as a whole and 
some of its members in particular, such as women and visible minorities.”343 She expresses 
several reasons to justify the retributive response of disenfranchisement: negating the 
significance of the crime, or “righting the wrong” in the language of her other article; responding 
to the flouting of society’s values, and the effect that such flouting could have in the future if it is 
not punished. 
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From these extreme cases of crime: treason, racial violence, and rape, Hampton then goes 
on to argue that the Canadian law might be “too inclusive” by covering crimes that do not have 
the political dimension that she sees in all three of these types of crime. But, she suggests that in 
fact, a white-collar criminal embezzler also could be seen as committing a similar type of crime 
(her category of moral injury helps here), putting herself above other fellow citizens whose 
money is lost in her scheme. Though she does not hang her hat on this argument, it seems that if 
we begin to include any crime in which the wrongdoer acted in such a way so as to put himself 
above a class of people, then we risk the special moral force of her first three examples being 
lost. But Hampton does not follow this suggestion all the way, and she is willing to bite the bullet 
by admitting the law could be over-inclusive.  
She also admits that there are costs to this punishment, and that the criminals are the ones 
to pay the cost, despite the fact that they may have also been on the receiving end of other 
oppressive structures, including class and racial oppression. She argues that these costs are 
justified because without these costs, the state would not be able to make the statement that 
vindicates the victims.  
And when the crime is central to the oppression of some of those victims, in the 
way that violence is central to the oppression of women, the state’s refusal to 
respond strongly and firmly to that violence amounts to an acquiescence that 
violence and a refusal to affirm the value of equality that is supposedly in the 
foundation of the polity. Such a refusal can help to reinforce, rather than combat 
socially oppressive practices that take the form of violence. It has been 
insufficiently appreciated that well-meaning compassion toward offenders can, 
in and of itself, do damage. Kindness toward the criminal can be an act of cruelty 
toward his victims and the larger community.344  
 
                                               





6. Conclusion: Putting the Pieces Together 
 I will return to the Brock Turner example from the beginning of this chapter to put 
together the pieces of Hampton’s theory into a coherent, feminist defense of the use of criminal 
law and punishment as tools to fight gender oppression, particularly violence against women. 
Using Jean Hampton’s dual expressivist theory, we can now articulate a full theory to support the 
outrage at Turner’s short sentence. First, let me note a few factors that I think make the Turner 
case exceptional. Turner is white, affluent, and seemingly unoppressed on any typical rubric of 
oppression. Therefore, the so-called left-wing approach of the structural disadvantages that can 
lead to criminality cannot be cited as contributing to his crime. Also, there is little question that 
he committed the rape given the eye-witness testimony and DNA evidence. Therefore, there 
were unusually low risks of convicting or punishing the wrong person.  
 On Hampton’s theory, the relatively short sentence sent the message that the crime of 
raping the victim was not that serious. His punishment failed to vindicate Chanel Miller’s rights 
of bodily integrity and equality. A harsher sentence would have sent the message that the acts 
Turner committed against her were wrong, a violation of our shared moral norms as a society. 
On Hampton’s strong retributive response view, a harsher sentence could have potentially 
restored Miller’s diminished human value and would have brought Turner down from the 
elevated social position he took for himself in diminishing Miller. On her moral education 
theory, in serving a longer sentence, Turner would have been more likely to experience the pain 
of the limitation of his freedom, hopefully prompting him to deeper consideration of the harm he 
caused Miller This could have been a gift to Turner: a valuable moral education. And, finally, the 
punishment would have sent the message to the rest of the community that rape is not tolerated, 




scene—it could have worked against the “rape culture” on campuses, sending the message that 
sexual assaults at parties, regardless of the intoxication level of the victim, are unacceptable.  
 If we, like most feminists, understand rape as a part of structural gender-oppression, then 
this theory helps to understand how the criminal justice system is a part of that structural 
oppression. This theory posits that the failure to punish rape and domestic abuse is part of the 
system of gender oppression. The criminal justice system is a public institution, and its failure to 
treat rape and domestic violence as serious crimes is itself a structural injustice. By analogy, we 
understand that lynching was only possible because law enforcement was known not to punish 
the perpetrators of this racial terrorism. The fact that the law did not prosecute or punish these 
murders was part of the structural racism of the late 19th and early 20th century United States. 
Sexism, which is prevalent across social, political, and legal structures, appears in criminal law 
as meager punishments or lack of prosecution. Short sentences may appear especially insulting to 
women victims when harsh prison sentences are the norm for much less damaging crimes. We 
punish so much that it is startling that we do not in fact punish rape and domestic violence (or 
police brutality). Under this theory, forcing changes in the legal world, including acting to make 
punishments more severe by, for example, recalling judges who do not sentence harshly enough, 
is a way of attacking the institutional or structural oppression of women.  
 This theory is compelling, and it captures the spirit of many of the activists and 
commentators who are sympathetic to the concerns about the racism and classism inherent in the 
criminal justice system, and yet not willing to part with it. It also explains how many people can 
be eager to end incarceration for drug crimes but not for other types of crimes, particularly rape 
and domestic violence. It also accounts for why in the Movement for Black Lives, harsh 




to punish the very police who brutalize black people. This theory takes as its starting place the 
claim that violence against women is a structural problem, but it includes the criminal justice 
system as a part of the structure. In this theory, punishing rape and domestic violence more 
harshly is a way to protect and vindicate the victims of violence against women that can also, in 
the long-run, change the norms around this kind of violence.  
 Another attractive feature about the two prongs of this theory is that they can fit within a 
view of criminal law as a political institution as articulated in chapter 3. We can take a weaker 
view of Hampton’s retributivist victim’s rights function of punishment, extracting the insight that 
criminal law can express the equality of members of society by taking the violation of their rights 
seriously, so long as this is taken into account alongside other political values. The moral 
education prong is consistent with using criminal law as a tool to promote social cooperation by 
reinforcing social norms, particularly those that are most tied to the equality of each member of 
society, which will be a central principle of any liberal society.  
 Both prongs of this theory rest on the assumption that punishment sends a message, and 
the government or society as a whole is the author of that message. Through punishment, the 
government can express the value of the victim, and work toward righting the wrongs of certain 
crimes. Through punishment, the society can express its values and teach people to value all 
lives equally—with special attention paid to women or people of color because members of those 
groups are being targeted for moral injury based on gender and race. If we understand criminal 
law to be a public, political institution, as outlined in chapter 3, we can be wary of the strong 
retributivist version of this claim. But the other two functions of this theory — expressing equal 
value of all citizens by punishing those who violate other members of society by breaking laws 




cooperation of the political community—seem like worthy ends to use the tool of criminal law to 
meet. Promoting equality and norms of social cooperation are worthy goals of a criminal legal 
system in the ideal world. In the next chapter, however, I will argue that the criminal law and 
punishment systems in the United States today cannot achieve these goals because the current 





Chapter 5: A Non-Ideal Theory of Criminal Law  
The Limits of the Feminist Expressivist Theory of Punishment 
 
0. Introduction 
In the last chapter, I put forward what I take to be the best defense of criminal law against 
the claim that the criminal justice system in the United States is deeply oppressive. There, I 
followed an expressivist theory of punishment, drawing primarily on Jean Hampton, to suggest 
that criminal punishment ought to be used to express condemnation for particular kinds of 
wrongs, especially violence against women. I argued that on this view, criminal punishment can 
begin to vindicate victims as well as change social norms by expressing condemnation for 
violence against women. In particular, I noted that criminal law could be used to express the 
equality of all members of society and to encourage social cooperation, goals that fit with 
Vincent Chiao’s view of criminal law as a political institution that functions to facilitate social 
cooperation. I used this example in part because rape is so often conceived of as one of the worst 
crimes, but more importantly because it, along with domestic violence, is also part of another 
system of oppression, gender-based oppression.  
In this chapter, I will explain why Hampton’s theory, and the political activists who call 
for criminal punishment in order to address systemic gender oppression, ultimately will fail at 
their aim.345 Basically, I argue that punishment cannot express the nuanced message that 
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Hampton aims for. Because of the history and present practices of the criminal justice system, 
there is no way to express condemnation for wrong acts without expressing (and through this 
expression achieving) social and political exclusion of the wrongdoers. As I argued in chapter 3, 
such exclusion is never a just outcome because the criminal law only properly operates within 
the social contract, not outside of it. Moreover, given the actual history of the criminal justice 
system in the United States, this social and political exclusion will fall heaviest on those who are 
members of other oppressed groups who are nonaccidentally correlated with being treated as 
criminals. Finally, the use of the criminal justice system in this way could lead to increasing the 
system’s reach and making it appear more legitimate or justified, again at the expense of those 
who are already disproportionately targeted by the system.  
To situate this claim, I argue that both Chiao and Hampton are working under 
problematic idealizations of the criminal justice system. Chiao works under the assumption that 
society is a system of mutual cooperation that the criminal law works to reinforce, abstracting 
away from the actual history of the societies his theory is meant to describe and the actual 
criminal justice system in the United States. Despite his engagement in application of his model 
to the non-ideal world, his model itself fails account for the structural inequalities in the criminal 
justice system. This abstraction from the real world means that we cannot trust the conclusions 
he draws about the role that criminal law can play in securing buy in with our norms.  
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Hampton’s work suffers from similar abstraction problems, some of which I began to hint 
at in the last chapter. Hampton’s theory does not take place in an idealized society, however, as 
her punishment theory is focused primarily on victims, and not just any victims. She focuses on 
victims of structural injustices: women and people of color. Her theory then, does not 
problematically work from a picture of society in which society is mostly a well-functioning 
cooperative endeavor with a few injustices to solve here and there. Hampton’s theory of law, 
however, does not address the actual workings of the criminal justice system in the United States 
or Canada. She notes the racial disparities in the criminal justice system, and she even 
acknowledges that people of color are oppressed (perhaps in a structural way), but she does not 
take that oppression to be part and parcel of the criminal justice system itself. When it comes to 
her theorizing about punishment, she fails to understand the criminal justice system as one that is 
oppressive in structure. Instead, she seems to relegate the overrepresentation of people of color in 
the criminal justice system to the periphery, an injustice that is accidental rather than essential to 
the system. Because both are operating under idealizations that abstract away from oppression in 
the criminal justice system (and for Chiao, in society at large), the conclusions that they draw 
about the possibilities of the criminal justice system are misguided because they do not take into 
account structural features of criminal law as it is.  
In contrast to the presentation of criminal law as a tool for reinforcing social cooperation, 
I will argue that the criminal law in the United States is really a type of domination contract, a 
term used by Charles Mills to describe social arrangements made for the benefit of a subset of 
members of a political community that claims to be universal. A non-ideal view of the criminal 
justice system in the United States starts with the understanding that particular groups of people 




as I discussed in chapter 2. It also requires acknowledging that ‘criminals’ are socially and 
politically excluded (to varying degrees) because of real or perceived moral failures, which I 
argued for in chapter 1. Because the criminal justice system in the United States has these 
features, its ability to communicate clearly about the social equality of members of society is 
compromised. As it itself regularly victimizes, its ability to stand for the victims is compromised 
as well. Moreover, Hampton’s own concerns that an improper punishment might itself cause 
moral injury rather than right a wrong are particularly salient given the reality of the domination 
contract of criminal law.  
 Finally, I will address a potential criticism. It seems like I am using Chiao’s work to 
make an argument for a central claim in my dissertation in chapter 3: social and political 
exclusion is not an acceptable criminal punishment because criminal law is a part of the social 
contract. It punishes wrongs outlined by the social contract, and it cannot expel people from the 
social contract. If I am rejecting Chiao’s argument as an ideal theory abstraction, how can I help 
myself to that conclusion of his for my overall claim that even ‘criminals’ who actually commit 
serious crimes are oppressed? In answer, I explain that ideal theory can play a role in diagnosing 
some injustices in the non-ideal system, such as clear violations of normative principles.  But it 
cannot explain how the non-ideal systems are actually operating or offer principles or guidance 
for corrective justice (sometimes called reparative justice). So, we can use ideal theory to say 
that in a just society, with properly functioning criminal law, there would be no social and 
political exclusion. There is social and political exclusion in ours, so it must be unjust. But we 
cannot use ideal theory to say that our criminal justice system can communicate important norms 





1. Non-Ideal Theory and the Social Contract 
There is some debate about what the term ‘non-ideal theory’ refers to. Many working in 
political theory, especially contemporary social contract theorists, talk about ideal theory as a 
project of constructing a “well ordered” or “ideally just” society. The features or principles that 
shape the society are taken to be normative ideals that can then be used to measure ‘non-ideal’ 
societies. Non-ideal theory on this model is like the applied version of ideal theory. One uses 
ideal theory to produce normative principles of justice, and then, using non-ideal theory, the 
principles of justice can be used to measure the justice of an existing societies like our own. I 
refer to this kind of non-ideal theory as ‘non-ideal theory as application,’ and usually advocates 
of this kind of non-ideal theory are ideal theorists. That is, their work centers on using the ideally 
just or well-ordered society a model for theorizing about justice, and secondarily using the 
principles therein to examine existing societies. 
There is another way that theorists use the term ‘non-ideal theory,’ in which the project of 
political philosophy is to start with societies that are not well ordered, perfectly just, or mostly 
just to build one’s normative principles. Rather than building a theory of justice based on an 
ideally just society and only then proceeding to existing societies, proponents of this kind of non-
ideal theory want to start with existing, unjust societies and circumstances. Non-ideal theorists of 
this sort critique ideal theory by arguing that it abstracts away from precisely the kinds of 
injustices that are present in existing societies. Non-ideal theorists often also add that ideal 
theory works to hide or obscure the injustices of existing societies.  I refer to this use of non-
ideal theory as ‘non-ideal theory as foundation.’ For the most part, throughout this chapter, when 
I use ‘non-ideal theory’ I mean it in the second sense of ‘non-ideal theory as foundation’ unless I 




Charles Mills’ critiques of Rawlsian political philosophy is one well known non-ideal 
theory critique of ideal theory in the form of social contract theory.  Mills criticisms of ideal 
theory and the social contract tradition go hand in hand. In the social contract tradition, theorists 
use the device of the social contract to argue about what types of governments or political 
principles are justified. Going back to Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, social contract theorists 
imagine human beings in a ‘state of nature’ meaning that they are not already existing in a social 
or political community. From there, human beings decide to form a social contract for mutual 
benefit, and arguments about what people would want that social contract to include provide the 
ideals for a just government or principles of political justice. No one really believes that these 
social contracts where actually made this way, but the social contract argument is a kind of 
metaphor or device for thinking about what the core principles of a government that everyone 
could endorse look like. Typically, the social contracts also start with moral equality (except 
Hobbes, who argues for factual equality in being vulnerable to being killed) in the state of nature, 
and end with a social contract that protects some of that moral equality in the form of political 
equality. This is usually supported by the idea that no one would give up total moral equality in 
the state of nature if the social contract did not give some political equality in the new 
arrangement. 
Though he finds much fault with this tradition, Mills recognizes that the social contract 
tradition helpfully intervened in the prevailing political theories of pre-modernity that focused on 
natural law or divine command theories. Despite the criticisms that social contract theory hides 
inequality, it is not without value. “Certainly it is not the case that feminists and critical race 
theorists want to argue, on the contrary, that sociopolitical institutions are natural rather than 




of characterization, social contract theory is unexceptional.”346 Mills argues that social contract 
theory got two things right: (1) social and political organizations are human-made not natural, 
and (2) human beings are morally equal (and ought to be treated as such). Even if some feminists 
and critical race theorists argue that social contract theories and ideal theories obscure existing 
inequalities, they typically agree that all people are morally equal and that human beings created 
the system of existing inequality.  
The problems with social contract theory begin with other aspects of the social contract 
as it is represented by ideal theorists, particularly in the kinds of abstractions involved in the 
description of the social contract. In particular, Mills notes that the description of the social 
contract includes problematic idealization and abstraction from real societies. “While it is true 
that society and the state are human creations, it is obviously false, as mainstream contract theory 
classically implies, that all (adult) humans are equal contractors, have equal causal input into this 
process of creation, and freely give informed consent to the structures and institutions thereby 
established.”347 Mills’ concern is that at the founding moment of the new society, the making of 
the social contract, each person is represented as having social and political equality in making 
the determination. In the United States, slavery subjugated a huge part of the population to non-
personhood, and non-slave women were also not legally treated as independent persons. There 
were also class inequalities, such as landownership, that kept many poor white men from equal 
membership.  
One of the key assumptions that Mills finds to be flawed in the contemporary social 
contract theory of Rawls is that a society by definition is “a cooperative venture for mutual 
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advantage.”348 Moreover, on Rawls’ articulation, society is “governed by rules ‘designed to 
advance the good of those taking part in it.’”349 Mills argues that this is a problematic abstraction 
because in fact society works as a cooperative venture for some, to the detriment of others, and 
the rules are designed only to advance the good of a subset of the people who are subjected to 
them. The role of Rawls’ description of society is debated: some argue that Rawls means for this 
to be a definition of an ideal society, not of actual ones, so they argue that Mills is unfairly 
critiquing Rawls because Rawls was saying that societies ought to be cooperative ventures for 
mutual advantage, not that society in fact is. Mill’s responds by pointing to language in Rawls’ 
work that adds “well ordered” to indicate normatively ideal societies. Hermeneutical disputes 
aside, Mills’ argument is that Rawls believes he is providing an ideally just version of existing 
societies, whereas attention to the world that we live in reveals that the social contract of 
Rawlsian ideal theory is not related to existing societies in any meaningful way. Whether Rawls 
actually thought that his theory of justice presents principles that could, with some work, actually 
be relevant to the society we live in aside, I agree with Mills that this description of society does 
not match the United States as a society. The rules governing society have historically and 
presently worked to mainly benefit a subset of wealthy, white men. Among other things, the 
United States’ deep history of racism, sexism, xenophobia, and classism make it so far removed 
from a well ordered society that the principles seem irrelevant to addressing existing injustice.  
The problem is not simply that the social contract presents an ideal theory that is factually 
inaccurate, but that the inaccuracies “obfuscate crucial social realities, embed certain tendentious 
conceptual partitioning, … and thereby undercut the transformative normative egalitarian 
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potential of the apparatus.”350 Mills argues that even if contemporary social contract theorists 
accept that, for example, the American project did not start out with all people being equal 
contractors in the United States’ origin story, and they would agree that the social contract does 
not capture these founding inequalities, they fail to trace the repercussions of that ‘idealizing 
abstraction’351 all the way through the theory. Thus, when the social contract theorists later draw 
conclusions from this social contract with built-in idealizing abstractions, they can no longer pick 
out what from the resulting theory can be useful for the world in which the idealizing 
abstractions do not hold. This is how the description of the community in the state of nature, 
which is markedly different from actual societies, can lead to principles that do not appropriately 
respond to the actual circumstances of injustice in existing societies. Moreover, Mills thinks that 
they can fool us into thinking that the existing world is closer to the ideal social contract than it 
actually is.  
The inaccuracies of the description of the society and people in the social contract lead to 
complications in the status of the normative claims derived from the social contract. As Mills 
notes, the typically egalitarian principles that emerge from the social contract theory are not the 
problem. The problem is that the political equality that emerges in the social contract has been 
denied in real societies to swaths of people based on their membership in certain groups, e.g., 
women, people of color, poor people, and so on. Because contemporary social contract theorists 
did not pay adequate attention to the actual exclusion of women, for example, they did not note 
the problem with the public/private distinction, which emerged when it was taken for granted 
that women were not equal members of society. The creation of the public/private distinction in 
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political theory is a result of the exclusion of some people, i.e. women, from existing societies 
and from meaningful consideration in social contract theories, even that of Rawls in the mid-
twentieth Century. The problem with the social contract is not the principle of political equality. 
Instead, the problem is that social contract theorists did not recognize how the exclusion of 
women from equal membership in actual societies affected the resulting political theories. If all 
we have is the principle of equality without a historical context of gender oppression, the 
public/private distinction does not appear as a way to exclude women from political equality.352  
The most damning flaw of ideal theory and the mainstream social contract model is that it 
cannot provide principles of corrective or reparative justice. “Simply put: in ideal theory, certain 
problems do not even arise in the first place; but given the fact that in the non-ideal world, they 
have arisen, what should now be done to address them?”353 Although it might be tempting to 
think that one could simply apply the ideal theory principles to the non-ideal situation, this does 
not account for the different ways that harms have accrued because of the history of injustice, 
how the structures might be corrupted by the entrenching of injustice, or indeed how the 
individuals in the political society might have been shaped by the injustices. As Mills argues, just 
because these are the ideal concepts that a society with no history of injustice would build, that 
does not mean that this is what a society that has had a history of injustice and has corrected for 
it would look like. Both could be considered ideally just societies, but it is not at all a logical 
deduction that the second society would look exactly like the first.354  
One example of how such an idealizing abstraction could provide inaccurate principles 
for an existing society is the idea of being “colorblind.” It is true that in an ideal world with no 
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history of racism, nothing in particular should hinge on one’s race (leaving aside for now 
whether or not there would be races at all in such a society). So, in a perfectly just society with 
no history of racism, one would rightly attend to race very little. But, to take that principle and 
apply it in, for example, the United States just after slavery was abolished would not be very just. 
It would arguably be more just than racialized slavery, but it would not provide justice for newly 
freed people who have no resources or social structure with which to build new, free lives. 
Walking around that society with nothing by ideal theory principles would actually cause you to 
be unjust toward the recently freed people. One needs a bit more theorizing to figure out who 
precisely owes what to the newly freed people to move toward a more just society. 
The flaws of the ideal theoretical tool of the social contract originate from the fact that 
the device depicts human beings as equal contractors in determining the shape of their shared 
lives. Mills proposes a non-ideal theory counter-part to this device: the domination contract. Of 
the early social contract theorists, only Rousseau seems to share Mills’ insight about the potential 
problems of the ideal social contract. He presents his own version in his book The Social 
Contract, but Mills sees a nascent domination contract in Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of 
Inequality.  Mills interprets Rousseau’ second text thusly: Rousseau paints a rosy picture of the 
state of nature where all human beings are equal, and inequality is introduced through an 
inchoate community in which some members start to get more wealth than others. Because they 
are still without a social contract, the wealthier people are worried that the others will take their 
wealth, and so they plan amongst themselves to offer everyone a social contract that will, on the 
surface, give everyone political equality, but in fact secures their wealth and status.355 This is a 
domination contract because it recognizes that the contract arose from a state of existing 
                                               




inequality, and, though the political community that formed was human-made, it was not equally 
made by all members. It was made by a subset for the purposes of maintaining their higher 
status.  
In addition to Rousseau’s contract from the Discourse, Mills identifies Carole Pateman’s 
book The Sexual Contract, and his own Racial Contract, which explicitly took up Pateman’s 
model and used it to analyze racial structural injustice, as domination contracts. Like Rousseau, 
the domination contracts retain the valuable insights from the social contract convention (the 
artificiality of the polity and the moral equality of people), but each domination contract starts 
from existing oppression, recognizing the historical background that enabled the current 
oppression, and identifying who the current “contract” or political institutions benefit and at 
whose expense.356  
Mills explains the domination contract as a device for non-ideal theorizing, just as the 
mainstream contract is a device for ideal theory. Instead of modeling a perfectly just society by 
assuming the equality and inclusion of everyone affected by the political community, the 
domination contract, begins with existing societies, especially the United States and other 
western countries. “Rather than a fictitious universal inclusion and a mythical moral and political 
egalitarianism, this revisionist contract expresses the reality of group domination and social 
hierarchy.”357 The domination contract identifies groups of people who are benefitting from the 
current political structures and those who are bearing the costs of them. This includes looking at 
society as made up of social groups in addition to individuals, with an understanding that one’s 
group membership will have important ramifications for how one fares in society. The insight 
from early social contract theorizing that political institutions and social hierarchies are human is 
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combined with the reality of actual social inequality. These two premises yield the conclusion 
that the existing social hierarchies are created and maintained by human beings, and likely those 
who are the beneficiaries of the inequality. Such non-ideal theorizing requires engagement with 
historical analysis, but unlike Rousseau’s creative anthropology, the domination contract, it is 
more empirically grounded.  
The purpose of the device is different in non-ideal theory as well. While social contract 
theory is meant to offer principles of a perfectly just society, the domination contract’s purpose is 
to uncover the “systemic social injustice and need for appropriate corrective measures.”358 It 
should also reveal that the existing contract (or set of political institutions) is in place to 
“reinforce and codify” social hierarchy rather than to promote social cooperation.359 The 
domination contract is meant to show that the injustices of a particular group, a race or a gender, 
are not peripheral anomalies or small injustices in a society that is basically cooperation for the 
mutual benefit of everyone. The domination contract is meant to show that the institutions are 
operating as if they were designed to reinforce domination over one group for the benefit of the 
other, and maybe they were in fact designed that way.   
In summary, Charles Mills critiques ideal theory, especially the use of the social contract 
as a device for theorizing about political justice because it makes inaccurate ‘idealizing 
abstractions’ by replacing existing oppression with abstract equality. Social contract theory 
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produced two important insights, however. The first is that the polity is a human creation, not a 
natural inevitability. The second is that human beings are all morally equal. Social contract 
theory, however, describes the foundation of the human-created polity ahistorically, and it 
represents it as an agreement that everyone equally had a hand in creating. This idealizing 
abstraction of equality and inclusion at an ahistorical founding produces an ideally just society, 
but one that has little resemblance to our own. The domination contract, as a device of non-ideal 
theory instead looks at existing, unjust society, describes how existing political institutions 
actually create and perpetuate unjust inequalities and social hierarchies.  
2. Public Law as Social Contract and Ideal Theory 
In chapter 3, I relied on Vincent Chiao’s theory of criminal law as public law. I argued 
that he was making a kind of social contract theory argument because he relies on the idea of 
society as a system for mutual cooperation. His development of the political justification of 
criminal law is ahistorical, and depends on the idea of the political institutions developing to 
support mutual cooperation. Criminal law is an institution that is part of that system of social 
cooperation, offering a last resort backup to the other institutions to assure everyone in the 
system of mutual cooperation that everyone will comply. Thus, I argued, Chiao presents criminal 
law as a part of the social contract, not as an independent sphere operating separately from the 
rest of society to vindicate pre-political moral norms.  
Just like the original social contract theory made important interventions in political 
philosophy when it first appeared, Chiao’s theory of public law makes important interventions in 
the way that philosophers of law have justified criminal law and punishment. For the most part, 
other philosophers of criminal law have not placed criminal law and punishment so squarely 




most consequentialist theories have also failed to take not of this important feature of criminal 
law: it is a political institution, and not a moral one. Much like the social contract theorists’ 
recognition that social and political structures are human-made, not natural, Chiao’s theory 
intervenes to place criminal law in that same domain.  
While his theoretical justification of the political institution of criminal law is ahistorical, 
he does make some concessions to non-ideal theory. His argument that we should think of 
criminal law as public law emerges from a historical account of how the modern criminal law 
system emerged out of a largely private system for redressing wrongs. This account, which 
focuses on criminal law developments in the United States and the United Kingdom in the 18th 
and 19th centuries is notably completely void of all discussions of race and most references to 
class. He only notes that criminal law as public law was, at least in theory, a move to a more 
equal distributions of the benefits and burdens of criminal law, as prior to public police forces 
and prosecutors, poor victims would have no recourse for crimes committed against him. His 
account, of course, is in sharp contrast with the account I present in chapter 2, which makes clear 
that the 19th century marked the beginning of the deep entwinement of racial hierarchy with the 
criminal justice system. In Chiao’s defense, the period in which criminal law emerged as public 
law was primarily before black people were considered subjects of criminal law (as property, 
during slavery, criminal law could not apply to them). Nevertheless, the racial oppression is left 
out of his chapters that develop the theory of criminal law as public law. In those chapters, 
criminal law is presented as an abstract adoption of a system for “negative reciprocity” to 
reinforce social cooperation. It is clear that Chiao means for his theory to apply to the United 




of the United States that he abstracts away from when he is developing his model of criminal law 
as public law.  
Chiao makes other concessions to non-ideal theory. One of Mills’ repeated critiques of 
ideal theorists is that they never actually get to the non-ideal theory that they argue their ideal 
theory is in service of.  That is, they never do non-ideal theory as application because they are 
actually more interested in arguing about ideal theory.360 Chiao, however, spends most of the 
second half of his book explaining how his criminal law as public law can explain why mass 
incarceration, over-criminalization, formalism in criminal law, and paternalism in punishment 
are unjust. He, therefore, engages in non-ideal theory, but of the as-application kind.  
It is also clear that he has real-world problems and injustices in mind even as he explains 
how his theory of criminal law as public law, a largely ideal theory, unfolds in a society 
governed by “anti-deference” egalitarianism. To illustrate what would be a violation of the 
principles of criminal law as public law in an anti-deference society, he uses the following 
practices from the United States: the (now-defunct) common law exception for marital rape,361 
racialized policing and stop-and-frisk,362 felon disenfranchisement,363and other police 
humiliation and violence.364 He also connects problems with police brutality to more general 
concerns about social and political exclusion, meaning that if everyone is not actually equally 
able to participate meaningfully in group decision-making, the likelihood that police will act 
more like occupying military than public servants .365 Finally, while disavowing punishment 
abolitionism as an ideal, he notes that, given the “dense administrative state,” “here and now,” 
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punishment likely should play a much diminished role in securing cooperation because other 
institutions will be much better at actually integrating people into the system of mutual 
cooperation.366 This strangely seems to be attentive to the real world situation in which it is 
likely that encouraging rule following by investing in education and social services would be 
more effective than more prisons, and yet, at the same time, totally ignorant of the reality that 
there are vast disparities along racial, class, and other lines for access to that dense administrative 
state.  
Despite Chiao’s nods to non-ideal theory, his theory of criminal law as public law still 
suffers from the biggest flaw of ideal theory and the mainstream social contract. That is, we 
cannot deduce from his view of the role of criminal law in an ideal society what the role of 
criminal law ought to be in an unjust society like our own. The role that criminal law has played 
in American society has been to more deeply entrench racism and classism and to oppress people 
by excluding them from social and political life. Chiao’s theory of how law should ideally 
operate can assist in pointing out the ways that criminal law is currently failing in the United 
States. But it cannot explain what the society ought to do to correct for this or what role criminal 
law can play in correcting the oppression it creates or other kinds of oppression in the society 
like gender-based oppression.  
Chiao’s argument that culminates in the political justification principles of criminal law, 
much like Rawls’ theory of justice, starts with the assumption that society is a system of mutual 
cooperation. Criminal law works to support that system by assuring each member that the others 
will equally share costs and benefits without free-riding through the use of negative reciprocity. 
Chiao gives a history of how this public law model of criminal law emerged in the United States 
                                               




and the United Kingdom, where the state took on the task of making the benefits and burdens of 
criminal acts more evenly distributed throughout the society, but, as I noted earlier, he makes no 
note of the development of the system into the future and how it did not evenly spread the 
benefits and burdens of crime. Moreover, when he moves to the detailed argument for the 
political justification of criminal law, he moves to a highly abstracted game theory. It is not 
simply that game theory idealizes human beings as highly rational, self-interested actors. It is 
that this kind of a model presents idealizing abstractions: those that ignore oppression. The 
actual system of criminal law that was developing where Chiao left off in the 19th century was 
not operating to solve an assurance problem to help secure a system of mutual cooperation that 
would benefit everyone. It was a system that imprisoned the poor and re-enslaved black people. 
Thus, we cannot be sure what parts of the theory that follow are so far afield from the criminal 
justice system in the United States so as to be completely unhelpful for fixing the structurally 
unjust criminal justice system.  
What we can conclude, however, from Chiao’s work is that, on his theory of criminal 
law, the United States does not have a criminal justice system worth supporting. Let me turn to 
Chiao’s conclusion of what a fully political justification for criminal law would look like. 
Chiao’s argument produces the following conclusion:  
“(7) The criminal law is worth supporting if and only if: 
a. The institutions whose rules it enforces are worth supporting, and 
b. Its use in a particular context would be consistent with the principles that make 
those institutions worth supporting in the first place.”367 
                                               




It is outside the scope of this paper to argue that the United States’ institutions are worth 
supporting (although Chiao notes that “worth supporting” does not require being perfectly just). 
It also would be difficult to identify the exact principles that make the United States’ institutions 
worth supporting in the first place. We can still conclude that in the United States,’ criminal law 
is not worth supporting following Chiao’s principle of public justification. First, when Chiao 
describes the principles that a criminal justice system would have to adhere to in order to meet 
this standard of justification in a society that adopted “anti-deference” egalitarianism, he 
explicitly rules out many American criminal law practices, such as stop-and-frisk, felon 
disenfranchisement, and lack of meaningful equal opportunity to influence the laws. Second, 
Chiao spends the remainder of his chapters critiquing important aspects of American law, 
including mass incarceration, overcriminalization, and adherence to formalism with regard to 
what counts as punishment (and so who gets the protections of the 4th–8th amendments). From 
Chiao’s ideal theory, then, we can conclude that the actual existing criminal law in the United 
States is not justified and not worth endorsing. But, it does not tell us what measures to take to 
move from the unsupportable criminal law to a justified one.  
3. Hampton’s Ideal Criminal Law 
Jean Hampton’s theory of punishment cannot be said to be ideal theory in the same way 
that Rawls’ or Chiao’s theories are.368 Nevertheless, her work contains problematic “idealizing 
abstractions.” While Rawls and Chiao idealize society as a system of mutual cooperation as the 
foundation of their respective theories, Hampton’s philosophy of punishment is imbued with the 
idea that there are deep injustices occurring. Her theory of punishment assumes that there are 
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structural injustices, particularly gender-based violence, but it also works from idealized 
assumptions about criminal law.  
Hampton’s focus on gender injustices and her use of racial violence examples point not 
only to random, peripheral injustices, but instead on these types of injustices as structural or 
society-wide. In her essay, “Punishment, Feminism, and Political Identity: A Case Study in the 
Expressive Meaning of the Law,” she explicitly takes the perspective of women as an oppressed 
group, from which she evaluates whether or not certain prisoners should be disenfranchised. 
“When all women, regardless of their background, fear the threat of male violence (and modify 
their behavior so as to avoid it), this violence is not some private affair but a societal practice-
with a point. The violence expresses-and helps to realize-the view that men are entitled to 
dominate over women.” 369 She expresses the view that gender-violence is a structural 
phenomenon used to dominate women. Critical of left-wing and right-wing views on crime, she 
criticizes both social-justice minded criminal reform advocates and harsh traditionalists about 
punishment for failing to address violence against women as a structural social phenomenon.370 
Perhaps because she was also responding to criticisms that the criminal justice system 
perpetuated racial discrimination, she also refers to an example of a racial hate crime, comparing 
it to violence against women, as both are more than crimes against individuals but also ways of 
subordinating whole groups.371  Emphasizing existing structural oppression, in this case gender 
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and race oppression, as a starting place for theorizing is exemplary of non-ideal theory, 
particularly when the goal of the project is to find a way to correct that injustice. 
In contrast, her view of criminal law as an institution is largely an idealizing abstraction 
because she presents it as an ahistorical tool whose use will send a straightforward 
communication about the values of the political community. Consider Hampton’s claim that 
punishments operate like electric fences, giving wrongdoers a shock that invites reflection for the 
wrongdoer and the general public who sees the shock. She writes, “But on the moral education 
view, it is incorrect to regard simple deterrence as the aim of punishment: rather, to state it 
succinctly, the view maintains that punishment is justified as a way to prevent wrongdoing 
insofar as it can teach both wrongdoers and the public at large the moral reasons for choosing not 
to perform an offense.”372 In arguing that punishment acts as a moral communication to a 
wrongdoer, she is assuming an idealized version of punishment. Successful communication 
through punishment in this manner can only occur if we assume that there are not people who get 
random shocks regardless of what they do, whether they are touching the fences or nowhere near 
them. It presupposes a minimally well-functioning system of punishment (not a perfect one, but 
minimally well-functioning). This is an assumption about the nature of the criminal law that is 
more in line with an ideal theory approach. If criminal law and punishment did not have a history 
of oppression, then perhaps it could morally educate in this way. 
One could argue against the claim that Hampton has an ideal theory view of criminal law 
by explaining that in fact, she critiques current practices in the criminal law (namely the under-
prosecution of gender-based crimes). This is a claim she makes throughout her work, and I 
emphasized the claim and explained how her theory supports it in the last chapter. But in fact, 
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this critique of the under-prosecution of gender-based crimes shows up more as a critique of the 
state for failing to use the criminal law.  
When the American courts, until recently, responded to spousal abusers with light 
punishment or no punishment at all, they were expressing the view that women 
were indeed the chattel of their husbands. When the present-day Canadian courts 
use a sentencing policy that gives certain types of sexual offenders lighter 
sentences, on average, than those given to people who have been convicted of 
burglary, they are accepting a view of women that grants them standing similar 
to-but slightly lower than-mere objects. Moreover, the widespread tolerance in the 
American South in the past [of racial violence particularly toward African 
Americans] demonstrates societal support for the message about relative value 
which [acts of racial violence] conveyed. Behavior is expressive, and the state’s 
behavior in the face of an act of attempted degradation against a victim is itself 
something that will either annul or contribute further to the diminishment of the 
victim.373 
 
She refers to explicit states here, not criminal law or punishment in the abstract (as she does 
when she discusses the moral educative role of punishment). In this particular passage, rather 
than talking about the abstract possibilities of criminal law, as in the passages on punishment as 
an electric fence. It is a sort of non-ideal approach, but it is still lacking an important part of the 
domination contract approach to non-ideal theorizing. She faults governments for failing to 
properly punish gender-based and race-based crimes, and she finds fault with the sentencing 
aspect of specific courts, but this is not the kind of structural, historical criticism of the institution 
that non-ideal theory calls for. In this picture of punishment, criminal law does not oppress, and 
has no history of oppression, and therefore can send clear, unambiguous messages about the 
values of the community.  
 There is one point in which Hampton acknowledges the potential deep-seated oppression 
in the Canadian criminal justice system. When she narrates her coming to the decision to support 
the Canadian government’s disenfranchisement of prisoners, she explains that the systemic racial 
                                               




bias evident in the Canadian system, where indigenous people are vastly overrepresented, was 
one of two things that slowed her decision to support the disenfranchisement.374 While she is 
ready to admit that racial oppression plays a role in criminal law in Canada (and presumably the 
United States) she argues that sometimes different kinds of oppression are simply at cross 
purposes. One cannot address both, and she chooses to address gender oppression. She appeals to 
the fact that women of color are also oppressed by men of color, and so seems to make gender 
oppression a more primary or more important kind of oppression.375 One can appreciate 
Hampton’s willingness to bite the bullet, so to speak, by acknowledging that she is choosing to 
prioritize fighting gender oppression over racial oppression. She is likely correct that there are 
simply times when one must make trade-offs in fighting to alleviate different kinds of 
oppression, but I do not think the case she presents is actually one of them.  
 Hampton’s observations about the failures of specific states to punish gender violence 
(and racial hate crimes) and her reluctant admission that racial oppression is in some ways 
connected to criminal punishment failed fully to impact her theory about the expressive potential 
of criminal law and punishment. When she explains that the failure of the United States to punish 
those who murdered black people in the south represented a failure to treat black people with 
equal respect, the claim rings true. As I have argued, this is the claim that the Movement for 
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Black Lives makes today. In a society where the criminal law is used so often to address so many 
issues, a failure of the criminal law to respond to an act of violence certainly suggests, at 
minimum, lack of concern on the part of the relevant political institutions and their leaders. 
Criminalization and punishment express social values, even if that alone is not a justification for 
using them, and the failure to punish people who seriously harm women and people of color does 
express that women and people of color are not valued (or are valued less) by our society. 
Though this is an accurate diagnosis of our system, again, her idealizing abstractions about the 
criminal justice system itself mean that she cannot address corrective justice matters. She might 
be able to explain to us why this failure to prosecute is unjust, but she cannot offer a path toward 
a more just society. 
Hampton fails to truly account for the history and current practices of the criminal justice 
system in the United States. The historical failure to prosecute domestic violence and rape as 
well as crimes against people of color, most especially black people, have communicated the 
state’s and society’s lack of concern for women and people of color. But the criminal justice 
system in the United States expresses many values. Failure to prosecute expresses lack of 
concern for women or black people, but felon disenfranchisement, stop-and-frisk, exceedingly 
harsh prison conditions, solitary confinement, and other ‘treatments as’ criminals have 
communicated that ‘criminals,’ especially those doubly oppressed by race or class, are not 
members of the social and political community. Given the fact that this history and oppression 
have already occurred, the criminal justice system is not a neutral tool for communicating shared 
norms like equality.  
These other actions, which express moral inequality, in fact prevent the criminal justice 




retributive response.  For example, Hampton argues that two scenarios would be equally 
troubling. One scenario includes the idea that voting means you are an equal member of the 
polity in good standing, and criminals, including rapists, are allowed to vote. This she says 
would be a terrible blow to victims of rape and to women as a whole.376 It would be deeply 
unjust. The following circumstances, she argues, would be equally unjust:   
[I]magine a state that decided to deprive prisoners of the right to vote so as to 
denounce not only their conduct but also them. On this view, disenfranchising 
prisoners would be a way of condemning them as outlaws-people who are outside 
the state and the community as a whole. I regard this way of understanding 
prisoner disenfranchisement as abusive, degrading, and unjust: abusive because of 
its message of hate, degrading because of what is said to be his “bad” nature (so 
that its message makes it akin to banishment) and unjust because of its 
unresponsiveness to possible systemic forces that can provoke criminal 
conduct.377 
 
This is actually the situation in the United States, and not just with voting rights. Given the 
context of the United States’ criminal justice system, it would seem nearly impossible for it to 
express condemnation of an act but not the person who did it. The idea that the state or the 
society could communicate that we are denouncing the crimes, not the person seems a stretch in 
any circumstances, but especially in the circumstances, present and past, of the United States. 
Elsewhere, Hampton stresses that the punishments given to those who commit moral injuries 
ought not to express that the criminal is of a lower status than the rest of society, lest the 
punishment end up being itself a moral injury.378 Even if the actual punishment given to a 
particular offender in the United States today were not as harsh as typical punishments are (the 
offender is not, for example, subject to random violence in prison), the meaning of criminal law 
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and punishment in the United States has been to confer outsider status and to reject the person 
rather than the wrongdoing.   
 If Hampton used the same approach when examining the criminal justice system in the 
United States and Canada as she did in explaining violence against women and racial hate-crimes 
(committed by non-state actors), she would likely have come to a more modest understanding of 
the capacity of law to morally educate or vindicate victims in actual societies. Unlike thorough 
ideal theorists, Hampton regularly engages with real societies, and she clearly wants her theories 
to be responsive to the most critical injustices of actually existing societies. She is also aware of 
existing social oppression in the form of gender oppression, and she is precisely eager to do 
corrective, reparative justice for that oppression. But her inability to recognize the structural, 
historically entrenched oppressive mechanisms of criminal law distorts her ability to evaluate its 
expressive capacities.  
4. A Non-Ideal Theory of Criminal Law 
A non-ideal theory of criminal punishment in the United States starts not with an ideal 
version of how criminal law ought to work, but with a sober analysis of how it does work, with 
attention to social groups and their subordination and domination. This project has been non-
ideal from the start.  First, it engages in non-ideal theory by beginning with the recognition of 
existing oppression: not only is the criminal justice system a tool of racial and class oppression, 
but everyone who is treated like a criminal is oppressed. Moreover, oppression is a group-based 
concept, and this theory of criminal law has taken the perspective that the basic agents in society 
are “people as members of social groups in relationships of domination and subordination.”379 
The criminal justice system is taken to have a history, and theorizing about the system 
                                               




presupposed historical development rather than as arising from an abstracted, ahistorical “ground 
zero.” A full non-ideal theory account of criminal law would not only engage in the history of 
anti-black oppression in the criminal justice system, but also of the oppression of other racialized 
groups, especially Indigenous Americans, the poor, disabled people, including those with mental 
and intellectual disabilities, LGTBQ+ people, non-citizens, and ethnic minorities.  
Non-ideal theory of criminal law also ought to reveal how existing social structures hide 
oppression. In the United States’ criminal justice system, the role of moral blameworthiness is 
essential. As I argued in chapter 1, the heart of criminal oppression is the idea that those who 
violate criminal laws deserve to be excluded from social and political life. This appears to be a 
neutral reason for exclusion. Unlike race or gender, this exclusion seems to be based on 
something that is within the power of the ‘criminal,’ and not on some arbitrary characteristic. 
The fact that criminal exclusion purportedly relies on a moral principle and not on an arbitrary 
personal characteristic is what makes it so amenable for use as a tool of racism or class 
oppression.  
As I noted, Chiao’s work makes an important intervention in philosophy of criminal law 
and punishment at a very general level, just as social contract theory introduced some important 
concepts into political philosophy. For the most part, philosophers of crime and punishment have 
treated criminal law as its own silo, distinct from the principles that govern the rest of society 
and operating on principles of interpersonal morality that are backed by strong state-based 
coercion. At this highly general level, Chiao captures an important fact about the nature of 
criminal law: it is a political construct, and because it uses the coercive force of the state, it needs 
a political justification, not a moral one. Kelly’s work, which does not employ the same kinds of 




between criminal liability, which is a determination that is necessarily limited in scope because it 
is a legal proceeding, and moral blameworthiness, which is an interpersonal determination that 
allows for a variety of responses from individuals.  
The implication of Chiao’s general point that criminal law is a political institution is that 
it is illegitimate for it to expel people from the political community. The distinctive harm of 
criminal oppression is exclusion from the social and political community for putative moral 
unfitness. But if the only justified criminal law is an institution that punishes violations of the 
system of social cooperation, not for moral violations, it ought not socially and politically 
exclude. This is consistent with Kelly’s theory that, even if we wanted it to, the tools of criminal 
law do not allow for the type of fine-grained evaluation of motives, backgrounds, excusing 
conditions, and unfair social burdens that are required for making determinations of moral 
blameworthiness.  
One might object that I have just criticized Chiao and Hampton for their ideal theories, 
but it seems that I am helping myself to a helpful conclusion of Chiao’s ideal theory, specifically 
that social and political exclusion are always unjust even for those who have been duly convicted 
of serious crimes. While many conclusions of ideal theory cannot apply to the non-ideal societies 
we live in because they are based on idealizing abstractions, there is some role that ideal theory 
can play. It cannot address issues of corrective justice because the conclusions that are drawn 
from ideal theory do not take into account how institutions and even people have been influenced 
by injustice and oppression. As I noted before, an ideal theory of justice might be able to identify 
that treating people unequally because of their race is unjust, it cannot come up with principles of 
how to correct for a history of racial injustice. But, ideal theories can set out basic principles of 




meeting the standards of justice. That is, they can often pick out injustice even though they 
cannot point the direction toward repairing the injustice.   
How do we distinguish between helpful insights of ideal theory and irrelevant 
conclusions that obscure existing oppression? As an example, I will return to Mills’ argument 
that radical feminists and critical race theorists do not take issue with the liberal principle that all 
persons are equal. They take issue with the claim that our contemporary societies offer anything 
like equality. But, feminist theorists like Susan Okin and Carole Pateman take issue with the 
public/private distinction. To sort out the distinction between a valid political principle like the 
moral equality of all people and a problematic conclusion that results from idealizing abstraction, 
such as the public/private distinction, we must more carefully trace the idealizing abstractions. 
The idealizing abstraction in this example is that the family does not have oppression built into 
it. Therefore, the family presents a special case, different than the other spheres of distributive 
justice, to which the principles of justice do not apply. The public/private distinction emerges as 
a way to shield the family from the same demanding norms of liberty and equality that shape the 
public sphere, thus reinforcing gender subordination while maintaining the veneer of 
egalitarianism. In contrast, the principle that political institutions ought to treat everyone, 
regardless of gender, equally, comes from the insight that people are moral equals in the state of 
nature, that is, outside of political institutions. Thus, they ought to be treated as equals within the 
political institutions.  
The same distinction can be drawn between two claims that arise from Chiao’s theory of 
criminal law as public law. The first is that criminal law ought not exclude people from the social 
and political community. The second is that criminal law functions to promote a system of social 




in Chiao’s work can be traced back to the insight that the criminal law is a political institution, 
not an institution for giving people what they deserve based on pre-political, interpersonal moral 
norms. The criminal law then only applies in the political context, that is, to people who are 
within the political society.  This is like the principle of equality in the social contract theory 
tradition. The problem is not in the identification that all people are morally equal or that that 
they should be treated as equals by the institutions of society. The problematic abstraction occurs 
when it is assumed that because they are moral equals in the state of nature, everyone is an equal 
contractor so the resulting political institutions treat people equally. Non-exclusion as a principle 
of criminal law is not based on the abstraction of a society that is actually a system of mutual 
cooperation, but instead is a regulating principle for what a just society should look like. It is 
appropriate for measuring whether a given criminal justice system is just or not because it is a 
requirement for a just criminal law. It is problematic when it is assumed that everyone is equally 
included in the system of mutual cooperation and not excluded by criminal law. If we apply the 
ideal version of Chiao’s criminal law to the United States, we might be led to believe that the 
criminal justice system in the United States can actually function to promote social cooperation. 
Because the American criminal justice system does not actually work at all like Chiao’s criminal 
law as public law, we cannot follow his conclusion that the criminal law in the United States 
functions to reinforce shared social norms.  
Moreover, Kelly’s arguments about the inability of criminal law to make moral 
determinations and the necessity of a theory of punishment that is more circumspect about the 
limitations of criminal law offer independent, non-ideal theory-based support for the argument 
that criminal law ought not socially and politically exclude criminals, even those duly convicted 





I have argued that the feminist expressivist justification for using the criminal law to combat 
gender-based justice is wrongheaded because it idealizes the criminal justice system, abstracting 
away from its history of oppression, including racial oppression. Nevertheless, Hampton’s 
arguments are compelling because in American society the criminal law has so often seemed like 
the only institution interested in justice. Considering the society that we live in, it is 
understandable that oppressed people would seek justice in the criminal law and would find 
vindication when individual wrongdoers are punished. I would not be honest if I did not admit to 
feeling vindicated when Harvey Weinstein was found guilty of sexual assault or when the men 
who killed Ahmaud Arbury where arrested. There are times that retributivists are criticized as 
wanting revenge, and certainly some aspects of the American criminal justice system point that 
way. But what drives so many people to this theory, whether or not they are scholars or lay 
people, is a sense of the need to vindicate the rights of victims and to do something toward 
righting a wrong. This is what makes Hampton’s theory compelling: it is able to wed the idea of 
vindication of victims’ rights and the chance to change social norms to government action.  
This theory is compelling also because we have made the same mistake that Hampton 
has. We believe that the problems with the criminal justice system are external to the system, not 
part of its basic structure. But a non-ideal theory approach that centers the historical development 
of the system as well as taking proper account of the ways that it is operating in the world as it 
exists right now point toward the conclusion that this system is intrinsically oppressive. We 
cannot use it to promote social cooperation or communicate the moral equality of each member 




have an ideal criminal law without racism or dehumanizing treatment. Our ideal criminal law 
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